The Leak and the Craft: A Hard Line Proposal to Stop Unaccountable Disclosures of Law Enforcement Information

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THE LEAK AND THE CRAFT:
A HARD LINE PROPOSAL TO STOP UNACCOUNTABLE DISCLOSURES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION

John Q. Barrett

INTRODUCTION

The critics of Kenneth W. Starr accused him, in the five-plus years that he served as the multi-tasked Independent Counsel, of many...
failings, mistakes, and improprieties. One of the most prevalent charges was one that has significance to lawyers and resonates with the general public's sense of bad behavior by prosecutors: the allegation that Starr and/or members of his staff "leaked" information.

This general accusation was, of course, imprecise. It also might have been overbroad. Prosecutorial "leaks" include such plain illegalities as disclosing grand jury information to the media or other unauthorized persons, and also the much less regulated practice of re-
leasing non-public law enforcement information. Although it may turn out that Starr and/or members of his staff illegally disclosed grand jury information, we already know—because we in the public learned only much later, and through lawful processes that made the information public, of grand jury secrets that Starr and his staff knew at much earlier points in time but did not "leak"—that they did not do so systematically. Indeed, Starr's Office of Independent Counsel was one of technical—indeed, perhaps overly technical—and very competent legality.

On the precise topic of prosecutors and other office employees talking about their work to outsiders, such as the media, Starr's office often stated its commitment to adhere to all of the laws and general policies against grand jury leaks and other undesirable information disclosures that can be found in prosecutors' offices at every level of government. For example, in an early press release, Starr emphatically announced that he would tolerate no improper disclosures of information by any member of his office staff:

A hallmark of this investigation from its inception has been that there have been no unauthorized or improper disclosures of information. When I was appointed Independent Counsel, I adopted and implemented a policy centralizing our contact with the press to assure that there would not be even inadvertent disclosures of information. I also received the assurance of each member of my staff that he or she understands and will abide by this policy. I am certain that these steps have worked and that they effectively have guarded against the dissemination of information to people outside of the investigation . . . .

When I took my oath of office I pledged to conduct this investi-

5. See infra Part I.B.
6. One example of grand jury information that did not leak is the substance of Hillary Clinton's January 1996 testimony before a Whitewater grand jury sitting in Washington, D.C. Although we now know that Starr's deputy, Hickman Ewing, Jr., found Mrs. Clinton's testimony to be so incredible that he drafted a proposed indictment of her later in 1996, this information did not become public until Ewing was subpoenaed to testify about perspectives and deliberations within Starr's office by defendant Susan McDougal during her criminal contempt trial—which was her second prosecution by Starr's office—almost three years later. See, e.g., Pete Yost, Starr Aide Tells of Questioning Clintons' Credibility, Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 1999, at A10.
7. Apart from the leak allegations, Starr's legal adversaries and other less-invested critics said that he was obsessed with legal technicalities and lacked the judgment and broader sense of perspective that a better prosecutor would have brought to his work. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 553, 559 (1999) (describing Starr's September 1998 referral to the House of Representatives of potential impeachment information regarding President Clinton as "an example of a prosecutorial approach that mechanically applies the facts of a case to possible charges, rather than screening those charges through the use of prosecutorial discretion"). See generally Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 723 (1999) (finding that Starr acted within the legal boundaries during his investigation).
gation with objectivity, integrity and with due respect to the rights and reputations of the individuals involved in, or affected by, the investigation. We have and will abide by all of the obligations imposed upon us to protect the integrity of the grand jury process and our ethical obligations as professionals, including those requiring the secrecy of our proceedings.8

Mr. Starr repeated this position in various ways over his years of service.9


9. See, e.g., Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, Nov. 25, 1994 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <http://www.oicstarr.com> ("Secrecy has been and will continue to be a hallmark of this investigation. However, we have no control over what may appear in the media based upon information obtained from sources outside of the investigation and, consequently, we must not and will not comment on the reports that have appeared this week."); Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, May 19, 1995 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <http://www.oicstarr.com> ("We have no control over what may appear in the media based upon information obtained from sources outside of the investigation. As we have stated previously, we have been and will continue to be bound by strict standards of secrecy."); Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, Aug. 28, 1995 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <http://www.oicstarr.com> ("It is the normal practice of the Office of the Independent Counsel not to comment on any aspect of our investigation, including any reports which may appear in the media. A statement of 'no comment' neither affirms nor denies the substance of the question posed. That will continue to be this Office's practice to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the investigation. Confidentiality has been and will continue to be a hallmark of this investigation. However, we have no control over what may appear in the media based upon information obtained from sources outside of the investigation and, consequently, we must not and will not comment on those reports."); Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, Feb. 29, 1996 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <http://www.oicstarr.com> ("This Office has adopted the professional practices of accountability of the United States Department of Justice, which are consistent with the highest standards of professional conduct. Our responsibility as prosecutors, and as representatives of the United States, strongly discourages us from commenting on matters of substance regarding the then-ongoing trial of James McDougal, Susan McDougal and then Arkansas Governor Jim Guy Tucker]. It is important for advocates to confine their legal arguments to the judge and jury, in accordance with the law."); Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, Feb. 18, 1997 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <http://www.oicstarr.com> ("We reaffirm that it is the normal practice of the Office of the Independent Counsel not to comment on any aspect of our investigation, including reports which may appear in the media. A statement of 'no comment' neither affirms nor denies the substance of the question posed. That will continue to be this Office's general practice to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the investigation."); Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, June 25, 1997 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <http://www.oicstarr.com> ("Federal law and traditional practice dictate that this process of investigation occur in secret, except that witnesses are themselves free to speak out publicly. This Office thus has no control over what witnesses might say to the media, nor over any publicity that might result."); Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, Jan. 21, 1998 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <http://www.oicstarr.com> ("Because of con-
What the "leak" allegations were suggesting in their vague generalities was something more basic about Mr. Starr's personal conduct and his supervision of the numerous, very serious federal criminal investigations that his office conducted. Starr and members of his office staff plainly did, on numerous occasions over the years, talk to reporters in detail about the thinking, the ongoing investigative work, the preliminary findings, the past and pending cases, and the possible next steps of the Office of Independent Counsel. Some of this speech occurred "on the record," which meant that the speakers were on broadcast media or authorized print reporters to publish these statements as verbatim quotations attributed to named persons. Such statements

helped to advance public understanding of Starr's work, or at least his and his staff's views of it. These statements and interviews also were available in the sunlight to be evaluated as prosecutors' statements about ongoing investigative and prosecutorial activity.\(^\text{11}\)

