CPLR 6214(d): Special Proceeding May Be Commenced Against Defendant As Well As Garnishee To Compel Payment to Sheriff

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damages. The court distinguished cases not allowing appeals in single trials, *i.e.*, where "the issue of liability is first determined by triers who promptly go on to hear the issue of damages," 148 emphasizing that the decision was limited to split trials.

Thus, in the interests of uniformity in appellate practice and in the administration of justice, the appellate division, second department, reinforces the position taken by the first department. In the second department, an appeal will now lie as of right regardless of whether the determination was made by a court or a jury or whether the appeal is made from an interlocutory judgment or an order.

**ARTICLE 62 — ATTACHMENT**

_CPLR 6214(d): Special proceeding may be commenced against defendant as well as garnishee to compel payment to sheriff._

_CPLR 6214(d) provides that where an order of attachment has been levied upon property or debts a special proceeding may be commenced against the *garnishee* by the plaintiff to compel the payment of the debt to the sheriff._

_In _Hom-De-Lite Realty Corp. v. Trimboli_, 149 plaintiff initiated a proceeding to compel the *defendant*, as distinguished from the garnishee, to pay a sum of money to the sheriff, upon which money a levy had been previously made by an order of attachment. The court held that, although CPLR 6214(d) does not expressly provide that the plaintiff has such a remedy against the defendant in the action, other related statutory provisions clearly imply that the remedy is available against the defendant._

150 It appears that this construction of the statute is in accordance with the legislature's intent in enacting CPLR 6214(d). 151 Since related sections such as CPLR 6202 provide that where the term "judgment debtor" is referred to in certain sections of the CPLR, it should be construed to mean "defendant." It is a reasonable inference that "garnishee" should also be construed to mean "defendant." This is especially true when the literal construction of the terms results in unnecessary hardship. 152

148 Id. at 37, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
149 28 App. Div. 2d 1127, 284 N.Y.S.2d 141 (2d Dep't 1967).
150 See CPLR 5225, 6202.
151 See MCKINNEY'S STATUTES, Bk. I, § 111 at 180, in which it is stated that remedial statutes should receive a liberal construction: "[I]t is particularly proper to extend their operation to cases within the intent of the lawmakers though not covered by the exact meaning of their language."
152 Id.