Fourteenth Amendment Personhood: Fact or Fiction?

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The United States Constitution "has stood the test of over two hundred years [and has] preserved and protected our basic rights and liberties." The interpretation of this governing document must be limited to ensure uniformity of law and equality of rights. Such limitation becomes crucial, particularly when considering the social, moral, religious, political, and economic evolution of our country since the drafting of the Constitution. The United States Supreme Court, and the judicial branch in general, have nevertheless created legal fictions to afford select groups constitutional rights that neither the Constitution nor the amendments thereto specifically guarantee.

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1 Robert Dole, The Constitution and the Congress, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 120 (1995). Some posit that "our" should include "real" people rather than entities such as the corporation. See Corporations are Not Persons, 134 CONG. REC. E1385 (Hon. Bruce Morrison inserting into the record an op-ed piece written by Ralph Nader and Carl J. Mayer, originally published in THE WASHINGTON POST on April 9, 1988).


3 See Thomas P. O'Neill, What the Constitution Means to Us Today, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 1, at 117 (elaborating on the expansion of our country from a weak union of four million members to a reigning "world superpower" 243 million members strong).

4 See generally Tejshree Thapa, Note, Expounding on the Constitution: Legal
Part I of this Note will explore the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part II will examine the concept of the legal fiction and the Court's employment of it to grant rights to groups and entities that are not explicitly granted rights under the United States Constitution. Parts III to VII will address corporate and fetal life, provide an overview of the judicial treatment of such lives, and consider the greater concept of life by examining the lack of constitutional protection in the fetal abortion context. Analogies will be drawn between the fetus and the human being, comparing this relationship with that between the corporation and the human being.

This Note does not attempt to argue that the corporate entity should be denied constitutional personhood. Likewise, it does not purport to address the right to choose an abortion, abortions in the context of rape and incest, nor when the mother's health is in jeopardy. The dilemmas raised by abortion are indeed personal and appropriate for another forum. This paper does address the blatantly illogical reality of including a corporation in the definition of personhood and granting it expansive rights while denying a fetus the same treatment. At a minimum, the fetus is due, and must be granted, the same constitutional protections as the corporation.

I. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: PURPOSE AND INTERPRETATION

Various interpretations exist for the true purpose of the original enactment of the Civil Rights Amendments and the Fourteenth Amendment.\(^5\) It is widely accepted that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to be "a civil rights amendment,"\(^6\) designed to safeguard newly emancipated blacks from

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\(^6\) The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protections of the laws.


\(^6\) The "slavery amendments," namely the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, are considered the "most important expansion of civil rights in the United States." Civil Rights and Discrimination (visited Feb. 15, 1999)<http://www.
unfair governmental treatment.7 Adopted in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to give Congress the power to counter the "black codes" established following the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment—codes aimed at limiting the civil rights of the newly emancipated black slaves.8 Not coincidentally, the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted the year following the culmination of the Civil War "to prevent the South from terrorizing and tyrannizing the new freedmen and the white unionists who had opposed secession in several Southern states."9

The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has served as a medium for creating rights not guaranteed by the text of the Constitution.10 As a result, we have witnessed the expansion of the umbrella of constitutional protection to cover groups never originally intended to be guaranteed protection.11 Reflecting this notion, the intent to empower or personify the corporation cannot be found anywhere in the original adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 Corporations, notwithstanding

nylawchristopher.com/Discrimination.html>.
7 See Corporations are Not Persons, supra note 1; Bittker, supra note 2, at 10.
8 See Civil Rights and Discrimination, supra note 6 (visited Feb. 15, 1999).
10 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 39 (Amy Gutmann, ed., 1997) (explaining that the Court has "smuggle[d in] new rights... under the Due Process Clause (which... is textually incapable of containing them)").
11 See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 169-70, 329-30 (1989) (positing that the original understanding of the Constitution did not include modern privacy rights and rights against sex discrimination); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 109-13 (1990) (suggesting that originally the Fourteenth Amendment was not understood to require the integration of schools or to give blacks the right to vote).
12 See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 578 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas explained that there was "no suggestion in [the] submission [of the Fourteenth Amendment to the people] that it was designed to put negroes and corporations into one class and so dilute the police power of the States over corporate affairs and quoted Arthur Twining Hadley's position that: The Fourteenth Amendment was framed to protect the negroes from oppression by the whites, not to protect corporations from oppression by the legislature. It is doubtful whether a single one of the members of a Congress who voted for it had any idea that it would touch the question of corporate regulation at all.
Id. (sources omitted); Ralph Nader and Carl J. Mayer, Court Doctrine Thwarts Reform, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., May 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 4897693 (explaining that no explicit statement by the Framers can be found illustrating an intent to include corporations in the definition of "person" of the Fourteenth
that reality, have long used the Fourteenth Amendment as a weapon to secure rights.\textsuperscript{13} Even more ironic is that "of the cases in [the Supreme] Court in which the Fourteenth Amendment was applied during the first fifty years after its adoption, less than one-half of one per cent [had] invoked it in protection of the negro race."\textsuperscript{14} This irony is particularly noteworthy as the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was completely void of an intent to include corporations within the scope of constitutional protection.\textsuperscript{15}

II. LEGAL FICTIONS

The legal fiction is a tool employed by the courts to create rights and is used both for convenience and to serve the ends of justice.\textsuperscript{16} This is particularly troublesome when one considers that the judicial branch, which is to interpret laws,\textsuperscript{17} and which was originally described as "the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution"\textsuperscript{18} and the "weakest\textsuperscript{19} branch, has come to be described as "an important legal and political institution."\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{13} See Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 589 (1990) ("Once armed with the fourteenth amendment, corporations wielded it with considerable force [as] 'more than 50 per cent. asked that its benefits be extended to corporations.'") (citing Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting)).

\textsuperscript{14} Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 303 U.S. at 90 (citing CHARLES WALLACE COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES 138 (1912)).

\textsuperscript{15} See Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 303 U.S. at 85–86 ("Neither the history nor the language of the Fourteenth Amendment justifies the belief that corporations are included within its protection."); Corporations are Not Persons, supra note 1; see also Hodding Carter III, Viewpoint, Court Packing: Tradition of Both Left and Right, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1986 (opining that the decision of the United States Supreme Court to include "corporations" within the Fourteenth Amendment definition of "person" was primarily an effort to "'safeguard' property").

\textsuperscript{16} See I. MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATION PROBLEMS 9 (1927).

\textsuperscript{17} See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.") (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{18} Id. at 465.

\textsuperscript{19} Id. See 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 167 (J.V. Prichard, ed. & Thomas Nugent, trans. 1914) ("Of the three powers . . ., the judiciary . . . is next to nothing.") (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{20} THOMAS G. WALKER & LEE EPSTEIN, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCTION 21–22 (1993) (explaining that the Court often engages in decision making that not only has social effects but is indicative of current political trends).
Employing various tools including the legal fiction, the judiciary is now creating laws, a function that it is performing in a dangerous and alarming manner. The courts, which are now seemingly completely unchecked, have created justifications to rationalize this behavior. It is posited that, "judicial lawmaking is part of the very constitution of American democracy, albeit an extremely controversial part." The Court has manipulated the Constitution and "use[d]... constitutional text as a springboard for announcing new rights not expressly mentioned in the text."
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONHOOD AND RIGHTS

Constitutional personhood has been defined to include natural persons and constitutional persons, which presumably includes those "juridical persons" upon whom the Court has felt it appropriate to grant constitutional rights. Query whether a "constitutional person" includes only the "unnatural." Judicial and statutory definitions of "person" over the years have come to include a variety of entities and characters, including the "natural"—human aliens, illegitimate children, and mir-

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (1962). As a result, the people of the country become governed no longer by the United States Constitution but by an elite few governing the masses, resulting in a return to the days of narrow-minded nobility.

The gravity of a Supreme Court which sits as ruler and dictator was discussed by Abraham Lincoln in his first inaugural address:

[The candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.


26 See id. at 1446–47 (defining a "constitutional person" as "one who is protected by the Constitution of the United States; in other words . . . one who is granted constitutional rights") (footnote omitted).

27 See id. at 1445 (describing the judicial inclusion of artificial beings in the definition of personhood). "Juridical persons are legal constructs, such as corporations." Id.

28 See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1142 (6th ed. 1990) ("In general usage, a human being (i.e. natural person), though by statute term may include labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers.") (citation omitted).


30 See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (establishing the personhood of illegitimate children under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
persons,—as well as the "unnatural"—foreign governments, labor unions, nursing homes, municipalities, and government units. Some have gone so far as to consider the personhood of artificial intelligence and computer programs.

One example of a prevalent "unnatural" or "constitutional" person is the corporation. The corporation as a person for Fourteenth Amendment purposes was created through the use of the judicial legal fiction. Over the years, the personhood of a "corporation" under the Fourteenth Amendment has become well established. Though Supreme Court precedent clearly grants the corporation Fourteenth Amendment personhood protections, the issue has not been free from dispute or debate. It is con-
tended that the Court's inclusion of the corporation within the scope of personhood was a haphazard judicial declaration, based on various pressures and motives, rather than well-reasoned constitutional interpretation.

In *Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.*, the Court declared that a corporation is protected by the same rights as natural persons for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, thus eliminating any uncertainty and providing an anticlimactic end to the debate. Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite stated:

> The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to . . . corporations. We are . . . of [the] opinion that it does.

Two years later, in *Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania*, the Court reaffirmed corporate personhood under both the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Did the members of the Court exercise legal reasoning, understanding the purpose and conforming to the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment? Chief Justice Waite was the very justice who stated that to deny women the right to vote was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and authored opinions which limited the protection of newly-emancipated slaves.

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40 See Corporations are Not Persons, supra note 1 (asserting that the Court "simply decreed that corporations were persons").
41 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
42 See id. at 396.
43 Chief Justice Waite's term on the Court began with his appointment in 1874 and ended with his death in 1888. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 906 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter OXFORD].
44 *Santa Clara*, 118 U.S. at 396. Chief Justice Waite's statement was made prior to oral argument in *Santa Clara*. See id. The parties' briefs had extensively argued this point. See id. The actual opinion was written by Justice Harlan. See id. at 397.
45 125 U.S. 181 (1888).
46 See id. at 188-89.
47 See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874); see also OXFORD, supra note 43, at 906.
48 See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (refusing to allow federal intervention into various state actions that allegedly breached Fourteenth Amendment protection); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) (upholding the dismissal of one of two indictments against Kentucky election inspectors for violating
Justice William B. Woods, a member of the Court during the time the Civil War Amendments were read in a constricted manner, held a conservative view of the Fourteenth Amendment. His desire to limit the power of the federal government fueled his decisions and "played a significant role in helping to limit the ability of the Fourteenth Amendment to act as a vehicle to protect individual rights." Despite the articulated concerns about the expansion of individual rights and attempts to limit and constrict the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has freely expanded corporate rights.