But not all of the statements and pieces of investigative information that emanated from Starr's office were on the record and attributed to named persons. At various times, Mr. Starr himself spoke,\(^\text{12}\) and other members of his staff seem to have spoken,\(^\text{13}\) to reporters about their work "on background" or "off the record."\(^\text{14}\) This conduct put infor-

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Starr's answers to questions about his decision to continue representing private law clients while also serving as independent counsel, and including an appearance by Starr's former deputy, Mark Tuohey, who defended Starr and his office against various charges by another guest, James Carville); Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Remarks at the University of Minnesota School of Law's United States v. Nixon Symposium (Oct. 24, 1998) (transcript available in the Federal Document Clearing House ("FDCH") Political Transcripts); Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Remarks at the Mecklenberg Bar Foundation, Charlotte, North Carolina (June 1, 1998) (transcript available in the Federal News Service); Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Address Before the San Antonio Bar Association Meeting (May 1, 1998) (transcript available in the Federal News Service) (reporting Starr's speech on executive privilege); Susan McDougal Sentenced to Two Years by Federal Trial (CNN television broadcast, Aug. 20, 1996) (transcript available in LEXIS) (broadcasting Starr's press conference outside the federal courthouse in Little Rock, Arkansas); Text of Whitewater Special Counsel's News Conference (CNN television broadcast, June 22, 1995) (transcript available in LEXIS) (broadcasting Starr's press conference following the arraignment of then Arkansas Governor Jim Guy Tucker); Today Show: Part I: Ken Starr Discusses Investigation of President Bill Clinton (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 9, 1999) (transcript available in LEXIS); Today Show: Part II: Ken Starr Discusses Investigation of President Clinton and First Lady (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 10, 1999) (transcript available in LEXIS).

11. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Nominee Faces Questions But No Strong Opposition, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1997, at 22 (quoting then-United States Attorney and Deputy Attorney General-designate Eric H. Holder, Jr.'s testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee: "I don't personally have any problem with the [public] pronouncements that Judge Starr has made.").

12. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Kenneth Starr, Trapped, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1997, § 6 (Magazine), at 42 (reporting that "Starr provided background assistance for the article [about him] but declined to be quoted directly").

13. See Steven Brill, Pressgate, Brill's Content, Aug. 1998, at 122, 131-32. Brill noted:

As a general matter, in response to an opening "Have you ever . . . ?" question, Starr hesitates, then acknowledges that he has often talked to various reporters without allowing his name to be used and that his prime deputy, Jackie Bennett, Jr., has been actively involved in 'briefing' reporters, especially after the Lewinsky story broke. "I have talked with reporters on background on some occasions," he says, "but Jackie has been the primary person involved in that. He has spent much of his time talking to individual reporters."

Id.

14. According to one study of journalistic ethics, written by a former reporter who had become a journalism professor, "off the record" does not even have a single meaning in the world of journalism. "Depending on the customs of the city and the reporter's previous dealings with a particular source, it [speaking 'off the record'] may mean promising not to use the information obtained at all, or to use the information only indirectly, or not to attribute the information to the source." Bruce M. Swain,
mation into the public domain without the accountability that comes from seeing, reading, or at least knowing who deployed it.

Starr’s decision to speak, and apparently to authorize his subordinates to speak, other than on the record was a choice. It was a policy decision by the person who was, within his areas of jurisdiction, the senior law enforcement official in the United States government.\(^5\) In the future, Starr’s successor senior federal prosecutors should reconsider that decision and, in my view, decide to take a very different course.

This Article explores what that course should look like. Part I defines and analyzes the two types of information—grand jury secrets and law enforcement information—that Independent Counsel Starr “leaked” according to the allegations that plagued his investigation. Part II examines the various restrictions on a prosecutor’s ability to disclose law enforcement information. Finally, Part III sets out strict guidelines, characterized by accountability, professionalism, and uniformity, for the disclosure of law enforcement information by the government.

I. THE “LEAK” ALLEGATIONS AGAINST INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STARR

From 1994 through 1999, Independent Counsel Starr and his staff were accused of two very different kinds of leaking. One species of leak, plainly illegal, is disclosing grand jury information to anyone

Reporters’ Ethics 47 (1978). Indeed, Washington, D.C., the site of much of Starr’s investigative activity and much of his office’s alleged leaking, has been described as “a city with whole hierarchies of terminology for off-the-record material: background, deep background, and deep deep background, government sources, high official sources, and White House sources.” Id. at 48-49.

How do I know that people in Starr’s office gave information to reporters on background or off-the-record? As a general matter, it was obvious in the press coverage of Starr’s investigation. Press reports at various points contained unattributed information about evidence, strategy, or “thinking” inside Starr’s office that, if reporters were not simply making it up (and I do not believe that many reporters make things up wholesale), could have come only from someone with inside knowledge of the Office of Independent Counsel. More directly, as I received telephone calls from reporters seeking my comments during 1998 and 1999 about the Independent Counsel Law and various developments in Starr’s investigations of President Clinton, Monica Lewinsky, and others, some reporters would flat out tell me—perhaps in violation of their own professional ethics, but that is beyond the scope of what I am addressing in this Article—that they were receiving lots of inside information from Starr’s office. My general impression is that this happened five to ten times. In some of these instances, later public disclosures, including on-the-record statements by Starr and his associates, confirmed the accuracy of what the reporters had told me earlier that they had learned in some kind of confidence from Starr’s office.

who is not authorized by law to receive it. The other species of "leak," proscribed by no federal statute or regulation and generally permitted by the customs of federal law enforcement, is sharing non-public, but non-grand jury, information with friends, political supporters, and selected reporters.

A. Leak Type 1: Grand Jury Secrets

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), a procedural rule that has the force of any substantive federal statute, protects the secrecy of "matters occurring before" federal grand juries. Although there is significant definitional dispute and divided case law on the question of what constitutes a "matter" occurring before a federal grand jury, the protection defined by Rule 6(e) certainly includes, at its core, verbatim accounts of witness testimony to federal grand juries. Rule 6(e) makes it a crime, subject to prosecution for criminal contempt and other charges, for any federal prosecutor, or for any prosecutor's non-lawyer colleague who is authorized under Rule 6(e) to receive grand jury information, to reveal any grand jury secrets to any unauthorized person.

