

CPLR 5240: Protecting the Abused Judgment Debtor

St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview>

Recommended Citation

St. John's Law Review (1972) "CPLR 5240: Protecting the Abused Judgment Debtor," *St. John's Law Review*: Vol. 46 : No. 4 , Article 23.
Available at: <https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol46/iss4/23>

This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lasalar@stjohns.edu.

to the judgment debtor the judgment will be executed. When the third party is a corporation with which the debtor is a building superintendent, may service upon the corporation be effectuated by service upon the debtor as its agent?

This issue was resolved in the negative in *St. Francis Hospital v. Tudor Apartments*.¹⁴¹ The Supreme Court, Orange County, stated therein that the execution should have been served upon "an executive officer, or some agent of the corporation whose duties are of sufficient importance to make it reasonably probable that process will be brought to the attention of the corporation."¹⁴² Service upon a judgment debtor in his alleged capacity as agent of a corporation was understandably characterized as imprudent.¹⁴³

CPLR 5240: Protecting the abused judgment debtor.

In deciding the foreclosure proceedings of *Dime Savings Bank of New York v. Barnes*,¹⁴⁴ the Supreme Court, Nassau County, has again utilized CPLR 5240 in an effort to minimize judicial abuse.¹⁴⁵ It is within the purview of 5240 that the court may at any time, upon a motion or on its own initiative, make any order regarding any enforcement proceeding of the CPLR. The court may deny, limit, condition, regulate, extend or modify the use of any enforcement proceeding found therein.¹⁴⁶

In *Barnes*, plaintiff-bank had properly declared the defendant-mortgagor in default and accordingly was granted summary judgment of foreclosure. However, mindful of defendant's attempts to make the mortgage account current and of the age and ill health of defendant's mother, with whom defendant lived, the court determined this case to be "a proper case for the exercise of the court's discretion, in the interest of justice, as provided in CPLR 5240. . . ."¹⁴⁷ In so finding, the court stayed the enforcement of its judgment upon the express condition that the defendant pay the entire arrearages due the plaintiff

¹⁴¹ 67 Misc. 2d 803, 325 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1971).

¹⁴² *Id.* at 804, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 600, citing 9 CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 64:253 (1966).

¹⁴³ 67 Misc. 2d at 804, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 600.

¹⁴⁴ 67 Misc. 2d 837, 325 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971) (mem.).

¹⁴⁵ In *Lee v. Community Capital Corp.*, 67 Misc. 2d 699, 324 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971), discussed in *The Quarterly Survey*, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. —, — (1972), this same court utilized CPLR 5240 in order to invalidate an execution sale where, had the sale been allowed, the debtor's equity of \$20,000 would have been lost for failure to pay only a few hundred dollars.

¹⁴⁶ *E.g.*, *Gilchrist v. Commercial Credit Corp.*, 66 Misc. 2d 791, 322 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971), discussed in *The Quarterly Survey*, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 355, 378 (1971). See 6 WK&M 5240.02.

¹⁴⁷ 67 Misc. 2d at —, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 368.

on the mortgage, and further, that the account not lapse into more than one month's arrears at any future date. Failure by defendant to satisfy these requirements would allow the plaintiff to have the mortgaged premises sold as per the judgment granted in foreclosure.

As evidenced by this decision,¹⁴⁸ CPLR 5240 is a valuable safeguard against judicial injustices. Attorneys should not hesitate to request its application, and judges should not refrain to use it as the broad source of authority it is intended to be.¹⁴⁹

ARTICLE 55 — APPEALS GENERALLY

CPLR 5519(a)(1): Stay protects the state from punishment for contempt.

Pursuant to CPLR 5519(a)(1), the state, its political subdivisions, and its officers and agencies are accorded an automatic stay in any enforcement proceeding once a notice of appeal is served upon the adverse party.¹⁵⁰ Such service is complete under CPLR 2103(b)(2) the moment it is mailed.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court, Nassau County, held in *Byrne v. Long Island State Park Commission*,¹⁵¹ that the state and the attorney general were not guilty of contempt because state officials prevented peaceful picketing in contravention of an injunction order.¹⁵² Thirty minutes after service of a copy of this order, the state mailed a notice of appeal to the plaintiff, thereby effectively staying the injunction, although the notice was not received until several days later.¹⁵³ Concluding that the stay foreclosed punishment for the state's activity during this interim,¹⁵⁴ the court denied the defendant's request to renew the application upon proper papers.¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁸ *Accord*, *Lee v. Community Capital Corp.*, 67 Misc. 2d 699, 324 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971).

¹⁴⁹ See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5236, supp. commentary at 155 (1970).

¹⁵⁰ See 7 WK&M ¶ 5519.03.

¹⁵¹ 67 Misc. 2d 1084, 325 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971).

¹⁵² *Byrne v. Long Island State Park Comm'n*, 66 Misc. 2d 1070, 323 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971).

¹⁵³ 67 Misc. 2d at 1086, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 149, *citing* *Hacker v. City of New York*, 25 App. Div. 2d 35, 266 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1st Dep't), *rev'd on other grounds*, 26 App. Div. 2d 400, 275 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1st Dep't 1966), *aff'd*, 20 N.Y.2d 722, 229 N.E.2d 613, 283 N.Y.S.2d 46, *cert. denied*, 390 U.S. 1036 (1967).

¹⁵⁴ 67 Misc. 2d at 1086, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 149-50. The court cited *Union Free School Dist. No. 7 v. Allen*, 30 App. Div. 2d 629, 290 N.Y.S.2d 669, 671 (3d Dep't 1968), where it was held that a stay was itself suspended while an appeal by the Commissioner of Education was pending.

¹⁵⁵ Plaintiff had proceeded by notice of motion rather than by order to show cause or by warrant of attachment, as required by statute (N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 757 (McKinney 1968)). 67 Misc. 2d at 1085, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 148. There is disagreement as to whether this defect is jurisdictional in nature or a mere irregularity. *Compare, e.g.*, *Johnson v. Ackerman*, 192 App. Div. 890, 181 N.Y.S. 772 (2d Dep't 1920) *with, e.g.*, *Maigille v. Leonard*,