Although corporations are generally governed by state law, nevertheless, "[t]he Court's various substantive due process and freedom of contract decisions between 1890 and 1937 strengthened the hand of corporations in their dealings with employees, unions, consumers, and state legislatures." The Court, despite attempts to "eschew[] responsibility for the law of corporations directly," has greatly affected the development and growth of corporate rights.

Despite the questionable circumstances surrounding its evolution, the corporation now undoubtedly qualifies as a person under the Fourteenth Amendment. Greater corporate constitut-

the Fifteenth Amendment by not allowing an otherwise qualified citizen of African descent to vote); see also OXFORD, supra note 43, at 906.

Justice Woods was appointed to the Court in 1880 and remained a justice until his death in 1887. See OXFORD, supra note 43, at 938.

See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the application of the Civil Rights Act provisions, which entitled all persons to full and equal enjoyment of private accommodations, to the states was not authorized by the Civil War Amendments and was therefore unconstitutional).

OXFORD, supra note 43, at 938.

See OXFORD, supra note 43, at 198; see also Chrysler Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 972 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (stating that the law of the state of incorporation will govern in matters of internal corporate governance); In re Schepps Food Stores, Inc., 160 B.R. 792, 797 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993) (finding that state law governs a director's duties to the corporation and its shareholders); Brown v. Kleen Kut Manuf. Co., 714 P.2d 942, 945 (Kan. 1986) (determining that the law of the state in which a corporation was formed will govern corporate liability).

Oxford, supra note 43, at 199. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down minimum wage provisions); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (allowing dismissal of employees based on union membership); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that the state could not put maximum limits on the number of hours an employer required an employee to work, in this case, of those in the baking industry); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (guaranteeing the right to enter into out-of-state contracts).


See id.
tional protections, however, are not without limit.\textsuperscript{56} The Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment states, "[n]o person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."\textsuperscript{57} While corporations are included under the definition of "person" with respect to property rights,\textsuperscript{58} liberty protections have been limited, until now, to natural persons alone,\textsuperscript{59} though there may be a current trend in the opposite direction.\textsuperscript{60} Despite Fifth Amendment due process protection, corporations are not granted protection against self-incrimination.\textsuperscript{61} It is agreed that the constitutional protections of the corporation are currently insufficient and must be increased.\textsuperscript{62} Nonetheless, corporations have been granted substantial constitutional pro-

\textsuperscript{56} For a general overview of corporate rights and protections, see Mayer, \textit{supra} note 13; see also "The Right to Govern is Reserved to Citizens": Counting Undocumented Aliens in the Federal Census for Reapportionment Purposes, 135 CONG. REC. E2804, E2805 (Rep. Jim Slattery) (explaining that corporations, though included under the interpretation of "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment, are not included as such for apportionment); The Immigration Act of 1989, 135 CONG. REC. S7858, S7888 (positing that the term "persons" is not used, defined, or interpreted the same way in every instance in which it is used in the United States Constitution).

\textsuperscript{57} U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment differs slightly, its effect is the same. \textit{See} U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{See} Rivard, \textit{supra} note 25, at 1452 n.103 (providing an overview of Court decisions establishing the inclusion of the corporation in the definition of personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause with respect to property rights).

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{See} Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939) (limiting the protections of the Privileges and Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to natural persons); \textit{see also} Rivard, \textit{supra} note 25, at 1454 ("[T]here is no coherent theory underlying corporate entitlement to intangible liberty rights.").

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{See} Rivard, \textit{supra} note 25, at 1454 (describing the Court's protection of corporate liberty rights under the Fourth Amendment).


IV. THE CORPORATION AND MODERN CORPORATE BEHAVIOR

The corporate framework, in one form or another, has long been in existence. Several corporate theories have developed over the years. The corporation is, at times, said to "have an identity and existence of its own." As an independent entity, a corporation can continue in existence immune from the effects of shareholder, officer or director death, incapacity, and the effects of share transfer.

63 See Hale, 201 U.S. at 76 (granting the corporation Fourth Amendment protection); Rivard, supra note 25, at 1454 (stating that corporations are afforded First and Fourth Amendment constitutional protection). But see United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (stating that "[w]hile they may and should have protection from unlawful demands . . . corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy") (citation omitted). Morton Salt's limitation on corporate constitutional protection has been called into question, however, in Dow Chemical, where the Court examined whether government surveillance of a corporate facility violated a right to privacy. 476 U.S. at 230–38. The Court, based on the facts, ultimately concluded that a right to privacy had not been invaded, but fell far short of declaring that no such right existed. See id. at 239.

64 See ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE § 64, at 126 (1976) (summarizing the ancestry of the modern day American corporation including "the legislative charter grants of early nineteenth century America, the English royal trading and colonizing charters of the sixteenth century, the boroughs and religious orders of the renaissance, the priestly colleges of ancient Rome, and the trading partnerships of Babylonia or Assyria"); Bad Company: How to Civilize the Corporation, Dollars & Sense (CNN television broadcast, July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Bad Company] (describing the formation of early European corporations not as business enterprises but as "embodiments of social stability and cohesion-monasteries and universities, boroughs and guilds . . . reconcil[ing] individual behavior with larger social ends").

65 For example, the trust theory is characterized by the notion that the corporation "belongs" to the investing shareholders. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) reprinted in FEDERAL OR STATE REGULATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE HEIGHTENING BATTLE FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 290, 293 (Arthur M. Borden & Herbert A. Einhorn, eds., 1978). It is interesting to compare the absolute control theory, namely, that the groups in control possess absolute authority with no obligation to the general community, see id. at 294, with the neutral technology theory, which asserts that community interests outweigh those of the corporation, and upon a balancing of their claims and interests, these various groups should be provided with a share of the income stream based on "public policy rather than private cupidity." Id. at 294–95. For a general overview of various corporate theories, see David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990).


Though the corporation has historically been considered within a property context, it is most commonly referred to in terms of personhood, as the corporation is the representation of the different persons of whom it is composed. Corporate governance, “the economic and legal dimensions of the relationship between shareholders and managers,” is founded upon this notion of corporate constituents. Some modern theories of the corporate entity describe the corporation not as a collection of persons such as shareholders, but as a collection of interested parties: “employees, creditors, suppliers, [and] community groups.”

“Separation of ownership and control” is a central theme in modern day corporate governance. Some corporations have been subject to scrutiny for making modifications to their organizational structure, including: changing the composition of the

68 Compare Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum and the Pursuit of Individualism in the Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1385-86 (1995) (referring to the historical view that the corporation was merely property that provided its governing constituents protection from liability and financial gain), with Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 175 (1989) (“[C]ontrary to popular belief, it is not particularly useful to think of corporations in terms of property rights.”).


70 BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 62, at vii (positing various forms of corporate regulation).

71 See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 66, at 108 (explaining that in order to best understand a corporation, it is necessary to “decompose” the corporate whole into its individual components); Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 283 (1998) (“Corporate law is primarily about shareholder, boards of directors and managers, and the relationships among them.”). The role of shareholders in modern day corporate governance, however, is questionable at best.


73 Ownership is described in the corporate context as having three distinct interests: “interests in an enterprise,” “power over an enterprise,” and “acting with respect to the enterprise.” BERLE & MEANS, supra note 65, at 290.

74 See id. at 292–93 (posing the notion that shareholder interaction is pivotal to the corporation and to the regulation of the activity within the corporate hierarchy). Berle and Means’ approach has been characterized by some as the “separation of ownership and control” thesis. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 62, at 2.
board of directors or its committees, implementing mechanisms for increasing the autonomy of outside board members, and altering board functions in general. The role of shareholders in modern day corporate governance, however, is marginal at best as their exclusion from corporate decision-making is now the norm. Shareholders regularly have little reason outside of financial incentive to invest in a corporation. Moreover, although shareholders were once, incorrectly, considered to control the wealth of the corporation, modern dissatisfaction has been attributed to the few individuals managing the corporation and usurping any role the shareholders may have had in the decision-making process.

It is true that the actions of corporate entities parallel human behavior. Generally speaking:

The corporation may cause death, injury, disease, and severe physical pain by decisions resulting in pollution, poor design, inadequate quality control, plant safety, and working conditions. Corporations also may impose severe deprivations of income, well-being, and effective personal freedom by decisions on hiring, firing, employment practices, and plant locations. Finally, corporations may exercise influence, power, control, and

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76 See VARALLO & DRIESBACH, supra note 72, at 5–8 (discussing high-profile disputes in corporate governance).
77 See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 62, at 2 (explaining that corporations are "democratic institutions," and shareholder input to directors and to other aspects of the corporation is through voting and the proxy mechanism); see also Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Race for the Bottom v. Climb to the Top: The Ali Project and Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10 J. CORP. L. 431, 440 (1985).
79 See ADOLF A. BERLE, POWER 203–04 (1969) (observing that, "[t]oday... criticism is... often directed against the right of private managers, as heads of corporations, to hold the power of accumulation and investment"); see also BERLE & MEANS, supra note 65, at 291–92 (explaining that true incentive lies not with the mass individuals that are engaged in group ownership but with the handful of men in the board room exercising actual control over the company).
80 See Schane, supra note 69, at 563 (summarizing various corporate actions).
even coercion over employees, customers, suppliers, and others by manipulating expectations of reward and deprivations, by advertising propaganda, promotions and demotions, not to mention illegal practices.\footnote{Abraham J. Briloff, \textit{LBOS and MBOS in the Takeover Alphabet Soup: Some Questions for Lawyers, Answers From an Accountant}, 15 J. CORP. L. 171, 195–96 (1990) (emphasis added).}