In the case of Independent Counsel Starr, much of what we know about his grand jury investigations comes from disclosures that plainly were not violations of Rule 6(e) by him or his staff. Some of the leading sources of public information about what transpired before Starr's grand juries were, on the record or indirectly, talkative grand jury witnesses themselves, along with their friends, attorneys, spokespersons, and political supporters. Each of these persons is, of course, not restricted by the prohibitions of Rule 6(e). Other disclosures of

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16. See infra Part I.A.
17. See infra Part I.B.
20. See generally Sara Sun Beale et al., Grand Jury Law & Practice § 5.06 (2d ed. 1998) (citing numerous decisions and other authorities); Howard W. Goldstein, Grand Jury Practice § 3.04[2], at 3-44 to 3-49 & nn.84-100 (1998) (same); Daniel C. Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket, 36 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 339, 340-41 (1999) (same). In the District of Columbia Circuit, however, the federal Court of Appeals recently clarified—in its decision exonerating the Office of Independent Counsel Starr on a particular charge that it had leaked grand jury information—that Rule 6(e)'s secrecy rule regarding "matters occurring before the grand jury" refers literally and narrowly only to those matters, and not to prosecutors' non-grand jury investigations or their personal thought processes. See In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091 (Office of Independent Counsel Contempt Proceeding), 1999 WL 709977, at *5-*9 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 7, 1999) (per curiam).
21. See Goldstein, supra note 20, § 3.04[2], at 3-42 & n.76 (citing decisions).
22. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2). Rule 6(e) also itemizes specific circumstances in which a person who otherwise would be subject to this prohibition may disclose matters occurring before a federal grand jury. See id. Rule 6(e)(3).
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grand jury information came directly from Starr himself, but through processes that conformed to Rule 6(e). The most notable example of these disclosures is Starr's statutorily-required and court-authorized 1998 transmissions to the House of Representatives of grand jury and other information that led to the impeachment of President Clinton.

Other scraps of grand jury-related information reached the public domain through processes that cannot fairly be blamed on Starr or his staff.

None of these disclosures negates the possibility that Starr or some other person on his staff—an attorney, a law enforcement agent, a consultant, or a worker in a support position—violated the Rule 6(e) prohibition. In early 1998, the private attorneys who were representing President Clinton, Mrs. Clinton, and other White House aides to the President filed complaints to that effect in the United States Dis-

25. See Starr Report, supra note 24. It was the House, not Starr, that summarily released this information in toto to the public—to Starr's great surprise and enduring consternation. See Testimony of Kenneth W. Starr before the House Judiciary Committee, Nov. 19, 1998, at 14, available in the FDCH Congressional Testimony on LEXIS (testifying that "the public disclosure or nondisclosure of the referral and the backup materials was a decision our office did not make—and lawfully could not make"); Today Show: Part I: Ken Starr Discusses His Interview of President Bill Clinton (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 9, 1999) (transcript available in LEXIS) (broadcasting Starr's explanation a year after the event that "[w]e made nothing public. We sent the information [contained in his impeachment referral] to the Congress of the United States, and the Congress, for better or worse, chose to make this public in an extraordinary way, including putting it on the Internet and the like, without any screening. . . . I was horrified. . . . I genuinely did [expect them to read it first]. It never occurred to me that—that they wouldn't."). But cf. Michael Isikoff, Uncovering Clinton: A Reporter's Story 353 (1999) (describing Starr's decision, after he learned that the House of Representatives planned to release publicly his impeachment referral, not to send Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich a staff-drafted letter warning that the referral "included 'highly explicit' material that is 'almost certainly inappropriate for wide public dissemination'.")
26. In March 1999, for example, Ms. Freda Alexander, the foreperson of the Washington, D.C. grand jury to which Starr's office had presented evidence in its investigation of President Clinton, Monica Lewinsky, and others in 1998, spoke on the record to reporters about that work, apparently because she misunderstood private legal advice she received about suing a former employer who had, she claimed, discharged her for missing work while she was serving as a grand juror. See Susan B. Glasser, Forewoman Would Have Voted To Indict Clinton: Grand Jury Leader in Lewinsky Probe Breaks Secrecy, Says President Lied, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1999, at A1; see also Grand Jury Forewoman Now Silent, Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 1999, at A3 (reporting a meeting between Starr and Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia about this matter).
district Court for the District of Columbia, a venue where Starr's office presented evidence to some of the federal grand juries that played roles in his investigations. Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson subsequently determined that these litigants had identified at least twenty-four media reports in 1998 that were prima facie evidence of Rule 6(e) violations by Starr's office and appointed a Special Master to investigate. This "leaks" investigation reportedly has exonerated Starr and his staff, but it appears that the court has not formally concluded its investigation as of fall 1999.

Although outsiders know little about the Special Master's investigation, it will not be surprising if this investigation concludes that Starr and his staff committed no clear violation of Rule 6(e). At the level of


28. Contrary to much of the contemporaneous press reporting, which asserted that there had been some kind of judicial finding that Starr had violated Rule 6(e), this decision meant only that President Clinton's counsel had filed discrete and intelligible allegations to this effect that were sufficient to shift the burden of proving non-violation to Starr. See Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See generally Judge Patricia M. Wald, A Whitewater Legacy: Running the Rapids of Constitutional Law, The Leslie H. Arps Memorial Lecture, Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Oct. 26, 1999) (stating that this decision was "widely but wrongly hailed" as proving the truth of allegations that Starr had leaked grand jury information).


30. See Jerry Seper, Secret Report to Court Clears Starr, Staff of Illegal Leaking, Wash. Times, Sept. 16, 1999, at A3 (quoting as the source for this report "a lawyer" who is "not a current or former member of the independent counsel's office" and "who has not read the document [Special Master Kern's report] but is familiar with its contents"); see also Clearing Ken Starr, Editorial, Wash. Times, Sept. 17, 1999, at A18 (editorializing that "sources familiar with Judge Kern's secret report told this newspaper's Jerry Seper that the charges against Mr. Starr were found to be entirely without merit"). Interestingly, as of early November 1999, no newspaper other than The Washington Times has reported on whether Special Master Kern has submitted to Chief Judge Johnson a report concerning the alleged leaks of grand jury information by Starr and/or his staff.
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office policy and group knowledge, I have a hard time believing that so many responsible and well-regarded persons would have stooped to such obvious and serious law breaking, or that not even one whistleblower would have come forward at some point if they had. I suspect that what may have happened, instead, is that one Starr staff member at a time—acting individually, in private, without seeking anyone’s authorization, and under great stress (some of it caused by the unfair and inaccurate media criticism that the office was receiving)—spoke in confidence to one reporter at a time about selected aspects of the Office’s investigative work and did not pause to consider whether they were revealing Rule 6(e) grand jury secrets. I am guessing, in other words, that any leakers in Starr’s office were solo operators whose colleagues did not really witness their misconduct.

