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**American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, Inc. v. Dann Ocean Towing, Inc.** 756 F.3d 314 United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Decided June 26, 2014)

Felipe Diaz, Class of 2016

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TIMELINESS OF CLAIM OVER MARITIME INSURANCE CONTRACT IS TO BE GOVERNED BY THE CONTRACT'S CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISION RATHER THAN THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF LACHES

American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, Inc. v Dann Ocean Towing, Inc.
756 F.3d 314
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
(Decided June 26, 2014)

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court for the District of Maryland’s decision that parties to a maritime insurance contract may elect to avoid the common law application of the Doctrine of Laches by including a choice-of-law provision in their contract, which requires the application of that jurisdiction’s statute of limitations.

The American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, Inc. (the “Club”) sought to use the equitable doctrine of laches when filing a civil action for breach of insurance contract with Dann Ocean Towing Inc. (“Dann”). The Club, a non profit provider of protection and indemnity insurance covering vessel owners and charterers against third-party liabilities arising from the ownership and operation of insured vessels, entered into a contract with Dann for a tugboat. Dann’s tugboat ran aground on a coral reef in 1998, damaging a barge. Both the barge owner and the United States asserted claims against Dann for property damage and environmental damage to the reef, respectively.

The claims were settled for a total of $2,170,000 in November 2001. Despite originally agreeing to contribute only $1,170,000 towards the settlement, the Club paid an additional $278,552.55, after one of the underwriters of Dann’s liability insurance became insolvent and could not pay its portion of the settlement. The Club sought reimbursement from Dann for its additional contributions, but Dann refused to provide any monetary relief. Thereafter, the Club declined to reimburse Dann for certain insurance claims that would have otherwise been payable to Dann, which totaled $131,085.43. Dann responded by refusing to pay its insurance premiums to the Club for the policy years between 1999 and 2001, which totaled $452,610.23. The Club filed an action against Dann, relying on the doctrine of laches over the application choice-of-law statute of limitations provision in the original contract. In its pertinent part, the insurance contract stated: “any contract of insurance between the [Club] and a Member shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the law of the State of New York. In no event shall suit on any claim be maintainable against the [Club] unless commenced within two years after the loss, damage or expense resulting from liabilities, risks, events, occurrences and expenditures specified under this Rule shall have been paid by the Member.” The Club relied on the equitable common law relief by asserting that its delay in filing was reasonable as it made various out-of-court attempts to obtain reimbursement from Dann, a delay

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2 Id. at 316.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 317.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 316.
that did not prejudice Dann, who asserted that the claim was time-barred under New York’s six year
statute of limitations.\textsuperscript{12}

The doctrine of laches is an equitable common law relief that has generally governed in
assessing the timeliness of a maritime claim.\textsuperscript{13} The doctrine can be raised by a defendant as an
affirmative defense to a claim as long as the defendant shows (1) a lack of diligence by the party
against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.\textsuperscript{14} This
doctrine has commonly been applied when determining whether a claim is time-barred irrespective of
any fixed statute of limitations, with certain exceptions.\textsuperscript{15}

The district court agreed with Dann that parties may elect to avoid the doctrine of laches by
including in their contract an enforceable choice-of-law provision that requires the application of
another jurisdiction’s statute of limitations.\textsuperscript{16} The district court thus held that New York’s six-year
statute of limitations barred all the Club’s claims except for one concerning the $76,925.56
premium.\textsuperscript{17}

Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit distinguished exceptions to the common application of the
doctrine of laches in upholding the district court’s ruling. These exceptions include statutory provisions
that impose time-bars on personal injury actions arising out of maritime torts,\textsuperscript{18} on certain cargo loss
contract claims under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,\textsuperscript{19} and on maritime salvage actions.\textsuperscript{20}
Additionally, the court relied on prior caselaw in which courts have allowed the application of contract
specifications regarding jurisdiction’s statute of limitations.\textsuperscript{21} In doing so, it rejected the Club’s
attempt to distinguish prior caselaw due to the procedural and substantive nature of the choice-of-law
clauses in each given jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{22} The court reasoned that even assuming the New York’s statute of
limitations constitutes a “procedural” rule of law, New York law states that unambiguous provisions of
an insurance contract must be interpreted through its plain and ordinary meaning.\textsuperscript{23}

Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in applying New York’s
six-year statute of limitations to the Club’s claims arising under its maritime insurance contract with
Dann.\textsuperscript{24}

Felipe Diaz
Class of 2016

\textsuperscript{12} Id. at 317.

\textsuperscript{13} Id. at 318.

\textsuperscript{14} Id. See also Giddens v. Isbrandtsen Co., 355 F.2d 125, 127 (4th Cir. 1966).

\textsuperscript{15} Id.

\textsuperscript{16} Id.

\textsuperscript{17} Id. at 317.

\textsuperscript{18} Id. at 318. See also 46 U.S.C. §30106.

\textsuperscript{19} Id. See also 48 Stat. 1207, 1209 (1936) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §30701 note).

\textsuperscript{20} Id. See also 46 U.S.C. §80107(c).

\textsuperscript{21} Id. See Cooper v. Meridian Yachts, Ltd., 575 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the parties’ contract, stating that “all
disputes arising out of or in connection with [the contract]...shall be construed in accordance with and shall be governed by
the Dutch law,” clearly meant that the parties’ choice of Dutch law governed not only the timeliness of pure contract
claims, but also the timeliness of the indemnification and contribution action for related tort claims); See also Italia
California’s statutes of limitations applied to both the breach of contract claims and the negligence claims based on a
choice-of-law provision in the parties contract, which clearly promoted California law, and because laches is a common law
doctrine rather than codified federal law).

\textsuperscript{22} Id. at 319.


\textsuperscript{24} Id.