Corporations "may enter into contracts, buy and sell land, commit torts, sue and be sued, [yet] cannot hold public office [or] vote in elections."\footnote{Schane, \textit{supra} note 69, at 563.} They can incur debt and are responsible for the payment of taxes.\footnote{See \textit{My Corporation}, \textit{supra} note 67; \textit{WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS} 118 (7th ed. 1995) (discussing the entity nature of corporations and providing an overview of corporate taxation); see also \textit{DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(13)} (1991) (authorizing Delaware corporations to borrow money); \textit{N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 202(7)} (McKinney 1986) (empowering New York corporations to borrow money).} Corporations also have standing to assert federal claims, such as civil rights violations under section 1983.\footnote{See Board of Managers v. West Chester Areas Sch. Dist., 838 F. Supp. 1035, 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 52 F.3d 313 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that "[a] corporation is a 'person' entitled to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment," and that "a 'person' need not be a member of a protected class to sue under the Fourteenth Amendment or federal civil rights statutes if its complaint is that it was treated differently because of its association with members of a protected class"); see also Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding that because a plaintiff's corporate status "ha[d] no bearing on its standing to assert violations of the first and fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983"); Auburn Med. Ctr. Inc. v. Peters, 953 F. Supp. 1518, 1520 (M.D. Ala. 1996) ("[A] corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the due process clause... [and] has standing to sue under § 1983 for violations of its due process rights."); Rhode Island Affiliate, ACLU v. Rhode Island Lottery Comm., 553 F. Supp. 752, 768 n.12 (D.R.I. 1982) ("It is well established that a corporation... has standing to assert violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments under § 1983.").} Though corporations cannot be imprisoned, they do qualify as persons under criminal statutes and can be held criminally liable and accountable for fines.\footnote{See United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 151 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1026 (1999) ("Corporations cannot be imprisoned. Only money is at issue."); Elizabeth Salisbury Warren, \textit{Note, The Case for Applying the Eighth Amendment to Corporations}, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1313, 1334–35 (1996) (discussing the broad definition of "person" in the RICO Act); Richard E. Welch III, et. al., \textit{Criminal Liability for Professional Partnerships: Two Perspectives}, 38 BOSTON B. J. 4, 15 (1994) (describing criminal liability for corporate illegal behavior as "an accepted cornerstone in federal criminal jurisprudence" and the theory of respondeat superior as a most important method in corporate control and in the correction of abuses).}

Speech on the part of corporate actors, that is, expression of...
ideas and espousing of beliefs, is one of the closest parallels between the corporate world and its human counterpart. Corporate speech in today's society is commonplace and at times surpasses individual speech in terms of effectiveness. There is no doubt that corporate speech is included within First Amendment protections. Though some believe that corporate speech has grown exponentially out of control and that limitations on this growth are required, it is conversely warned that "[allowing the government to discriminate against disfavored messages is a recipe for disaster." It has been argued that the First Amendment does not concentrate solely on "speaker autonomy" but also encompasses the need for the free flow of information to prevent the government from suppressing contrary views. According to Justices Holmes and Brandeis in their noteworthy dissent in Abrams v. United States, "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Though speech plays an obvious role in political awareness, decision making, and obtaining personal information, the Court may

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65 See Briloff, supra note 80, at 195; Terry Ann Halbert, The First Amendment in the Workplace: An Analysis and Call for Reform, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 42, 51 (1987) ("Corporate speech acquires a superior effectiveness compared to individual speech because the former can afford a vastly more expensive 'megaphone.'"); Herbert I. Schiller, Television is a Social—Not a Biological or Technological—Problem, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1169, 1174 ("Philip Morris and Time-Warner 'speak,' and millions of households, domestically and internationally, hear their voices, amplified by national television. In comparison, the individual citizen's voice, if expressed loudly enough, may reach across the living room.").

66 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778, 784 (1978) (addressing "whether the corporate identity of the speaker deprives th[e] proposed speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection" and holding that a corporation is not deprived of such First Amendment protection regardless of whether a "material effect on its business or property" exists); id. at 804 (White, J., dissenting) ("There is now little doubt that corporate communications come within the scope of the First Amendment.").


68 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783 (articulating the purposes of the First Amendment, including "its role in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas"); Kathleen Sullivan, in Speech and Power: Is First Amendment Absolutism Obsolete?, NATION, July 21, 1997, at 18 (discussing the dangers of allowing excessive government intervention in the regulation of speech).

69 250 U.S. 616 (1919).

70 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

91 See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 62, at 59 (discussing corporate campaign
have failed to distinguish the protection of First Amendment speech from private corporate regulation. Though some believe that corporate speech must be curtailed, this idea must be distinguished from the notion of taming the giant corporation by regulating and limiting it through other laws, including antitrust laws, the imposition of corporate taxes, and the promotion of labor unions.

It is important to determine whether the expansion of corporate speech is really due to corporate domination of individual rights per se or to a simple gap between wealth and the lack thereof. It is a common contention that the marketplace of ideas is now dominated by the “rich, who outspend their rivals and distort public debate.” Inevitably, money has the ability to purchase power and influence. Cognizant of these economic gaps, however, corporations have aggressively used First Amendment privileges to gain certain benefits in attempts to defeat progress in corporate income tax referenda, health and safety investigations, and criminal antitrust actions.

activities in a First Amendment context).

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92 See Shapiro, supra note 87, at 12 (emphasizing that “the current Supreme Court ‘cannot seem to distinguish between government efforts to censor speech and government efforts to regulate private power’ ”).
93 See id.
94 See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 62, at vii (positing various forms of corporate regulation).
95 See id.
96 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 65, at 295 (“A couple of hundred corporate managers can make decisions controlling most of our industrial economy.”). Certainly, this is not a new notion. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, at 91 (Alexander Hamilton (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged . . . as the most productive source of national wealth.").
97 Justice Holmes emphasized the importance of this “free trade in ideas.” Abrahms, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The importance of maintaining a fluid and healthy “marketplace of ideas” has been celebrated time and again by the Court. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 769 (1996); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995).
99 See Corporations are Not Persons, supra note 1 (describing specific instances
assertion of constitutional rights has not been limited to the First Amendment; corporations have also attempted to invoke certain Fourth Amendment privileges, such as Dow Chemical Company's unsuccessful attempt to use the unreasonable search and seizure clause as a way to circumvent governmental monitoring of its compliance with environmental laws.105

Though it may appear that corporations are granted rights more liberally than are individuals, the fact that corporations take full advantage of the constitutional rights they are granted hardly something to criticize. In Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Beckwith,101 the Supreme Court clearly recognized the right of corporations to "invoke the benefits of . . . the Constitution and laws which guarantee to persons the enjoyment of property, or afford to them the means for its protection, or prohibit legislation injuriously affecting it."102 Though the growing demand for modern corporate social responsibility likely results in faulting corporations for using or, in the opinion of some, abusing the rights granted them, perhaps the problem lies not in the exercise of these rights, but in the granting of such rights in the first place, which allows the corporate entity to become so powerful. Nevertheless, the power of the modern corporation is undeniable. The actual extent of corporate power may not be fully understood.103

Speech is power. . . . Yesterday's free speech principles have become today's power principles—for the powerful. . . . The problem traces back at least to . . . when the Supreme Court first treated corporations as persons entitled to constitutional liberties . . . [C]ommunication is the handmaiden of commerce . . .

by Boston and Idaho companies from 1978–1988); My Corporation, supra note 67 (delineating the various constitutional rights granted the modern day corporation including the freedom of speech on public issues irrespective of material corporate effect); Nader and Mayer, supra note 12 (claiming that corporations have "corrupt[ed] the political process in a manner neither the Framers of the Bill of Rights nor the creators of the [Fourteenth] Amendment even dreamed would be possible"). See generally Robert B. Reich, The New Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility, CAL. MGMT. REV., Jan. 1, 1998, at 8 ("Corporations have become steadily more aggressive and effective in the political arena during the past several decades.").

105 See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that a warrant is not needed for aerial observations and photographs of an industrial complex).

101 129 U.S. 26 (1889).

102 Id. at 28.

103 See Shapiro, supra note 87, at 11–12.
Money is speech... [and] it is power. And when moneyed speech receives new absolute protection, the power dynamic of freedom changes immensely.... In the process, citizen democracy succumbs to corporate democracy.\(^{104}\)

Whether corporations have “absolute protection” and whether “citizen democracy” has succumbed to “corporate democracy” is subject to debate. Though it is commonplace to assert that corporations are taking advantage of individuals and their rights, corporations undoubtedly have positive influences upon society.\(^{105}\) The increased dominance of the corporation has benefited the country’s economic growth and development.\(^{106}\) Corporate entities impact society in a positive way, creating benefits for many to whom they would otherwise be unavailable.\(^{107}\) Nevertheless, though corporations may benefit the na-


\(^{105}\) See Society and Politics Greenpeace: The Economist Chronicles Group’s Evolution, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, Aug. 5, 1998 (attributing the idea that “[E]fforts by multinational corporations to address environmental issues have reduced the need for activist groups” to an essay published in *Economist*).

\(^{106}\) See BERLE, supra note 78, at 379 (1969) (“Corporate power has served the United States well. In substantial measure, the material prosperity of the country is due to it.”). But see David Friedman, Opinion, Back to Basics: Greed and Spin have Replaced Discipline and Collaboration as the Engines of Economic Growth, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1998, at m1 (concluding that “[t]he nation's future lies in fostering entrepreneurship rather than] the corporate dinosaurs of years past”).

\(^{107}\) See Reich, supra note 99, at 8 (describing a new trend in corporate responsibility and an apparent corporate interest in placing increased importance on the societal effects of its operations rather than the typical emphasis on investor wealth maximization); David Ong-Yeoh, Companies: Call for Good Corporate Governance Growing, BUS. TIMES, July 8, 1998, at 6 (indicating an example of the growing belief that “companies must be responsible for their decisions which impact on society” and the understanding that “when business[es] make decisions today, it impacts on society so... social, ethical and environmental factors [must be considered]”); id. (“[G]ood corporate citizenship is also good for business.”); Marilyn Carlson Nelson, Giving Back to the Community: Corporate Responsibility, Address at the Greater Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce’s Portfolio Series Luncheon (Nov. 12, 1997), in VITAL SPEECHES 343 (Mar. 15, 1998) (“Clearly, philanthropy is not hazardous to corporate health!”).

For instance, International Business Machine Systems (IBM) has supported those with learning disabilities through “product ideas, subsidized access to IBM’s speech technology, research with disabled students, loan of the time of IBM engineers, direct financial grants and marketing” while Intel “has provided millions of dollars of the best Intel microprocessors for... use in... systems for [the disabled].” *Technologies for the Disabled, Developing Partnerships for Assistive and Universally Designed Technology for Persons with Disabilities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology of the House Comm. on Science*, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of James R. Fruchterman, President, Arkenstone Inc.) (providing exam-
tion, the overall detrimental effect on individuals and society appear, perhaps, to tip the scale in the opposite direction.

