CPLR 3025(b): Practice of Granting Leave To Amend Pleadings Without Inquiry into the Merits of the Cause of Action as Amended Ruled No Longer Tolerable

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In both the above hypothetical and Perez, the manufacturer, i.e.,
the guilty party, has been immunized from liability at the expense of a
party with a legitimate claim. In all fairness, Mendel is only partly
responsible for this result inasmuch as earlier cases had labelled the
defendant's claim as one for breach of warranty, rather than one for
indemnification. The latter construction could conceivably remedy
much of the injustice inherent in this area; the statute of limitations
on the claim for indemnification would not begin to run until defen-
dant paid a judgment secured by the injured party. Regrettably, lower
courts have not been willing to adopt this approach. Nonetheless, there
could be little objection to thrusting ultimate liability on the actual
wrongdoer. Perhaps, judicial reaction to Mendel will result in a reap-
praisal of the earlier decisions which refused to compare the innocent
retailer with a passive tortfeasor in negligence cases.

ARTICLE 30 — REMEDIES AND PLEADINGS

CPLR 3025(b): Practice of granting leave to amend pleadings without
inquiry into the merits of the cause of action as amended no longer tolerable.

Among those powers “inherent in the court as a part of its ordinary
jurisdiction” is the power to amend pleadings. The statutory declara-
tion of this authority, contained in CPLR 3025(b), instructs that leave
to amend shall be “freely given,” but is silent as to what mode of in-
quiry should be made into the propriety of such amendment. Histori-
cally, the courts have applied a rule of strict non-inquiry into the merits
of the proposed amended pleadings, save in instances where the allega-
tions contained therein are patently without substance. Recently,
however, in East Asiatic Co. v. Corash, the Appellate Division, First
Department, characterized this practice as no longer tolerable, reason-
ing that “[t]he day when motion practice would be allowed to pro-
liferate through avoiding coming to grips with the substantial question

91 See cases cited note 88 supra.
95 Christal v. Kelly, 88 N.Y. 285, 290 (1882); see also Kalt Lumber Co. v. Dupignac, 150 App. Div. 400, 184 N.Y.S.1098 (1st Dep't 1912).
is past. We can no longer afford the time or judicial manpower for the repeated applications for the same relief which necessarily result from postponing decision."98

There would seem to be nothing to preclude the East Asiatic decision. The time-honored rule of non-inquiry into the merits of a 3025(b) motion to amend is derived strictly from the case law of the various departments of the appellate division.99 Lacking any instruction to the contrary from the Court of Appeals, the discretion available to the court under rule 3025(b) would appear to be broad enough to include an inquiry into the merits.

**ARTICLE 31 — Disclosure**

**CPLR 3101:** Court recognizes that public policy grounds for restricting disclosure in matrimonial action are no longer viable.

It had long been ruled that disclosure in matrimonial actions should be limited to cases wherein the movant demonstrated "special circumstances."100 For, disclosure was deemed to be burdensome and it was feared that discovery proceedings would jeopardize the parties' chances for a reconciliation.101 With the enactment of the DRL, however, and its provision for extensive conciliation proceedings,102 it was posited that the public policy grounds for restricting the use of disclosure devices in matrimonial actions were no longer viable.103 This approach was adopted by the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in *Dunlap v. Dunlap*.104

In *Dunlap* plaintiff-wife sought to examine defendant on two claims: her cause of action for divorce based on the nonfault ground of living apart for a period of two years pursuant to a separation agreement and defendant's counterclaim based on adultery. Recognizing that the grounds for denying disclosure have been "substantially diminished," the court permitted plaintiff to examine defendant regarding her action for divorce. However, the court properly disallowed

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98 Id. at 434, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
99 See note 96 infra.
102 DRL § 215(c) et seq.