If my supposition is correct that “Starr’s” leaks of grand jury information actually were isolated instances of misconduct by separate individuals not acting in concert, it will be very unusual if the Special Master or any leaks investigator succeeds in proving that such misconduct occurred.Leaks investigations generally seem not to succeed, even when someone is in fact culpable for making a prohibited disclosure of information. First of all, the reporters who receive leaks al-
most never give up their sources. Leak investigators know this and, if they also understand the value of free and aggressive reporting in a constitutional democracy, they tend not even to ask reporters, much less seek to enforce subpoenas that might compel them to describe, who told them what and when. This reliable silence by reporters must in turn give government leakers great confidence that their contacts will not give them up. Thus, the leakers also seem generally to tough it out by offering false denials. Finally, leak investigators shy away from polygraph examinations and other investigative methods that might identify leakers or move them to admit their misconduct.

There is a further problem in leak investigations that is particular to leaks of grand jury information. As noted above, Rule 6(e) and the case law interpreting it are quite unclear about exactly what kinds of disclosures it prohibits. A disclosure of actual grand jury testimony would clearly be illegal, but in Starr's case, no such information from any of his grand jury investigations has appeared in media in a form that suggests it came from such a blatantly illegal disclosure. Beyond
the fairly narrow category of grand jury testimony leaking, it is unclear what Rule 6(e) encompasses. In his well-noted April 15, 1998, interview with Steven Brill, Starr voiced the narrow interpretation that Rule 6(e) does not encompass the pre-grand jury statements of witnesses who later may testify before a grand jury. This view may not be commendable, but it is not inconsistent with the statements and conduct of numerous Department of Justice ("DOJ") prosecutors. It will be surprising if a federal appellate court, at the end of the substantive litigation over grand jury secrecy in the context of Starr's investigations, holds plainly and directly that Starr's reading of Rule 6(e) is incorrect and illegal.

B. Leak Type 2: Law Enforcement Information

Leaks of grand jury testimony itself are, of course, the easiest leaks to identify. If an investigator with the powers of federal law enforcement is determined to interrogate the prosecutors and other persons who had access to grand jury testimony that leaked, such leaks also should be the easiest ones to trace back to a limited number of possible sources.

Beyond the core area that is defined by the rules of grand jury secrecy, however, there is a wealth of non-grand jury information that law enforcement personnel possess and, when it suits some purpose to do so, share with the media. In Starr's case, without belaboring the evidence that someone in Starr's office violated Rule 6(e) is a quotation from or a description of actual grand jury testimony. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-228, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17290, at *10-*33 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 1998) (order to show cause) (Johnson, C.J.) (redacted version of opinion) (listing the 24 media reports that, in the Court's view, are prima facie evidence that someone in Starr's office violated Rule 6(e)).

39. See Brill, supra note 13, at 122.
40. See id. at 132 ("Well, it is definitely not grand jury information, if you are talking about what witnesses tell FBI agents or us before they testify before the grand jury or about related matters," he [Starr] replies. "So, it's not 6-E.") (emphasis in original).
41. See In re Sealed Case, No. 99-3091 (Office of Independent Counsel Contempt Proceeding), 1999 WL 709977 at *5 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 7, 1999) (stating that the DOJ had, as amicus curiae in this litigation, "generally support[ed]" Independent Counsel Starr's position, which the Court upheld, regarding the "coverage" of Rule 6(e)).
42. See Robert Reno, Starr's Loose Lips Don't Sink Ships, Just Our Confidence, Newsday, June 17, 1998, at A51 (according to syndicated columnist who is the brother of Attorney General Janet Reno: "Basically, here's how it works, folks. There are more than 3,000 state and federal prosecutors in America .... [Q]uite a number of them are gushing faucets who know exactly how to play selective footsie with the media in ways that make each of their jobs easier."); see, e.g., Robert E. Precht, We Have Seen The Enemy: Scenes From A Trial, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 539, 545 & nn.42-43 (1999) (describing how press reports prior to trial in the World Trade Center bombing trial said that the government had located a gas station attendant who recalled pumping gas into a yellow Ryder van driven by defendant Mohammed Salameh after he had reported it stolen and a few hours before the explosion) (citing Mary B.W. Tabor, Witnesses Report Seeing Suspects on Eve of Blast, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1993,
details here, there consistently were abundant disclosures to media, regarding "Whitewater" and all the other matters within Starr's constellation of jurisdiction, by sources who obviously were members of federal law enforcement. These disclosures began in 1993—when Mr. Starr was still in private practice and well-regarded by persons who spanned the political spectrum—as the DOJ was considering criminal referrals from the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") regarding James McDougal, Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan, and James and Susan McDougal's real estate and other dealings through the years with Bill and Hillary Clinton.\(^3\) These disclosures continued in 1994 after Attorney General Reno had appointed Robert B. Fiske, Jr. to investigate Whitewater matters as a special and independent prosecu-

at B4 (attributing the report to unnamed "Federal officials" and "Federal investigators") and Peg Tyre, *Feds: Salameh Drove Bomb Van*, Newsday, Mar. 24, 1993, at 3 (quoting "New Jersey FBI Director James Esposito" in the story but attributing only to "[s]ources" the information about what "a witness told federal agents"); Jerry Capeci & Gene Mustain, *Jailed Gotti Isn't Crying 'Uncle'* , N.Y. Daily News, Aug. 4, 1999, at 3 (reporting allegations by John J. Gotti's attorney that the federal government leaked videotapes of Gotti's conversations with visitors at the federal prison in Marion, Illinois, to embarrass him); Warren Wilson, *Microsoft's Gates Hissed, But Herbold Whistles Back*, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Oct. 15, 1998, at C1 (reporting statement by Microsoft Executive Vice President Bob Herbold that, as its antitrust suit against Microsoft was about to commence, the federal government leaked "damaging but one-sided 'snippets' of information" about Microsoft to generate negative publicity about the company). See generally Eric H. Holder, Jr. & Kevin A. Ohlson, *Dealing with the Media in High-Profile White Collar Crime Cases: The Prosecutor's Dilemma*, in *White Collar Crime*, at B-1 (1995) (discussing prosecutor cooperation with media and the guidance provided to prosecutors by DOJ media policy); Doyle McManus et al., *Learning Curve Hits Independent Counsel*, L.A. Times, June 17, 1998, at A1 (quoting former Carter Administration DOJ official Terrence B. Adamson: "Providing background [briefings] is something that prosecutors have done for a long time."). But see Frank A. Aukofer, *Babbitt Likely Will Be Cleared: Report Says Interior Secretary's Role in Casino Issue is Being Investigated by Counsel*, Milwaukee J.-Sentinel, Aug. 12, 1999, at 3 (quoting Michael Gauldin, spokesman for Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, regarding Independent Counsel Carol Elder Bruce's 1998-1999 investigation of Mr. Babbitt: "She conducted a very thorough and professional investigation without a lot of the confrontationalism and leaking that have been the hallmark of other independent counsels.").