Corporations reap benefits above and beyond those of normal citizens and, as a result, may limit individual rights and freedoms. The rights of the private individual sacrificed at the expense of the corporate giant is an all-too-common characterization. As a result, corporations have come to be viewed as self-ruling entities and dominators of power and control, having been described as more powerful than the Nazi movement. For example, in revisiting the expansive arena of corporate speech one finds that the corporation may have thwarted the effect of the voice of the individual. This monopoly is not only perceived in the forum of commercial or personal speech, but applies also to political speech and discourse. It is a popular sentiment that big business dominates the government itself, with the voices of citizens going unheard.

Examples exist outside of speech as well, with the environmental arena serving as another forum of concern. Corporations, it is argued, continuously violate environmental laws. Though they may suffer public relations backlashes, such violations are small concerns to corporate survival since the corporation can pass costs incurred on to consumers and since the revocation of its corporate charter is improbable. Corporations have also

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1999] FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PERSONHOOD 513

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See Reich, supra note 99, at 8 (noting an example of corporate desire to “invest in the future”).

An additional factor is the possibility that the bar has deserted its responsibility to represent and protect the people and has become an extension of the corporation. See Morton Mintz, No Contest: Corporate Lawyers and the Perversion of Justice in America, PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 1, 1997, at 42 (positing that certain attorneys represent the interests of the large, private corporation at the expense of the interests of the nation).

See Briloff, supra note 80, at 195 (“The corporation is both a product of and a contributing participant in the power structure and belief system of society.”); Floyd Abrams, in Speech and Power: Is First Amendment Absolutism Obsolete?, NATION, July 21, 1997, at 12 (questioning whether “corporations have too much to say in determining national policy”).

See Wendy Kaminer, in Speech and Power: Is First Amendment Absolutism Obsolete?, NATION, July 21, 1997, at 14 (“But if Nazis are more vicious than the average corporation they’re also less powerful; their ravings have relatively little effect on the democratic process or the free flow of ideas.”).

See id.

See Bennett, supra note 21, at 85; Mark Presky, Letter to the Editor, Ruling Against Campaign Limits, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1998, at B6 (“The interests of the people will be heard only when the great moneyed influences are quieted.”).

See Thomas Linzey, Awakening a Sleeping Giant: Creating a Quasi-Private
been criticized for receiving preferential treatment, for example, in the form of tax subsidies over and above those received by their individual, private citizen counterparts. Corporations are clearly subject to taxation; but the corporate tax agenda is often fulfilled to a greater extent than that of private citizens, with taxpayers "pad[ding] profits for big businesses." Not only do corporations reap benefits from governmental favoritism but "systems of accountability are endangered" when corporations become too familiar with the government.

Corporations have been referred to as "artificial persons" which have been "award[ed] ... superhuman privileges" by the judicial branch of government. Some have gone so far as to consider them "unaccountable Frankensteins" with quasi-human powers "nonetheless constitutionally shielded from ... law enforcement [and] accountability to real persons such as workers, consumers and taxpayers." Moreover, corporations bear the reputation of "not ever be[ing] trusted," and are often regarded as entities with disproportionate advantages over society at the expense of its individual members. Is it, however, a valid

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*Cause of Action for Revoking Corporate Charters in Response to Environmental Violations*, 13 PACE ENVT. L. REV. 219, 224 (1995) (postulating that the ability to revoke corporate charters because of abuses or violations has become meaningless).

114 Federal spending could be reduced by approximately $150 billion annually with the elimination of corporate subsidies, grants, and tax breaks. See Ray Santis-teban, Editorial, *Aid to Dependent Corporations*, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 4, 1997 (explaining that approximately 60% of domestic corporations and 74% of international corporations were excused from the payment of federal taxes, causing the government to forego approximately $150 billion in potential tax revenues).

115 Modern public corporations are astounding in size and worth, with their value often exceeding the gross national product of many nations. In 1994, General Motors led sales with $123 billion, Federal National Mortgage led in assets with $273 billion, General Motors led in profits with $5.7 billion, and General Electric led in market value of common stock worth $92.5 billion.


117 *Corporations are Not Persons*, supra note 1.

118 Id.

119 Frank Antonucci, Editorial, *Corporate Greed Time for Union to Draw the Line Against Carrier*, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), April 16, 1998, at A11, available in 1998 WL 4350951 (describing Carrier corporation's threat to close its operations and its alleged attempt to place the blame on company employees).

proposition that corporations are abusing the rights they have been granted to the detriment of greater society? 121 There is a movement to subject corporations to greater regulation, 122 supported by the belief that the government has unjustifiably granted the corporation too much power. The government must derive its powers from "the great body of the society, [rather than] from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it." 123 The question then seems to be whether modern day corporations represent such a "favored class" given disproportionate constitutional protection by the Court. In defining the rights of various groups the Court has employed the legal fiction to extend constitutional rights to groups that otherwise would be denied those protections. But are these legal fictions being drawn by the Court to suit its own desires as well as those of politically-empowered corporate interests? The answer appears to lie in the determination of whether the corporation fits within the framework of the Fourteenth Amendment "person" 124 or whether it is one of the more flagrant and persistent abuses of the legal fiction constructed by the Court.

V. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: EVOLVING OR GOVERNING?

The Constitution has been described as a "Living Constitution," 125 that "would have snapped if it had not been permitted to

121 Some would answer in the affirmative. For example, revelations of corporate exploitation of children in the workplace seem, today, routine. See Nicole J. Krug, Note, Exploiting Child Labor: Corporate Responsibility and the Role of Corporate Codes of Conduct, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 651, 651 (1998) (describing the problem as one of "epidemic proportions").

122 See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 62, at ix. "[T]he corporate form is so powerful that it needs to be controlled to limit massive externalization of costs by corporations and wealth transfers to corporations from other groups. [Furthermore,] regulation is needed to protect corporate investors from malfeasance by remote corporate managers." Id.


124 See supra note 5 (quoting the text of the Fourteenth Amendment). It has been posited that the framers of the United States Constitution did not intend for the document to address specific situations but, rather, that the words of the Constitution govern through a comprehensive interpretation of its terms. See SCALIA, supra note 10, at 37 ("In textual interpretation, context is everything, and the context of the Constitution tells us not to expect nit-picking detail, and to give words and phrases an expansive rather than narrow interpretation—though not an interpretation that the language will not bear.").

125 SCALIA, supra note 10, at 42.
bend and grow. It is apparent that "American society... has undergone constant change in virtually all facets of its existence—geography, demography, economics, law, politics, technology, employment, industrialization, ... social structure[,]... environmental conditions [and] international affairs." One may opine that the meanings of certain terms and interpretations by the Framers should not be used as definitions centuries later to establish the parameters of constitutional rights. Accordingly, "[l]egal change" is required "to respond to the existing and often changing social or economic conditions." What, however, should the "guiding principle" for this judicial evolution be?

Some maintain the answer is public opinion while others argue it is the will of the majority. As a government that allows, moreover promotes, the evolution of public opinion, the concept of a Living Constitution transforms a historic governing document into a fluid document reflecting majority views rather than providing a governing and continuous mandate of

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126 Id. at 41. Various approaches to constitutional interpretation exist. Originalism is the doctrine of interpretation which adheres to the language and history of the Constitution. Justice Antonin Scalia is one of the strongest proponents of this theory. See Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views, supra note 2; see also Carter, supra note 15 (explaining that Justice Scalia, together with Chief Justice Rehnquist, have come to be known as "apostles of... judicial restraint"). Conversely, judicial activism erases such boundaries and calls for a stronger interaction between constitutional law and real politics. See Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views, supra note 2.

127 BARRY R. SCHALLER, A VISION OF AMERICAN LAW: JUDGING LAW, LITERATURE, AND THE STORIES WE TELL 120 (1997) (describing change as "inevitable... desirable and even necessary").

128 See Laurence H. Tribe, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 10, at 85-86 ("[I]t seems to me quite impossible to sustain the proposition that understandings or meanings frozen circa 1791 can possibly serve as the definitive limits to certain freedoms as enforced today.").

129 SCHALLER, supra note 127, at 120-21 (emphasis omitted).

130 SCALIA, supra note 10, at 45.

131 But see THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 110 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[G]overnment [has] been instituted... [b]ecause the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint."). As such, it appears that the government was originally envisioned to control the popular will and to funnel it into the legislative process. See id. at 109 (establishing that the ultimate power in the newly formed union must rest with the "persons of the citizens").

132 See SCALIA, supra note 10, at 47 ("If the courts are free to write the Constitution anew, they will... write it the way the majority wants... This, of course, is the end of the Bill of Rights, whose meaning will be committed to the very body it was meant to protect against: the majority.").

133 See id. at 44-45 (explaining that the entire idea of living constitutionalism is diametrically opposed to the "antievolutionary purpose of a constitution").
the rights of the country's inhabitants. The Court, "[b]y trying to make the Constitution do everything that needs [to be done] from age to age, [will] have caused it to do nothing at all." 134

The success of our government is based on a document that is over 200 years old and has only twenty-seven constitutional amendments. Though in the past the amendment process was relied upon to initiate constitutional change, today the modern judiciary has assumed that role. For example, if the Nineteenth Amendment, 135 which granted women the right to vote, was an issue today, it is likely that judicial initiative rather than constitutional amendment would be the mechanism used to implement such a change. 136 The Court, as demonstrated through the concept of the legal fiction, has in fact bent and stretched the Constitution to afford rights where it has deemed it appropriate and to deny them where perhaps more merited. It is debatable whether the Constitution should evolve or govern. But if "bending" and "growing" are, in fact, valid propositions, it logically follows that as the Court created the legal framework for the recognition and protection of the personhood of the corporate entity in the 1880s, it has the prerogative and should do the same for the fetus in the 1990s.137

VI. IN RE LIFE: CORPORATION V. FETUS

Though a corporation is now included in the constitutional definition of personhood, this legal fiction at some point naturally exhausts itself. A corporation, however defined, does not and cannot carry with it those biological and psychological characteristics which vivify a person—namely life. Though a subject in its own right, the judicial creation of the corporate person serves as a natural springboard to genuine issues of personhood.

134 Id. at 47. See Autumn Fox & Stephen R. McCallister, An Eagle Soaring: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 223, 304 (1997) (“An evolving constitution may travel through the vagaries of time, but a dead constitution—in all of its stillness—affords protection not just for the moment, and not for one person, but for all time and for all people.”).

135 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”).

