CPLR 5201: Reservation Clause in Liability Policy Causes New Seider Problems

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The rule of *Seider v. Roth*\(^{110}\) allows a New York plaintiff to maintain a quasi-in rem action by attaching the contractual obligations of a liability insurer to defend and indemnify a nonresident insured defendant. The value of the attached res is the limit of the liability policy\(^{111}\) and the insurer, who is the true party in interest, is liable up to this amount in the event the insured defendant is held responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries. Since a plaintiff only resorts to this peculiar procedure when no other basis of jurisdiction over the defendant is available, the typical *Seider* case involves an out-of-state accident and a defendant whose only contact with New York is the amenability of his insurer to process here. Despite the extremely tenuous nexus with the forum state in such cases, *Seider* has thus far withstood constitutional attack.\(^{112}\)

A new problem spawned by the *Seider* doctrine arose in *Seligman v. Tucker*,\(^{113}\) wherein a New York resident plaintiff commenced a personal injury action arising out of a Massachusetts accident by attaching the Washington, D.C. resident defendant’s automobile liability policy. The policy contained the following provision:

> The Company shall have no obligation to indemnify, pay to or on behalf of, or defend any person entitled to protection under this policy where such obligations or this policy provide the sole basis

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\(^{112}\) In its first constitutional test in the federal courts, the *Seider* doctrine was held unconstitutional, the court proceeding on the assumption that New York law did not allow a limited appearance. The court reasoned that unless the defendant was permitted to defend on the merits without conferring in personam jurisdiction, he would be denied due process of law. Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Indeed at the time *Seider* and *Podolsky* were decided, CPLR 320(c)(1) had not yet been enacted and no other New York authority for a limited appearance existed. Subsequently, however, in Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1968), the New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant in a *Seider*-type action could appear and defend on the merits without suffering any in personam consequences. This holding rescued *Seider* from oblivion. In Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), aff’d en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844, rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 949 (1969), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the *Seider* procedure as supplemented by the limited appearance created in *Simpson*. In so holding, the court assumed that if the defendant were unsuccessful in his defense he would not be estopped in a subsequent in personam suit by the quasi in rem judgment rendered against him in the *Seider* action. The court added the proviso that the plaintiff in a *Seider* action must be a New York resident. The latter requirement was reiterated in Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969).

\(^{113}\) 75 Misc. 2d 72, 347 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1973).
of jurisdiction of the court over said persons, such obligations, or this policy.\textsuperscript{114}

The defendants moved to vacate the order of attachment, arguing that the above provision prevented any res from coming into existence. The court denied the motion, quoting from the Seider opinion wherein it was observed that "the policy [an automobile liability policy without the clause at issue in Seligman] casts on the insurer several obligations which accrue as soon as the insurer gets notice of an accident, and whether or not suit is brought."\textsuperscript{115} These pre-existing obligations, the Seligman court held, constitute an attachable res, despite the contractual limitation on the obligation to defend and indemnify.

The court's holding immediately raises certain practical questions. Is the value of the res still the full measure of the policy limits despite the reservation clause, or is it merely the value of the miscellaneous package of rights which accrue before suit commencement, such as the right to receive certain medical payments or to have the insurer investigate the accident? If the latter is the rule, the plaintiff can look forward to only a meager recovery. In Simpson v. Loehmann,\textsuperscript{116} the Court of Appeals held that "[f]or the purpose of pending litigation, which looks to an ultimate judgment and recovery, such value [of the attached res] is [the policy's] face amount and not some abstract or hypothetical value."\textsuperscript{117} The policy in Simpson, however, did not contain the clause at issue in Seligman. Unfortunately, the Seligman court refused to address the question, stating that the "rights, duties and obligations under the policy here are between [the insurer] and the defendants. It is not for this court to decide those matters in this proceeding."\textsuperscript{118} The court did, however, strongly suggest that the clause might be given no effect and the insurer held liable for the full policy limits. Referring to the fact that the insurance form had been administratively approved in New York, the court declared that "[t]he administrative act of the Superintendent of Insurance, in approving the form of an insurance contract, cannot be presumed to defeat the public policy of the State of New York, or overcome the law as settled by the Courts of New York."\textsuperscript{119}