\(^3\) For example, Susan Schmidt and Michael Isikoff reported:
The RTC, according to documents and interviews with sources familiar with the probe, told federal prosecutors more than a year ago that Bill and Hillary Clinton and other principals in a dozen corporations doing business with Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan during the mid-1980s could possibly have benefited from an alleged [check-kiting] scheme [to drain funds from the thrift], though there is no evidence they had direct knowledge of it. Susan Schmidt & Michael Isikoff, *Dealings of Clinton Partners Were Referred to Justice Dept. in 1992*, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 1993, at A3. Although sources for this reporting were of course not identified, the tenor of the story suggested that they were employees of the Resolution Trust Corporation, not the Department of Justice. But see Susan Schmidt & Michael Isikoff, *Arkansas Probe Sensitive From Start: Investigation of Collapsed S&L Affected by Links With the Clintons*, Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1994, at A1 (chronicling "[t]he history of the Madison investigation, pieced together from interviews with Justice Department and RTC officials along with documents from the case").
tor within the DOJ. Disclosures continued after the independent counsel law was enacted later that year and Reno triggered it in the Whitewater, Vincent Foster, and Webster Hubbell matters, resulting in the appointment of Independent Counsel Starr. These disclosures continued from 1994 to 1998 as Starr was assigned to investigate numerous other matters.

II. PROSECUTORS' ABILITY TO DISCLOSE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION

The disclosures of non-grand jury law enforcement information that flowed from Starr's office are typical of what federal law enforcement sources give to the media in criminal investigations, and certainly in criminal investigations that involve public officials or other persons and events of notoriety, throughout the country. In this part, I will describe how this is possible by considering the relative absence of restrictions on the government's ability to engage in this kind of talking and revealing about people and matters it is investigating by methods other than the grand jury.

A. Rule 6(e)

The rule of grand jury secrecy is a limited restriction on the ability of law enforcement personnel to disclose information. Rule 6(e) is, as described earlier, not a broad prohibition and it is not easy to en-

44. See, e.g., Susan Schmidt, '84 Clinton Panel Names as a Suspect: RTC Asks Fiske to Probe Whether $60,500 in S&L Funds Was Diverted, Wash. Post, Apr. 2, 1994, at A1 (reporting that RTC investigators in 1993 named the 1984 Clinton gubernatorial campaign as a suspect in their criminal investigation of Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan, and that 10 of RTC's criminal referrals to the DOJ regarding Madison were forwarded to special prosecutor Fiske). Although this reporting also did not identify its sources, the tenor of the story again suggested that they were RTC, and not DOJ (including Mr. Fiske's office), employees.
45. See e.g., Ellen Joan Pollock, Starr Takes Over Whitewater Probe as Decisions Must Be Reached on Batch of Possible Indictments, Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1994, at A14 (reporting, according to unnamed "lawyers involved in the investigation," that Starr had "substantial documentary evidence" showing that Webster Hubbell had billed personal expenses to his former law firm and soon could seek his indictment on mail fraud and other charges, and that Hubbell's "attorney declined to comment").
46. See, e.g., Bob Woodward, Shadow. Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate 398 (1999) ("The media stories about the Lewinsky matter were obviously coming, at least in part, from Starr's office."). But see William Raspberry, Just Two Questions, Wash. Post, Nov. 21, 1998, at A21 (quoting a letter from Starr to Kendall: "When you look at the information that we had in our office, and [at] the FBI, as opposed to information that you had access to, it [the former] never entered the public domain." He [Starr] mentioned specifically the celebrated blue dress with its DNA secrets. "Those were never in the public domain because you did not have a witness in your joint defense arrangements whom you could debrief." (first two sets alterations in original) (emphasis in original).
47. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
Although it does apply more directly to investigations, such as public corruption investigations, that are conducted more before grand juries and through their compulsory processes than drug and other street crime investigations, which law enforcement agents tend to develop outside the grand jury context, Rule 6(e) simply is not the all-encompassing limit on government disclosures of information that criminal defense attorneys claim it to be.

B. Department of Justice Regulations

Beyond Rule 6(e), the policies of the DOJ also are not, as restrictions on information dissemination go, very restrictive or demanding. The DOJ's formal regulations in this area, which generally apply to court-appointed independent counsel who were or are in operation under the independent counsel law, are filled with generalities. In the context of indicted criminal cases and filed civil proceedings, the DOJ recognizes both the patent impropriety of releasing information "for the purpose of influencing a trial" and the existence of "valid reasons for making available to the public information about the administration of the law." How should one, in the words of the regulations themselves, "strike a fair balance" between these competing values? The DOJ candidly admits that finding this balance "depends largely on the exercise of sound judgment" by DOJ personnel and by representatives of the media. The regulations do not presume to coach the media on how to behave. For DOJ personnel, however, the regulations contain "Guidelines" that apply to releases of information from the time a person becomes the subject of a criminal investigation until any resulting proceeding is terminated by trial or otherwise. These guidelines define safe harbors (types of information that DOJ personnel generally may disseminate) and rocky shoals (types of information

48. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
49. See Richman, supra note 20, at 342-45.
50. Professor Richman exaggerated only a little when he described the focus on grand jury secrecy as a project in "Plugging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket." Id. at 339.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. § 50.2(b).
57. See id. § 50.2(b)(3)(i)-(iv) (authorizing DOJ personnel, subject to "specific limitations imposed by law or court rule or order," to "make public" a "defendant's name, age, residence, employment, marital status, and similar background information," "[t]he substance or text of the charge," "[t]he identity of the investigating and/or arresting agency and the length or scope of an investigation," and "circumstances immediately surrounding an arrest"). The regulation also directs, however, that where releasing such information would be "highly prejudicial" or "serve no law
that they should not release). The regulations also plainly state that senior officials can and will, in specific circumstances, make ad hoc decisions about what information to release.