136 See SCALIA, supra note 10, at 47.

137 For the view that a fetus may still deserve certain protections even if it does not fall within the constitutional definition of a "person," see LEONARD GLANTZ, ABORTION AND THE STATUS OF THE FETUS 107 (H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr. & Stuart F. Spicker eds., 1984).
One is led to explore the realistic and practical ramifications of denying the fetus those protections guaranteed by the constitutional framers—namely life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Corporate personhood is not the first and most certainly will not be the last of legal fictions, yet it is certainly one of the more visible. Courts have engaged in an intellectual shell game to offer corporations protections while simultaneously denying such protections to other beings, such as fetuses, though they come closer to "living" than does the corporate entity. It has been posited that corporations are substantially similar to "flesh-and-blood human" beings and, as such, are rightfully considered persons. But the relationship between the fetus and the per-

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138 See SCHALLER, supra note 127, at 156–57 (citing Myrdal, a mid-twentieth century European commentator, who stated that "Americans 'of all national origins, religion, creeds, and colors... hold in common the most explicitly expressed system of general ideals' of any Western nation [including] 'the essential dignity and equality of all human beings, of inalienable rights to freedom, justice, and opportunity'.") (footnotes omitted); O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 803 n.11 (1980) (asserting that Blackstone's vision of liberty influenced the Framers and quoting his statement that "'[t]he right of personal security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health and his reputation'") (emphasis omitted). Does it, then, withstand reason that the "inalienable right to opportunity" includes the right to be born into the world?

139 The legal fiction is a tool commonly used in legal jurisprudence. See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 622 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the idea that no wrong can be committed by the ruler, as "the vainest of all legal fictions"); Conservatorship v. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 854 (Ct. App. 1988) (acknowledging that allowing an unconscious patient to choose whether to receive medical treatment is a legal fiction). A legal fiction is also assumed by Justice O'Connor in using the reasonable observer for endorsement test purposes, which is, in her view, "a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the... social judgment." Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779–80 (1995) (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)); Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 635–36 (1989).


141 See Schane, supra note 69, at 564 (noting that the Supreme Court has been defining corporate personality since the nineteenth century). But corporations are not "persons" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy clause. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988).
son is more intellectually and physiologically analogous than is the fictional relationship between the corporation and the person.\textsuperscript{142} Does it stand to reason that the framers intended the corporation to receive greater personhood protection than the fetus? Some would answer in the affirmative.\textsuperscript{143} But if the "artificial being"\textsuperscript{144} of the corporation, composed of technical rules of governance,\textsuperscript{145} can be afforded the same protections as a human being, should not a fetus, arguably living, be afforded the same?\textsuperscript{146} It seems this rationale can be reduced to basic common sense which, arguably, is lacking in the current governance of this nation.\textsuperscript{147}

The term "person" may have a broad legal definition. For example, in statutory form "person" may refer to "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals." 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); see also United States v. Best Foods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1882 (1998) ("The term 'person' is defined in CERCLA to include corporations and other businessorganizations."); Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Non Statutory Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1612, 1709 n.385 (1997) (citing Lon Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 379 (1930–1931) for the proposition that an odd reversal has occurred between the term "person" and "corporation" over time). Although using "person" to refer to a corporation began as a fiction, this usage has become so widely accepted that it is now necessary to say "natural person" when referring to a "person" who is not a "corporation." See Siegel, supra at 1709.

\textsuperscript{142}See Charles Wolfe, Joseph Lambert to Succeed Stephens as Chief Justice, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., June 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7421438 (quoting newly-appointed Justice Joseph E. Lambert of the Kentucky Supreme Court who stated that a viable fetus should be protected by criminal law in the same way a "person" is).

\textsuperscript{143}Arnold H. Loewy, Why Roe v. Wade Should be Overruled, 67 N.C. L. REV. 939, 942 n.21 (1989) ("There is not a shred of historical evidence, of which I am aware, that would suggest that the framers thought of fetuses as persons against whom the State could not act except with due process of law.").

\textsuperscript{144}Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (describing the corporate entity as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law . . . [and] possesses only those properties which the [state-created] charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence").

\textsuperscript{145}"Corporations" should be distinguished, however, from "companies." See CONARD, supra note 64, at 136–38 (distinguishing the technical aspect of the corporation from the company which encompasses companionship, fellowship, and relationships between partners).

\textsuperscript{146}See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993) (defining "life" as an "animate being: the quality that distinguishes a vital and functional being from a dead body or purely chemical matter").

\textsuperscript{147}See SCHALLER, supra note 127, at 123 (stating that government tends to "operate to frustrate and humiliate citizens in defiance of common sense" and citing Philip K. Howard for the proposition that "by the absence of the one indispensable ingredient of any successful human endeavor: use of judgment . . . we have constructed a [legal] system [which] basically outlaws common sense" (citing PHILIP K.
The constitutional framers foresaw the liberty interests of future generations, as evidenced by their desire to explicitly secure the right of "posterity." Rationalizing the exclusion of the fetus from the definition of constitutional personhood while at the same time including the corporation appears inconsistent. Assuming, arguendo, that the inclusion of the fetus was not intended by the framers, the Court is free to treat the fetus in the same way it has treated the corporation and create constitutional protections unfounded in the constitutional text for the fetus. Accordingly, the Court should further its pronouncement of rights under the "evolving constitution" by following the guideline that "new rights are needed as a way of instrumentally advancing and making more secure the broad purposes of expressly mentioned rights." It would seem, based on past actions, that the Court could confidently protect the interests of the fetus by creating new rights through legal fiction or through any other device of its choice.

"The corporation does not exist in nature; unlike real persons it has no existence independent of the government that cre-
This concept of personhood was considered early on by Blackstone: "Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed us; artificial are such as are created and devised by human laws, for the purposes of society and government, and are called corporations or bodies politic." True, the fetus has not been granted the benefit of the legal fiction to establish its "existence" or its "artificial personhood." Nevertheless, and more convincing of fetal personhood is that the fetus exists, realistically, entirely independent of the government. Though the corporation is totally dependent on the government for its "life," the fetus has life irrespective of whether the government endows it with one. Some maintain that the corporation indeed exists, and that it merely relies on the government to afford it a "personality" via the construct of a legal fiction. Whence the corporation gets its existence is largely irrelevant. "The law [treats] the corporation . . . in many respects as though it were a natural person—which assuredly it is not." And, if the "existing" corporation is granted a personality and legal rights, then the fetus, whose existence is independent of the government, should be given the benefit of a fiction as well, whether it be of "life" or of "personality." It is alarming that the judiciary has granted greater freedoms and protections to the completely fictional de jure corporate person than to the de facto fetal life already in existence.

The reasons for lack of fetal protection remain open for debate. Approximately three in ten pregnancies end in abortion, and although fetal abortion appears to be declining, such statistics lend support to the intensity of the abortion contest. Out-

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153 Bad Company, supra note 64.
155 See WORMSER, supra note 16, at 8 ("Whatever of 'fiction' . . . is involved in the conception of the corporation is found in the fact that the law endows the corporation with personality.").
156 Id. (emphasis added).
158 See generally MARK CRUTCHER, ACCESS THE KEY TO PRO-LIFE VICTORY 19 (1998) (noting that abortion rates in the nation and in the majority of states declined between the late 1980s and early 1990s) (citing statistics of the Alan
side of the traditional "liberty" arguments currently disseminated that balance the rights of the mother against those of the unborn, one argument for the continued denial is the inevitable commotion that would arise in current constitutional law were the Court to recognize the fetus as a person entitled protection. Another argument for lack of fetal protection is the negative effect such protection would have on medical advances and treatments. Nevertheless, in 1997, one-half of Americans considered abortion on par with the murdering of a child. A 1987 survey by the Alan Guttmacher Institute listed the top four reasons for aborting a fetus as: (1) concerns about the way a child would affect the mother's life; (2) inability to afford the child; (3) desires to avoid single parenthood or existing problems in a relationship; and (4) lack of preparation for child-rearing responsibilities. Opponents of abortion argue that the primary reason for aborting the fetus is convenience coupled with a complete disregard for the living. Supporters of these positions condemn the use of abortion as a cure for "physical or psychological discomfort of the mother, over-population, financial hardships, [or] social insecurity." The Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade, addressed the above-
mentioned anti-abortion arguments when it weighed the rights of the fetus as a person against the mother's liberty right to abort the fetus.\textsuperscript{165} In \textit{Roe}, the Court was faced with the issue of whether a fetus was a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\textsuperscript{166} Rather then answer this question absolutely, the Court held that a state's interest in protecting "fetal life" only becomes compelling subsequent to viability.\textsuperscript{167} That is, a fetus is not afforded protection as a "person" before birth, but is afforded some protection after it becomes viable. The Court, in effect, decided that the status of the unborn should depend solely on the liberty interests of its mother.\textsuperscript{168}

Several justifications were provided in support of this controversial decision. Justice Blackmun articulated that one of the reasons the fetal protection claim had to fail was because there was no case law supporting the classification of a fetus as a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment.\textsuperscript{169} Another factor

\textsuperscript{165} See id. at 151–52; Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views, supra note 2.

\textsuperscript{166} See \textit{Roe}, 410 U.S. at 158 ("All this... persuades us that the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.") (footnote omitted). Certain states, including Wisconsin and Connecticut, have diverted from this conclusion. See id. at 158 n.55.

\textsuperscript{167} See \textit{Roe}, 410 U.S. at 163–164 (defining "viability" as the point at which the unborn "presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb[,]" and, as such, the time at which the state has a compelling interest to protect the fetus); see also Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., \textit{Abortion and Fetal Viability} (visited July 26, 1998) <http://www.plannedparenthood.org/library/abortion/fetalviability.html> (providing a general overview of the fetal viability issue).

\textsuperscript{168} See \textit{Roe}, 410 U.S. at 162 ("[T]he unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense."); see also Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, \textit{The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection}, 95 \textit{YALE L.J.} 599, 600 (1986) (reiterating the traditional rationale articulated in \textit{Roe} that the fetus had no individual rights independent of its mother).