If it was the court's intent that the policy provision be vitiated

\textsuperscript{114}Id. at 73, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
\textsuperscript{117}Id. at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
\textsuperscript{118}75 Misc. 2d at 74, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
\textsuperscript{119}Id. at 74, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
completely, its treatment of the issue seems too perfunctory. By over-
riding an agreement in a contract negotiated and delivered in another
jurisdiction and involving only nonresidents, a state may exceed the
bounds of due process. The question of a state's power in this sphere
was considered by the United States Supreme Court in *Watson v. Em-
ployers Liability Assurance Company*. There the validity of a Lou-
isiana direct action statute was at issue. The plaintiff was a Louisiana
resident, injured in Louisiana by a product manufactured in an-
other state. The Louisiana court allowed a direct action against the
manufacturer's liability insurer although the insurance contract, which
had been negotiated and delivered outside Louisiana, contained a pro-
vision prohibiting such actions. The Supreme Court allowed the
Louisiana court to override the policy provision, placing great emphasis
on the state's interest in providing a forum for the redress of injuries
occurring within its own borders. The Court conceded that "[s]ome
contracts made locally, affecting nothing but local affairs, may well
justify a denial to other states of power to alter those contracts."

It has been argued that in *Watson* the forum state's interest in the
case was much stronger than in *Seider*. In the former case, the injury
occurred within the forum state, a fact which in certain circumstances
may even provide a basis for in personam jurisdiction. In the latter
case, the only jurisdictional nexus was the plaintiff's residence in the
forum state. Thus in the *Seider* situation the forum's interest may not
be strong enough to justify its rewriting a contract between nonresi-
dents.

An earlier United States Supreme Court case, *Home Insurance
Co. v. Dick*, placed a clear limitation on a state's power to disregard
provisions in out-of-state contracts. A Mexican resident insured com-
menced a quasi-in-rem action against a Mexican insurer in a Texas
court by garnishing reinsurers present there. The policy sued upon was
negotiated, executed, and was to be performed in Mexico, and con-
tained a contractual statute of limitations on claims. Although this
limitations period had elapsed, the Texas court allowed the insured to
proceed, applying the Texas limitations period to the action. The
United States Supreme Court held that "Texas was . . . without power

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121 Id. at 71.
122 Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 116 (2d Cir. 1968) (Anderson, J., dissenting),
aff'd en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844, rehearing denied, 396 U.S.
123 See, e.g., CPLR 302(a)(3).
124 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
to affect the terms of contracts so made. Its attempt to impose a greater obligation than that agreed upon and to seize property in payment of the imposed obligation violates the guaranty against deprivation of property without due process of law."

The analogy to the Seligman case is quite clear. If the Seligman court's intent was to ignore the provision absolving the insurer from liability in Seider-type cases, the effect would be to impose a greater obligation than the insurer had agreed to assume. *Home Insurance* requires the state to show some interest in the case before it can do this.

As the Seligman case demonstrates, the Seider doctrine has a boundless propensity for creating new problems. To ameliorate this situation, a recent legislative proposal would replace Seider with a direct action statute. A right of action would be created against automobile liability insurers doing business or qualified to do business in New York. The action would be maintainable against the insurer regardless of any contrary provision in the policy but only in cases involving out-of-state automobile accidents where no basis of personal jurisdiction over the insured is present. The proposed statute would bar all attachment of liability policies. While an action under this statute might involve the voiding of provisions in out-of-state contracts, its limitation to automobile cases makes it less objectionable than the Seider doctrine which could conceivably have a wider application. More importantly, the direct action statute would avoid the quasi-in-rem nature of the proceeding, thus eliminating the troublesome question of determining the value of the attached res. Hopefully, this proposal will soon become the law.

**CPLR 5240:** Court indicates that relief from a completed sale of real property will be difficult to obtain.

Too often the sale of a judgment debtor's home pursuant to CPLR 5236 results in a miscarriage of justice. In many cases, a substantial

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125 *Id.* at 408.


127 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT TO THE 1973 LEGISLATURE IN RELATION TO THE CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES, PROPOSALS RELATING TO A RIGHT OF DIRECT ACTION AGAINST LIABILITY INSURANCE CARRIERS, MCKINNEY'S N.Y. SESSION LAWS 2046-50 (1973). This proposal was passed by the 1973 Legislature but was vetoed by the Governor.

128 Professor David D. Siegel notes that most of the problems of the Seider doctrine arise from its quasi in rem mold. 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5201, supp. commentary at 51-52 (1973).

129 In 1963, both the right of redemption and the requirement that personal property