The DOJ's internal rulebook for prosecutors, The United States Attorney's Manual, contains further policy guidance in this area. While potentially criminal matters are under investigation but have not yet been indicted, the Manual flatly prohibits "components and personnel of the Department" from "respond[ing] to questions about the existence of an ongoing investigation or comment[ing] on its nature or progress, including such things as the issuance or serving of a subpoena, prior to the public filing of the document." The very next subsection of the Manual, however, defines the following exceptions to this duty:

In matters that have already received substantial publicity, or about which the community needs to be reassured that the appropriate law enforcement agency is investigating the incident, or where release of information is necessary to protect the public interest, safety, or welfare, comments about or confirmation of an ongoing investigation may need to be made. In these unusual circumstances, the involved investigative agency will consult and obtain approval from the United States Attorney or Department Division handling the matter prior to disseminating any information to the media.

These statements encompass the substance of the policy guidance and constitute the only formally codified restraints on federal law enforcement personnel within the DOJ today. Thus, at least as a floor, they are the policy within any DOJ component or any office of independent counsel. It amounts to a system where, in dealing with media and responding to inquiries, each United States Attorney, the Assis-

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58. See id. § 50.2(b)(3)(iv).  
59. See id. § 50.2(b)(6)(i)-(vi) (specifying "[o]bservations about a defendant's character;" "[s]tatices, admissions, confessions, or alibis attributable to a defendant, or the refusal or failure of the accused to make a statement;" references to "invesgative procedures... or to the refusal by the defendant to submit to such tests or examinations;" "[s]tatices concerning the identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses;" "[s]tatements concerning evidence or argument in the case;" and "[r]n opinion as to the accused's guilt, or the possibility of a plea of guilty to the of-

59. See id. § 50.2(b)(9) The Code states:

Since the purpose of this statement is to set forth generally applicable guide-
dines, there will, of course, be situations in which it will limit the release of information which would not be prejudicial under the particular circum-
cstances. If a representative of the DOJ believes that in the interest of the fair administration of justice and the law enforcement process information beyond these guidelines should be released, in a particular case, he shall re-
quest the permission of the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral to do so.

Id.

60. U. S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorney's Manual § 1.7-530(a).  
61. Id. § 1-7.530(b).
tant Attorney General who heads the Criminal Division (along with the Main Justice officials above them, up to and including the Attorney General herself), and each Independent Counsel has blanket permission to determine that "the public interest, safety or welfare" requires the release of non-grand jury information.62

In some instances, the determination whether to release investigative information has been made, formally or informally, as the DOJ's regulations and The United States Attorney's Manual envision: with permission from an official at the United States Attorney level or higher, and in unusual circumstances for specific (and generally valid) reasons, such as reassuring the public about aggressive efforts that federal law enforcement is devoting to a known situation, or about the public's own safety.63 But the DOJ also has experienced the release of information that is contrary to its general policies: individual prosecutors, or agents working under their supervision, deciding on their own to provide information to individual reporters on terms that allow them to use the information while protecting the sources' identities.

C. Legal Ethics Rules

State court ethics rules, which are made applicable to federal attorneys by a new federal statute that took effect in 1999,64 seem not to impose much additional constraint on prosecutors releasing non-public investigative information. American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct ("Model Rule") 3.6, which is the basis for most of the particular state court ethics rules that pertain to lawyer

62. See Levenson, supra note 7, at 564. Under the now-expired independent counsel law, each independent counsel had full legal authority to determine on his own that "public safety, interest or welfare" required him to disclose certain law enforcement information. The statute did not require an independent counsel to consult with the Attorney General or even with a career official in the DOJ before making this kind of determination. In addition, even after an independent counsel followed through on his determination to disclose law enforcement information, the statute gave the attorney general no remedy short of her ultimate, never-exercised power to dismiss the independent counsel for cause. See generally Barrett, supra note 15, at 547 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994), which authorized the attorney general personally to dismiss an independent counsel "for cause").

63. The public statements that Attorney General Reno and other Department officials made about investigative efforts and developments in the days following the bombing of the Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City are one example. See, e.g., Richard A. Serrano & James Risen, Bombing Suspect In Custody: FBI Questions 2 Others as Death Toll Hits 65, L.A. Times, Apr. 22, 1995, at A1 (reporting on Reno's April 21, 1995 press conference where she announced the arrest of Timothy McVeigh). Federal Bureau of Investigation official James K. Kallstrom's public briefings and statements during the early investigation of the crash of TWA flight 800 are another example of the Department deciding, at the highest levels, to release more investigative information than its ordinary policies might dictate. See generally Joe Sexton, The Investigation: The First 36 Days: Behind a Calm Facade, Chaos, Distrust, Valor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1996, at A1 (quoting Kallstrom and describing his close relationship with FBI Director Louis J. Freeh).

speech outside of court, bars lawyers from speaking about investigations or litigation only when they "reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter." Model Rule 3.8, which defines special responsibilities of prosecutors and thus supplements Model Rule 3.6, is similarly directed to the adjudicative, not the investigative, stage of law enforcement lawyering.

It seems that, in the minds of prosecutors who contemplate disclosing investigative information prior to the commencement of formal proceedings, the risk of prejudice to citizens that is the focus of these rules does not rise to the level where it becomes a matter of the prosecutors' professional responsibility as lawyers not to release the information. Indeed, one confirmation that prosecutors do not perceive these ethics rules as significant restraints is the fact that the DOJ, in its recent efforts to effect the repeal of the new statute that puts federal prosecutors under state ethics rules, has made no claim that these particular rules affect how federal attorneys must conduct themselves.

D. Media and Public Culture

The prosecutors and their supervisors who know that there are at least some policy and professional restraints on their abilities to disclose law enforcement information do so today in a public culture that strongly tempts government law enforcement personnel to talk about their work. There are, obviously, an enormous number of media outlets and reporters. These media woo prosecutors and law enforcement agents because they have the content these media need, including crime stories, information about well-known or powerful persons, and facts that can be connected to popular themes, such as negative views of the government and public officials. Reporters also can offer prosecutors and agents credible protection from identification, and thus from consequences of being caught in the act of talking without

66. See, e.g., id. Rule 3.8(e) (directing prosecutors to "exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators" and other colleagues in law enforcement "from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6").
67. See id. Rule 3.8(g) (directing prosecutors, "except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, [to] refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused") (emphasis added).
68. See Testimony of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Mar. 24, 1999, available in the FDHC Congressional Testimony on LEXIS; see also Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 607, 631-33 (1999) (explaining that "prevailing ethical norms," as they apply in "the investigative context," allow "more leeway" to prosecutors than they do to other lawyers).
lawful authorization from an appropriate supervisor.69

For these would-be media sources in law enforcement, reporters' requests for information, and the prospect of publicity about one's work, are undeniably appealing. Telling the government's side of a story, and/or rebutting the anti-government story that the government's adversaries often put out to the media without restraint or honesty, makes sense in the effort to build support in investigative, jurisdictional, bureaucratic, budgetary, public opinion, and other battles.70 Press reports also provide pure ego gratification. Some prosecutors and agents are tempted, while working on the matter at hand, also to think about their own prospects for advancement in law enforcement. They also may start to think about developing their future job opportunities in the private sector, their political support, their prospects for election or nomination to judicial office, and/or their prospects for non-judicial elective office. As these thoughts occur, some lawyers and agents surely come to conclude that talking to the media is one way to build name-recognition and reputation and thus, perhaps, to realize these ambitions.