The victory of a woman's liberty interest over the life of the fetus in \textit{Roe} has been challenged by recent state legislation limiting a pregnant woman's freedom. See \textit{Pregnant Drug Abusers Face Detention}, \textit{CHICAGO TRIB.}, June 17, 1998, at 16, available in 1998 WL 2867478 (describing a recent Wisconsin law which allows various professionals to report drug or alcohol abusing pregnant women to the authorities who can then have the women hospitalized or sent to a rehabilitation center); Bob Herbert, \textit{Fetal Protection Conceals Real Agenda}, \textit{MILWAUKEE J. SENTINAL}, June 16, 1998, at 12, available in 1998 WL 6333375 (citing a \textit{New York Times} article on the new Wisconsin law and emphasizing that the law provides no criminal sanctions although it does allow authorities to take action against abusive women. Conversely, the article proceeds to note that viewing the fetus as a person could lead to an erosion of women's rights, particularly the right to have an abortion.).

\textsuperscript{169} See \textit{Roe}, 410 U.S. at 157; see also Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views, supra note
the Court relied on was the use of the word "person" in other instances in the Constitution clearly did not include the fetus. This legal reasoning cannot withstand scrutiny. The argument that the use of a term throughout the Constitution generally should determine its meaning in specific instances is certainly flawed as it assumes a uniformity of meaning that may not exist. In fact, a wide application of this principle would call into question the constitutional rights of otherwise protected parties. For example, though children are at times a protected class, all constitutional provisions referring to "persons" do not apply prima facie to children. Based on this rationale, one could deny children and newborn infants constitutional protections and justify the decision by citing the instances throughout the Constitution in which children are not included in the definition of a "person." Thus, infanticide theoretically would be constitutionally permissible. Should we then apply this reasoning to corporations? The corporation, as a "person," has been denied constitutional protections in certain instances, yet it remains protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. Relying on Blackmun's reasoning in Roe, one could use instances where constitutional personhood protection was not afforded to the corporation to preclude the corporation from receiving Fourteenth Amendment protection.

Should the Court's rationales in Roe be held in high esteem? To reiterate, the Court's reasoning has also been criticized for determining the interests of the fetus based on the interests of others, mirroring the Dred Scott era. As a result, by denying

2. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157; see also Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views, supra note 2.

176 See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 404 (1856) (concluding that the ability of blacks to claim the rights and privileges of the Constitution hinged on the status of being "free persons").
fetal personhood protections, "the Court created [an entire] class of human beings who are disposable property." Despite the later Court's unwillingness to overrule Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court's reasoning in Roe may be described as an "arbitrary resolution of the abortion matter, no different in kind from the bare minimum that our politics could have supplied."

The Supreme Court's decision in Casey has, in turn, been vehemently criticized for its exemplification of a complete disre-
gard for the original foundation on which this country was built; namely, the concept of a Union supplanted with individual declarations of liberty. A fundamental principle since the inception of our government is that to live in the Union, individuals must sacrifice certain individual rights to serve the good of the nation. The unique characteristic and beauty of the United States is its composition of many people with differing viewpoints. So long as such differences exist, views and personal convictions will span the length of the spectrum. Though such individuality and uniqueness are desired, they must not overshadow the central principles of the union. As Robert Bork stated:

Americans now place less value on what we owe others as a matter of moral obligation; less value on sacrifice as a moral good, on social conformity, respectability, and observing the rules; less value on correctness and restraint in matters of physical pleasure and sexuality—and correlatively greater value on things like self-expression, individualism, self-realization, and personal choice.

The Court, in the view of many, has become notorious for "failing to require individuals to take responsibility for their own actions; failing to protect human values and to promote societal

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181 See infra note 182 and accompanying text; Richard A. Erb, Jr. & Alan W. Mortensen, Wyoming Fetal Rights—Why the Abortion "Albatross" is a Bird of a Different Color: The Case for Fetal-Federalism, 28 LAND & WATER L. REV. 627, 652 ("The idea that the United States Supreme Court alone can fairly legislate and adjudicate social policies violates traditional federalism. This violation manifests itself in decisions such as Roe.") (footnote omitted).

182 See THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 37 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[I]t is equally undeniable that whenever and however [the government] is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights . . . ."). Some argue that the barrage of individual freedoms sought by people of society today is out of control. Furthermore, they revert back to the notions of early America that focused on religion as the regulating force of such "complete" individual freedoms. See Robert N. Bellah, Religion and Legitimation in the American Republic, SOCIETY, Jan. 11, 1998, at 199 (citing Tocqueville, who "saw religion as the great restraining element that could turn naked self-interest into . . . 'self-interest rightly understood,' that is, a self-interest that was public spirited and capable of self-sacrifice").

183 Robert Bork was the Acting Attorney General for Richard Nixon during the Saturday Night Massacre and was later a nominee for United States Supreme Court. His nomination failed to obtain Congressional approval in 1987.

184 BORK, supra note 157, at 65 (quoting William J. Bennett). This notion hearkens back to the inception of our present government and, particularly, to the first Vice-President of the United States John Adams, who said that "[w]e have no government armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and religion." Bellah, supra note 182, at 193.
responsibility; [and] failing to . . . create a sense of coherence among the conflicting interests involved." The Court in Casey correctly stated that

[our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans to us and then to future generations. It is a coherent succession. Each generation must learn anew that the Constitution's written terms embody ideas and aspirations that must survive more ages than one. We accept our responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in light of all our precedents. We invoke it once again to define the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution's own promise, the promise of liberty.

Although the Court acknowledged the necessity of ensuring the Constitution's continuity, whose terms "must survive more ages than one," it engaged in an about-face, manipulating its commitment to the Constitution and conveniently disguising its creation of a society of individuals in terms of liberty. The Casey Court obliterated the communal foundations of our country, opting instead for a country where each person is, so to speak, the master of his own destiny with the opportunity to define his own sense of reality. The Court proclaimed that "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."

Although this statement may have historic support at some level, the Court created a "heretofore unheard-of constitutional right to 'personal dignity and autonomy.'" The Court's declaration thus completely defies the United States' republican form of government. Furthermore, the concept of "personhood," em-

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185 SCHALLER, supra note 127, at 137 (alluding to the illuminations of Herzog's character in The Sweet Hereafter). "When courts . . . [do not] reinforce[e] the goals of individual responsibility and societal well-being, they are incapable of serving either truth or justice." Id.


187 Id.

188 See supra notes 180–184 and accompanying text.

189 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.

190 Id. at 851.

191 For such an example, see Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (August 26, 1789), arts. 1, 4 and 5, translated in 10 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 71 (15th ed. 1985) and cited in SCALIA, supra note 10, at 134.

192 BORK, supra note 157, at 103.

193 See Bellah, supra note 182, at 197 ("A republic as an active political community of participating citizens must have a purpose and a set of values. . . . [and] must attempt to be ethical in a positive sense and to elicit the political commitment of its
bodilying a great deal more than "individuality," demands an integrated sense of self within a greater social order. The Court's decision in *Casey* reduces persons to the equivalent of isolated, Cartesian beings.

The United States Supreme Court was intended to interpret the Constitution based on sound legal reasoning and deliberation, not to decide social and political policies. The Supreme Court, according to some, has superseded its constitutional authority in that an issue as divisive as abortion should be left to the democratic process *vis a vis* the constitutional amendment process and individual state legislative initiatives. Because of certain ideological blocs on the Court and the greater role that the personal beliefs of individual justices have played in the judicial appointment process in recent years, one is led to believe that the judiciary is failing to fulfill its duties of deciding issues narrowly, exercising self-restraint, and identifying and surpassing its own biases. This is evidenced by appointers having greater concern about nominees' positions on salient issues than with their overall jurisprudential approaches.

citizens."). The United States, though often referred to as a democracy, is indeed a republican form of government— with votes cast for representative electors rather than, for example, convening at the town square for a literal one person, one vote poll.


195 See id. at 307 ("Historically, the resolution of questions of a fundamentally moral nature has been considered a state prerogative. . . . Thus, not only did Roe preempt state moral prerogatives and . . . legislative decision making[,] . . . it diminished . . . state and legislative authority."); Chuck Colson, *The Human Life Amendment* (visited Feb. 13, 1999) <http://www.breakpoint.org/scripts/60813.html> ("Passing a constitutional amendment would achieve a restoration of the democratic process, for ratification will involve an extended, formal process by which the people, not the courts, can decide the most divisive issue of our time. It could be a national referendum on the legal status of unborn children."). See generally supra note 181.


197 See Erb & Mortensen, supra note 181, at 627 (describing the importance of a Supreme Court nominee's position on abortion in the confirmation process).

198 See BORK, supra note 11, at 114, 220 (1990) (stating that the Roe decision is merely an expression of the Court's own subjective views about the morality of abortion).
It is said that corporate characteristics parallel that of a human being, including the ability to cause death, injury, disease, and severe physical pain, to enter into agreements and transactions, and to pay taxes. These attributes are not, however, those that come to mind as being the essence of "personhood." A person is thought of as one who breathes, grows, and develops. A person has facial attributes, a beating heart, and physical processes. In addition, a person has sensory perceptions, is endowed with reason, and experiences emotions. However creative the legal fiction drawn, the corporation cannot be said to possess any of these traits.

From the moment of conception the fetus has living characteristics. An embryo develops rapidly from the moment of its creation and can suffer injury in as little as seventy-two hours after conception. By two weeks of development, differentiation has begun, as cells begin to take on characteristics which enable them to form specific organs, including the "nervous system (including the brain), the skin and the hair...[as well as] the skeleton, connective tissues, blood system, urogenital system and most of the muscles." By the third week of fetal development, the heart, as well as the brain, spinal cord, muscles, and skeletal structure, have all started to develop, as have the

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199 See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
201 In contrast, a corporation with its legally defined personhood, lacks such characteristics. See FDIC v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1489 (10th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a corporation cannot suffer from emotional distress as it "lacks the cognizant ability to experience emotions"); Dynamic Image Techs., Inc. v. United States, 18 F. Supp.2d 146, 151 (D.P.R. 1998) (articulating the absence of a legal principle delineating corporate suffering of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
202 The term "embryo" generally refers to the developing child from the moment of conception to ten weeks of development, after which it is called a fetus. See GLADE B. CURTIS, YOUR PREGNANCY WEEK BY WEEK 95 (3rd ed. 1997). For the purposes of this paper the two will be used interchangeably, as a legal distinction has not been created between the terms "embryo" and "fetus" but, rather, between the viable and unviable fetus. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1972).
203 See CURTIS, supra note 202, at 37 (explaining that the embryo is a group of quickly developing cells).
204 See id. at 52 (explaining that embryonic damage from the use of drugs during pregnancy can lead to injury "as early as [three] days after conception").
205 Id. at 47 (explaining the development of the germ layers of cells which develop into various bodily systems and organs).
206 See id. at 54.
fetus’s eyes. At one month, the brain chambers, limb buds, and occasionally, the heartbeat can be observed. At five weeks of fetal development one finds progress in the brain and eyes, and the presence and formation of the nostrils, intestines, pancreas, and the bronchi of the lungs. At six weeks, the tubes that connect the throat and lungs are formed, arms and legs develop further, and fingers and toes are visible. At seven weeks the baby “looks more recognizable as a human being,” and is capable of movement. The fetus, at ten weeks old, possesses an audible heartbeat. Likewise, most bones have started to form, digits have separated, sex characteristics can be determined by observable external genitalia, the digestive system can excrete and absorb substances, hormones are produced, insulin is secreted, and there is fetal movement inside the uterus. Such movement is definite, including squinting and the movement of the mouth, fingers, and toes. By the time the fetus is eleven weeks old, its body and face resemble that of a fully developed human. At the thirteenth week, ossification of the skeletal system occurs and the fetus may be observed sucking its thumb.