E. Unaccountable Government Speech About Law Enforcement Matters Is Wrong

Our rules, weak though they are, and the strong statements that public officials—including Attorney General Reno and then-Independent Counsel Starr71—make regularly about the need for law enforcement personnel not to speak about non-public matters, are correct. Law enforcement wields enormous power over the individual. People's lives, jobs, relationships, privacy, and happiness are at stake when the government commences an investigation, and they are not easily restored after the government has disclosed information about who it is investigating and what it is learning about them. As former Secretary of Labor Raymond J. Donovan famously asked after he was prosecuted in state court by an elected District Attorney—not in federal court by an independent counsel, as political and legal lore

69. Cf. Independent Counsel Implosion, Editorial, Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 1999, at A20 ("The subject of leaks is one on which we cannot comment dispassionately. Soliciting leaks, after all, is part of what a vibrant free press does. And it would be rather hypocritical for an organization that thrives on such disclosures also to denounce them.").

70. Cf. Neil A. Lewis, A Court Becomes a Model Of Conservative Pursuits, N.Y. Times, May 24, 1999, at A1 (noting that, during the writer's research regarding the judges of and some of the recent decisions rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, "[m]ore than half of the ... active judges were interviewed ... although most asked that they not be quoted directly or by name"). For an interesting discussion of non-government lawyers using media in efforts to influence prosecutors, see Jonathan M. Moses, Note, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1811, 1837-39 (1995).

71. See supra note 9.
now misremembers this case—"Which office do I go to to get my reputation back?"

Government behavior—the choices we make as we exercise public power—also makes fundamental statements about our values as a general public, and about the values of the individuals who hold governmental positions of power. In criminal prosecution, the right values continue to include, in my view, what Attorney General Robert Jackson described in his famous 1940 speech to DOJ personnel as "[a] sensitiveness to fair play and sportsmanship," as "temper[ing] zeal with human kindness," as "approach[ing the prosecutorial] task with humility." On the specific issue of disclosing law enforcement information outside of court, Jackson recognized that law enforcement entities and personnel simply need to make their choices. The prosecutor "can have citizens investigated and, if he is that kind of person, he can have this done to the tune of public statements and veiled or unveiled intimations." Or law enforcement can choose, based on a principled view of its craft, to behave better than that.

III. A PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYERS

Although leaks are difficult to locate after the fact, they can be reduced hugely, if not prevented altogether, in any law enforcement organization. It simply takes law enforcement leadership that is willing to make clear policy and then to demonstrate, by its own example in following the policy and by its determined, even-handed enforcement efforts that make examples of any violators, its seriousness in taking a hard line against unaccountable disclosures of law enforcement information.

72. See, e.g., Father Andrew M. Greeley, Prosecutors in America Are Out of Control, The Stuart News/Port St. Lucie News, Dec. 19, 1998, at D3 ("If a special counsel is appointed—even on the most flimsy grounds—the cost of your defense is $2 million in addition to the harm done to your reputation and your family life. The costs go even higher when you are indicted. As former Secretary of Labor Raymond Donovan said when he was acquitted in the 1980s, "Where do I go to get my reputation back?").

73. Selwyn Raab, Donovan Cleared of Fraud Charges By Jury in Bronx, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1987, at A1 (quoting Donovan's remarks in a courthouse corridor following his acquittal on all ten counts after an eight-month trial: "The question is, should this indictment have ever been brought? Which office do I go to to get my reputation back? Who will reimburse my company for the economic jail it has been in for two and a half years?").


75. Id. at 3.

76. See generally Green, supra note 68, at 619 (explaining that prosecutorial conduct implicates ethics both when this conduct is subject to legal rules adopted by courts or other bodies that control lawyer conduct, and when prosecutorial conduct involves what to do "in situations where the law offers a choice").

77. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv. L.
For an Attorney General of the United States and her subordinate officials in Main Justice, as well as for United States Attorneys and any future independent counsel or special prosecutor, the key components of a principled and fair approach are the following policy components:

(1) Decisions to disclose law enforcement information should come from the top, in response to requests for permission that have traveled up the chain of command. United States Attorneys, other law enforcement component heads, and their supervisors in Main Justice should decide, in an ascending hierarchy and, using the “public interest, safety or welfare” standard in the current Manual, when the DOJ as an entity will disseminate information about any investigation or prosecution.\(^78\)

(2) Anonymity should end and accountability should begin. Law enforcement policy should be to disseminate its information always, and only, on the record. This policy would demonstrate law enforcement’s substantive commitment to fair play and restraint in using the powerful voice of the government. It also would demonstrate a justified, democratic confidence that law enforcement officials can describe their work for the public directly to the public. Finally, it would permit law enforcement officials to be held accountable both for their statements and for the substantive acts that on-the-record statements can explain, thereby eliminating the “who said what” mysteries that stem from the media protecting their sources and too often are the end of today’s leaks investigations.

(3) Top officials can and should share the responsibility for speaking publicly about enforcement matters with personnel who are most expert in the particular matters being discussed. Top officials should be encouraged, in other words, to invite other personnel to be present with them and to participate when an authorized disclosure of information is made.

(4) When law enforcement officials choose to disclose information in the public interest, they should do so generally. Information disclosures should be made through general press availabilities, not exclusive interviews. If some extraordinary circumstance requires an Attorney General or other authorized senior law enforcement official to discuss non-public law enforcement matters in an exclusive interview, \(^{78}\)

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Rev. 1521, 1545 (1981) (“Self-imposed limits on discretion may have greater force than either their detractors or creators realize. As they acquire greater visibility, they may become part of the popular climate and professional culture in which prosecutors work. In the end, however, such limits are likely to be no stronger than the determination of the men and women who abide by them to limit their own discretion.”).

78. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. This standard also could be strengthened (1) by requiring affirmatively that any decision to disseminate law enforcement information must have a legitimate law enforcement purpose, and (2) by stating that merely seeking to discredit a law enforcement critic or a subject of a law enforcement investigation would not qualify as such a legitimate purpose.
she should be required to explain that circumstance on the record during the interview.

(5) Violations should have serious consequences. In this respect, Independent Counsel Starr was exactly right: an improper disclosure of law enforcement information should be, at minimum, "a firing offense." 79


From the beginning, I have made the prohibition of leaks a principal priority of the Office [of Independent Counsel]. It is a firing offense, as well as one that leads to criminal prosecution. In the case of each allegation of improper disclosure, we have thoroughly investigated the facts and reminded the staff that leaks are utterly intolerable.

Id.

In rare instances, the DOJ has fired employees over unapproved information disclosures. In 1946, for example, Attorney General Tom C. Clark fired Oetje John Rogge, the former Assistant Attorney General who had headed the Criminal Division from 1939-1940, after he had returned to the Department as a Special Assistant Attorney General following World War II to investigate links between Germany's Nazi government and groups and persons in the United States. See, e.g., Associated Press, German Plot to Defeat Roosevelt in 1940 Disclosed by Justice Aide, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1946, at 1 (summarizing Rogge's interview with imprisoned Nazi Hermann Goering and other evidence); United Press, Nazi Links to U.S. Found, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1946, at 5 (describing Rogge's investigations in Germany in spring 1946). In mid-1946, Rogge had delivered a detailed report on his investigation to Clark, who had declined to release it. Rogge responded by speaking publicly about his findings, which led Clark promptly to fire him. See Associated Press, Clark Ousts Rogge for Speech Linking Americans with Nazis, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1946, at 1; see also David Bird, O. John Rogge, 77, Anti-Nazi Activist, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1981, at B14 (reporting, as part of Rogge's obituary, that his report to Attorney General Clark said that 24 members of Congress either collaborated with or were used by a Nazi agent). See generally O. John Rogge, The Official German Report: Nazi Penetration, 1924-1942; Pan-Arabism, 1939-Today (1961) (including material from Rogge's September 1946 report to the DOJ). In 1999, a United States Attorney removed an Assistant District Attorney who had been specially detailed to her office to be the lead prosecutor in the recent federal case against John A. Gotti because the Assistant had press contacts that violated federal policy. See David M. Herszenhorn, Gotti Offered Lighter Term As Setbacks Hamper U.S., N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1999, at B3 (reporting the dismissal of Assistant District Attorney Vincent Heintz from the case).

In Starr's five years as independent counsel, there apparently was only one instance of employee discipline. In March 1999, Starr announced that he was accepting the resignation of his spokesman, attorney Charles G. Bakaly, III, and that Starr was referring a matter involving Mr. Bakaly to the DOJ for criminal investigation. See Roberto Suro, Starr Aide Resigns, May Face Prosecution: Justice Dept. Gets Referral in Leaks Probe, Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1999, at A1; see also Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, Mar. 11, 1999 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <http://www.oicstarr.com> (announcing that Starr had accepted, "with regret," Bakaly's resignation effective June 1, 1999; that Bakaly would be on paid administrative leave until that date; and that Starr's internal investigation concerning possible unauthorized disclosures to the New York Times had been referred to the DOJ). Although the facts of this ongoing and largely unpublicized matter were unclear to the public for months, it became somewhat clearer in September 1999 that Starr's action against Mr. Bakaly related to a leaks investigation that the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") had conducted at Starr's request. See In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091 (Office of the Independent Counsel Contempt Proceeding), 1999 WL
In tandem with this policy, which should be explained with clarity and emphasis to both law enforcement personnel and the media,\(^7\) the DOJ, and any other special federal investigator or prosecutor who comes into existence, should begin to disseminate its public information in a more uniform and comprehensive way. Every unsealed indictment and brief should promptly be posted on the Internet. Every on-the-record media interview with a law enforcement employee should be taped and posted for public retrieval. Top officials should do more regular, appropriate, general briefing of the public and press. The growing DOJ web site\(^8\) and Attorney General Reno’s weekly press availabilities\(^8\) are good models of ways to make the work of federal law enforcement open and accountable to the press and the public.

CONCLUSION

This proposal is idealistic.\(^9\) It requires integrity and character at the highest levels of law enforcement. But we always have had that in many high-ranking Main Justice officials, as well as in many United States Attorneys and DOJ component heads.

Controlling unaccountable disclosures of information also requires

\(^7\) 709977, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 7, 1999) (per curiam). The FBI was investigating whether any member of Starr’s office had been a source for press reports during President Clinton’s impeachment trial that Starr believed he was constitutionally empowered to seek the criminal indictment of a sitting President. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Starr Is Weighing Whether To Indict Sitting President: A Constitutional Matter, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1999, at A1. There has been no report that Starr ever disciplined Mr. Bakaly before March 1999, or any other Office of Independent Counsel employee at any time, for providing information to a reporter.

\(^8\) See, e.g., Paul E. Coggins, Keep Your Investigations To Yourself, Legal Times, May 19, 1997, at 32 (explaining his practice, while serving as United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas, of sponsoring an annual gathering for heads of investigative agencies and reporters to “discuss a wide range of issues...including the rules governing disclosure of information during an investigation”).


\(^9\) It is not, however, unrealistic. As recently as earlier this year, top DOJ officials apparently were considering policy changes in the area of contacts between Main Justice officials and reporters. See Attorney General Janet Reno’s Weekly Media Availability, Apr. 8, 1999, at 10 (transcript available in FDCH Political Transcripts on LEXIS); id., Apr. 1, 1999, at 11-12 (transcript available in FDCH Political Transcripts on LEXIS).
some guts at the top levels of law enforcement, and guts may be less abundant than are personal integrity and good character. My proposed hard line risks imbalanced reporting on matters of great public interest, and it trusts reporters, at least to a degree, not to be captured by the non-government sources who will continue to give them information in all of the current ways. It also would require the ugliness of firing (or at least trying to find and fire) the first violators, to teach truly the seriousness of this culture shift in federal law enforcement.

But it would be the right thing to do, which is the whole point, and the luxury, of being a federal prosecutor. Those who need to be told more than that will not understand it anyway.84

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84. Cf. Jackson, supra note 74, at 6 ("The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impossible to define as those which mark a gentleman. And those who need to be told would not understand it anyway.")
Notes & Observations