When the fetus is between four and five months old, it begins activity and movement which can be felt by the mother, a process referred to as “quickening.” Approximately one month later, the digestive system is developed enough to enable the fetus to swallow, absorb needed materials, and pass unabsorbed substances. Development continues, and at twenty-five weeks, a little over six months of development, the eyelids will open and

\[207\] See id. at 223.
\[208\] See id. at 63.
\[209\] See id. at 62.
\[210\] See id. at 70.
\[211\] See id. at 73.
\[212\] Id. at 86.
\[213\] See id. at 86 (noting that ultrasound technology can detect the movement of the body and limbs).
\[214\] See id. at 102.
\[215\] See id. at 109, 193.
\[216\] See id. at 110.
\[217\] See id. at 117.
\[218\] See id. at 131.
\[219\] Id. at 138, 248 (referring to quickening as “the beginning of... bonding” and as “miraculous”).
\[220\] See id. at 176.
the baby will blink. Incidentally, twenty-five weeks of fetal development marks the beginning of the third trimester.

Unlike a corporation, a fetus may suffer bodily injury and death. The corporate parallels of injury or death—hostile takeover and voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy—hardly parallel the effects injury and death have on the human being. At the embryonic stage a fetus may be harmed by environmental pollutants and by medicinal and chemical factors which can lead to lead poisoning, cerebral palsy, microcephaly, ambiguous genital development, abnormalities of the bones, hands, reproductive organs, and central nervous system, mental retardation, limb defects, blindness, and possibly miscarriage. The use of drugs and alcohol likewise can have detrimental effects on the child's health, including an increased chance of deformities and miscarriage.

The Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey rejected the "rigid trimester framework," holding that no state has a right to place an "undue burden" on a mother's right to obtain an abortion prior to fetal viability. Is this, however, a meaningless distinction? Legally, viability is the point at which a state may "promot[e] its interest in the potentiality of human life" and can regulate and proscribe abortions. When one looks at the physical reality of fetal viability, however, one sees that although the means, that is, the trimester approach as compared to the fetal viability approach, may have changed, the result has stayed the same. The third trimester is marked at twenty-five weeks of fetal development. Realistically, "[b]etter methods of caring for premature babies have contributed to higher survival statistics [so that t]oday, infants born as early as [twenty-five] weeks of

221 See id. at 225.
222 See id. at 222.
224 See CURTIS, supra note 202, at 51, 90–91 (explaining that the fetus should be protected from chemicals and pollutants to ensure healthy development).
225 See id. at 52 (emphasizing the deleterious effects of cocaine use on a child in utero).
227 Id. at 878.
228 See id.
229 Id. at 879.
230 See generally CURTIS, supra note 202, at 207–14.
pregnancy can survive."  Earlier than that, however, fetal viability is less than promising. The premature birth survival rate for a fetus weighing 1.1–1.5 pounds, or in terms of time, at twenty-two to twenty-three weeks of development, is a mere 43%. Can one realistically say that a fetus, which has grown through to twenty-five weeks of development as outlined above, cannot be deemed a "life?" The Court, though perhaps less "rigid" in its rationale, seems to have created a distinction without a difference and has in effect ordained that life begins at approximately twenty-five weeks of fetal development.

But is it for the Court to determine when life begins? Setting aside the examination of viability and trimesters, the basic truth is that fetal development parallels that of a human being. Is one to say that the fetus is due less protection than a corporation because a corporation possesses more traits of "personhood" than does the fetus? It is argued that:

[One] cannot . . . believe that a corporation which "can level mountains, fill up valleys, lay down iron tracks and run railway cars on them" is "a mere conception of the legislative mind," or that it is a mere "artificial being invisible, intangible and existing only in contemplation of law," or that it is only an "invisible, intangible essence of air." Can a life with a developing brain, functioning organs, muscle, and skeletal structure seriously be denied at least as much protection as corporations, rivers, and lakes? Does the corporation deserve greater protection than a fetus with a beating heart simply due to its ability to "lay down iron tracks and run railway cars on them?" This seems to be, at best, an absurdity.

The passage of laws purporting to protect fetuses by declaring them "persons" is an accelerating national trend, and not a

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231 Id. at 240.
232 See id.
233 See id. at 201, 207.
234 See id. at 240.
235 WORMSER, supra note 16, at 7 (footnote omitted) (quoting New York Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909)); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 742–43 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("A ship has a legal personality, a fiction . . . [and t]he ordinary corporation is a 'person'. . . . [s]o it should be . . . [with] valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes . . . [and] air. . . .").
236 See Sam Orr, Equality is One Tough Equation, FLORIDA TODAY, June 26, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11940419 (discussing the Wisconsin law that recognized a fetus as a person with a right to life).
new phenomenon. Legal history is not completely devoid of the idea that the moment of conception is the moment at which life begins. In fact, some courts have held that human life begins at conception. A Tennessee appellate court in *Davis v. Davis*, although subsequently overruled, believed the conundrum of denying personhood protections to a fetus could not withstand reason when it articulated that a healthy fetus is, indeed, a person. Though it hinges on viability, the Supreme Court has let stand a 1997 South Carolina ruling which expands the definition of "child" under child-neglect and child-abuse statutes to include the unborn fetus. Following this trend of fetal protection, South Dakota and Wisconsin have passed laws allowing a husband, doctor, or guardian to request a court order that would confine a pregnant woman abusing "alcohol or drugs." These laws not only allow the government to make demands on a pregnant woman, but also delegate that right to other "interested

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237 See Donald Raum v. Restaurant Assocs., Inc., N.Y. L.J., July 13, 1998, at 26 (explaining that, "a fetus is considered a person when its injuries give rise to a criminal assault prosecution"); Herbert, supra note 168, at 12 (explaining recent legislation signed into law by Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson defining the "unborn child" as a human being from fertilization to birth). In the context of a survival statute, even a stillborn fetus has been considered a "person." See Wartell v. Woman's and Children's Hosp., Inc., 676 So.2d 632 (La. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 704 So.2d 778 (La. 1997).

238 See CNN Interactive, Roe v. Wade (visited June 22, 1999) <http://cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/roe.wade/audio/index.html> (Texas Asst. Atty. Gen. Robert Flowers explaining that "it is the position of the state of Texas that upon conception, we have a human being...”).


240 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594 (Tenn. 1992) (concluding that "[w]ithout live birth, the Supreme Court has said, a fetus is not a 'person'").

241 See Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *9 (articulating the primary issue in the case as "When does human life begin?").

242 See Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779 (S.C. 1997) ("South Carolina law has long recognized that viable fetuses are persons holding certain legal rights and privileges."); see also Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 261 (1960) (holding that denying a viable fetus personhood was "unsound and illogical" and unjust); Regina M. Coady, Comment, Extending Child Abuse Protections to the Viable Fetus: Whitner v. State of South Carolina, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 667, 682 (1997) (analyzing the Whitner decision and arguing that "[t]he child's physical location is irrelevant. . . [and that a] mother must not evade responsibility for abusing her child at the child's most vulnerable stage, its fetal stage").

Arguably, constitutional rights should be personal and the liberty of neither the mother nor the child in utero should be determined based on the rights of another. Nevertheless, the trend toward protecting the fetus, unable to protect itself, is evident.

Again, is it for the courts to determine when life begins, or is “life” a theological or medical designation? The Court in Roe, stated:

We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology . . . [are unable to] arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.

Ironically, this is exactly what the Court did. Historically, until Roe, the government of the United States had never limited nor forced the meaning of life. “It is not recorded that any American government, from the founding on, has ever thought it worthwhile to compel anyone’s concept of meaning or of the mystery of human life.” Yet the Court has in effect, proclaimed a beginning of life and imposed it upon members of society.

VII. WHEN DOES LIFE BEGIN?

The questions of whether the fetus is a person and when personhood begins are not new inquiries. Several theories of fetal personhood have emerged. The chromosomal completion theory is centered on the notion that from “the moment of fertilization . . . the creature . . . [which] has all the attributes of a human from the beginning . . . is not . . . a ‘potential life’ . . . .

247 Bork, supra note 157, at 103.
248 See id. at 174–76; see also Mario Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor’s Perspective (Speech at the Univ. of Notre Dame, Sept. 13, 1984), in More Than Words: The Speeches of Mario Cuomo 37 (1993) (“[T]he whole community . . . should agree on the importance of protecting life—including life in the womb, which is at the very least potentially human and should not be extinguished casually.”) (emphasis added); id. at 42 (“A fetus is different from an appendix or a set of tonsils. At the very least . . . the full potential of human life is indisputably there.”); Meyendorff, supra note 163, at 64 (positing that the cure for
social evils “cannot be achieved by killing innocent victims who possess a full potential for... human life”).

Other less compelling theories exist. The fetal consciousness theory is founded on the belief that “it is doubtful that a fetus becomes conscious until well after the time most abortions are performed, and even if he or she is conscious, that would not put the fetus at a level of awareness comparable to that of a dog, let alone a chimpanzee.” BORK, supra note 157, at 178. One recognizes the inherent weakness of this theory when looking at patients in persistent vegetative states [hereinafter PVS]. There are many similarities between a fetus and a PVS patient. “PVS patients continue to breathe, have blood pressure, react to light, and respond with merely physical reflexes, such as grimacing or yawning.” Linder, supra note 245, at 1184 (footnote omitted). Like the fetus, PVS patients have recently become the subject of a new argument in the right to life debate, which has spiraled out of the fetal right to life debate. See Linder, supra note 245, at 1183 (describing the recent trend in the right to life debate and adding PVS patients among aborted fetuses as a subject of the right to life controversy); see also BORK, supra note 157, at 176 (addressing similarities between the fetus and the PVS patient). The underlying issue in the PVS scenario is whether the state can justifiably terminate medical treatment—that is, supporting or aiding the taking of a human life—irrespective of the PVS patient’s consent. See Linder, supra note 245, at 1183 (explaining the debate between those who believe such state action is wrong and in violation of its authority and those who believe that it is a “pragmatic choice” in a world of detached and reasoned considerations of medical options).

Tangential issues in the PVS debate pit the value of ongoing medical care against the value of life. See id. at 1186 (noting that exorbitant public health costs are receiving increased scrutiny). But see id. at 1187 (suggesting an increase in the number of PVS patients and the growing trend toward euthanasia may be providing ammunition for the movement supporting the termination of the lives of PVS patients). Many of the same concerns voiced in the fetal abortion context are expressed in the PVS context. See MEYENDORFF, supra note 163, at 64 (drawing an analogy between the aborting of a fetus and the killing of the terminally ill stating that “[i]f the ‘terminally’ sick... were put quietly to death, what a psychological relief for those psychologically and materially responsible for their continued existence! But what a horrible and totally unhuman perspective for society! [I]t is quite frightening to discover how close to its realization we already are.”) (emphasis added). Since the fetus is indeed a person, as is the PVS patient, it is argued that the fetus is entitled to the same protections afforded a human being. See Johnsen, supra note 168, at 602. Likewise, fetuses should be afforded greater protections under the law due to their complete inability to protect themselves. See CNN World News Briefs, Canada Bill Bans Sex Selection, Surrogate Motherhood (visited June 22, 1999) <http://cnn.com/WORLD/9606/14/newbriefs/index.html> (highlighting Canadian legislation in response to certain genetic and reproductive practices and identifying them as “‘contrary to the principles of human dignity, respect for life, and protection of the vulnerable’”). One of the more troubling illustrations of the particular need for fetal protection was the discovery of 30 human fetuses in a dirt field in San Bernadino, California. See CNN Interactive, Children Find Boxes Containing Human Fetuses (visited June 22, 1999) <http://cnn.com/US/9703/15/briefs.pml/fetus>.

The anatomical viability theory, centered on the point at which the fetus’ physical body can sustain its own life, completely ignores both fetal development up until the point of viability as well as the theological and philosophical views of when life begins. See Abortion and Fetal Viability, supra note 167. The Planned Parenthood home page defines “fetal viability” as the point at which,
This theory proposes that because a fetus is chromosomally complete at the point of conception it is fully human from the beginning. Thus, it provides one of the strongest arguments in support of the view that a fetus is a person from the moment of conception. This parallels the Warnock Report on Human Fertilization and Embryology published by the Warnock Committee. In its report, the committee enunciated that individual human development begins at fourteen to fifteen days of fetal growth. As such, it is posited that the fetus inside the mother's body should not be considered merely a "clump of tissues" but [the fetus] reaches an "anatomical threshold" when critical organs, such as the lungs and kidneys, can sustain independent life. Until the air sacs are mature enough to permit gases to pass into and out of the bloodstream, which is extremely unlikely until at least 23 weeks gestation (from last menstrual period), a fetus cannot be sustained even with a respirator, which can force air into the lungs but cannot pass gas from the lungs into the bloodstream.

Id. (quoting the collective amicus brief of the American Medical Association, American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, American Academy of Pediatrics, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Fertility Society, American Medical Women's Association, American Psychiatric Association, and American Society of Human Genetics for Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, No. 88-605, at 7 (October Term 1998)).

BORK, supra note 157, at 175 (quoting Roe v. Wade language of "potential life"). Bork explains that:

[The new organism is . . . a different individual. This cell produces specifically human proteins and enzymes from the beginning. Its chromosomes will heavily influence its destiny until the day of its death, whether that death is at the age of ninety or one month after conception.

The cell will multiply and develop, in accordance with its individual chromosomes, and, when it enters the world, will be recognizably a human baby. From single-cell fertilized egg to baby to teenager to adult to old age to death is a single process of one individual . . . . It is impossible to draw a line anywhere after the moment of fertilization and say that before this point the creature is not human but after this point it is. It has all the attributes of a human from the beginning, and those attributes were in the forty-six chromosomes with which it began . . . . Such creature is not a blob of tissue or . . . a "potential life" . . . but rather a life with potential.

Id. (emphasis added).

See id. at 174–76.

See MARY WARNock, A QUESTION OF LIFE—THE WARNock REPORT ON HUMAN FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (1985).

See id. at 59 (holding that state regulation of embryonic research should begin when the fetus reaches approximately two weeks). See STenger, supra note 179, at 144 (providing an overview of the Warnock Report).

Terry Gross, James McCartney on the 25th Anniversary of Roe v. Wade, FRESH AIR, Jan. 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2923510 (quoting Dr. James McCartney, Chair of the Department of Philosophy, Villanova University, and Eth-
rather as "the human form taking shape."²⁵⁴

"The moral debate over abortion centers on the point in the development of the fertilized ovum when it has acquired those characteristics that entitle it to moral respect."²⁵⁵ As stated earlier, there is strong public sentiment for the proposition that life begins at conception.²⁶⁶ The Warnock Committee recognized this public sentiment as strong support for the view of the "absolute sanctity" of life from the moment of conception.²⁵⁷ Life, however, has not always been deemed to begin at conception.²⁶⁸ Historically, "[a]lthough conception and the earliest stage of pregnancy before quickening, no one believed that a human life existed; not even the Catholic Church took this view."²⁶⁹ The modern Christian view of this issue, however, is that life begins at the moment of conception. The Catholic Church teaches that, "[h]uman life must be respected and protected absolutely from the moment of conception. From the first moment of his existence, a human being must be recognized as having the rights of a person—among which is the inviolable right of every innocent being to life."²⁷⁰ Similarly, in the view of the Orthodox Christian churches, the celebrations of the Feast of the Conception of St. John the Baptist and the Feast of the Annunciation of Christ²⁶ⁱ lend direct support for the inherent belief that human life begins at conception rather than at the time of viability.²⁶² Likewise, the Hebraic prophesies in the Old Testament lend support to life beginning prior to birth, as one finds in Jeremiah, "before I formed you in the womb I knew you, before you were born I dedicated you."²⁶³

The ability to procreate has been described as "a God-like privilege of man, which he has no right to refuse if he wants to

²⁵⁴ Id.
²⁵⁵ BORK, supra note 157, at 176.
²⁵⁶ See id. at 174; WARNOCK, supra note 251.
²⁵⁷ Stenger, supra note 178, at 142.
²⁵⁹ Id. (footnotes omitted).
²⁶⁰ CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 547 § 2270 (1994) (emphasis added). The official rules of the Catholic Church provide for excommunication as a penalty for aborting a life in the mother's womb.
²⁶¹ The Feast of the Annunciation of Christ is the celebration of the Conception of Christ Himself, as Man, in the womb of the Virgin Mary. See MEYENDORFF, supra note 163, at 64.
²⁶² See id.
²⁶³ Jeremiah 1:5.
preserve the ‘image and likeness of God’ given him at his creation.”

"Indeed, for those who believe a fetus has a soul and is a unique, irreplaceable object of God’s affection and human responsibilities, it is hard to imagine how the fetus could not have interests and rights commensurate with those responsibilities."

To that end, undoubtedly the aborting of a fetus is, in Biblical tradition, “an interruption of human life.” In light of the many “persons” that have been afforded constitutional protection throughout our history, it appears that fetal life should likewise be granted those same rights and protections, as demonstrated by traditional legal doctrine and various religious beliefs.

It is commonly argued that one must be born and alive to qualify as a person. Yet the intent of our Constitution’s framers regarding the definition of a “person” remains unclear. Assuming, arguendo, that the framer’s intended that only the living receive constitutional protection, it appears that satisfying the criterion of “living” may have been insufficient. Arguably, the framers’ intent was to include only the typical white male property owner in their meaning of “person.”

Today, the idea of non-whites being

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\textsuperscript{264} MEYENDORFF, supra note 163, at 61.
\textsuperscript{266} MEYENDORFF, supra note 163, at 64.
\textsuperscript{267} See supra notes 37–46 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{268} See Orr, supra note 236 (“The issue of personal freedom is very touchy, but the Constitution is clear in this regard. It was written to permit a man to do pretty much as he pleases, and I use the term man with foresight.”) (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{269} See THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 336 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining the general objection to including slaves in representation calculations was the notion that “[s]laves are considered as property, not as persons . . . [and should be] comprehended in estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and to be excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of persons”). Madison rejected the notion of slaves exclusively as property interests:

[One] must deny the fact that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons.... [T]he slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, [and in] his liberty... the slave is no less evidently regarded by the
denied personhood protections is inconceivable. But the history of Supreme Court decisions has endorsed this notion, establishing the real potential for such drastic consequences. In *Dred Scott v. Sanford*, it was held that blacks were "beings of an inferior order," and as such would be considered mere "ordinary article[s] of merchandise and traffic." Thus, individuals who clearly are born, alive, and human, were considered property rather than persons.

That type of decision is not unusual. Historically, the Court has violated fundamental rights, as in *Dred Scott*. The effects of the *Dred Scott* decision were dreadful. "[I]t took a civil war to clean up the mess left by the Supreme Court . . . in *Dred Scott*." Does this "public sentiment" that governed at that time in any way justify or excuse the intolerable treatment of black slaves? The obvious answer is "no." It is crucial to consider whether, in another 150 years, we will awaken to discover that the current treatment of the fetus is as appalling as was the treatment received by black slaves, obviously persons, almost 150 years ago.

**CONCLUSION**

The United States Supreme Court has deemed the corpora-
tion a “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment and has afforded corporations great constitutional protections. The Court, in delineating corporate rights and protections, has not based its decisions upon the rights of others. Nevertheless, in the context of fetal life, the Court has persistently balanced fetal rights against the liberty interests of the mother. The determination of one’s rights must not be based on those of another. The affording of rights to a class of “persons” must be determined through interpretation of the United States Constitution and the amendments thereto.

Undeniably the Court has created and extended rights where it has deemed appropriate, regardless of whether the judiciary has assumed powers it was not originally intended to have. This is perhaps the prime example of how the Court-created legal fiction guarantees and creates rights for “persons” to whom such rights otherwise would be unavailable. Likewise, the Court must afford the fetus, whether through the employment of the legal fiction or the recognition of the fetus as a life from the moment of conception, constitutional protection as a “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment.

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