CPLR 7501: No Right to Jury Trial on Threshold Questions

St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol42/iss3/39
CPLR 6214: Extension for perfection of attachment may be granted even after ninety-day limitation period.

CPLR 6214 provides that a levy upon any interest in personal property or debts made by service of an order of attachment is void after ninety days unless: (1) the sheriff has taken into his control the thing attached; or, (2) the plaintiff has commenced a special proceeding to compel payment or delivery of the res; or, (3) the plaintiff has procured an extension of the ninety-day limitation.

Under the CPA, where an action was in rem and the levy had not been perfected within the ninety-day period, the order of attachment as well as the levy became void. Since the in rem action was based upon the attachment, it had to be dismissed. However, because of the broad language used in CPLR 6214(e), some writers have felt that an extension of time may be given even after the levy has become void.

In Seider v. Roth, the appellate division, second department, granted an extension of time in which to perfect a levy on the defendant's interest in a liability insurance policy even though the ninety-day period had expired. Because of "the novelty of the question, the uncertain state of the law and the fact that the requirement of CPLR 6214 is largely ministerial as it relates to intangible property . . .," the court thought it appropriate to grant an extension even though ninety days had already elapsed.

ARTICLE 75 — ARBITRATION

CPLR 7501: No right to jury trial on threshold questions.

In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gottlieb, the insurer applied to stay arbitration of a claim against it, and sought an immediate jury trial on the issue of whether or not the automobile

163 Sturcke v. Link, 176 Misc. 93, 26 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941).
165 7 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ¶ 6214.15 (1965).
168 54 Misc. 2d 184, 281 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1967).
operated by respondent was in physical contact with a hit and run automobile. The supreme court, Queens County, held that the insurer was not entitled to the jury trial requested, but, rather, to a preliminary hearing by the court on the issue.\textsuperscript{169}

While there is no constitutional right to a jury trial of issues raised on a motion to stay arbitration,\textsuperscript{170} Sections 1450 and 1458(2) of the Civil Practice Act granted a statutory right to such a trial. Although these sections were not transposed to the CPLR, the general feeling of authors\textsuperscript{171} and commentators,\textsuperscript{172} based on the Second Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, was that the new arbitration provisions were not intended to eliminate trial by jury if desirable or constitutionally required. This seemingly clear evidence of legislative intent regarding the right to jury trial weakens, somewhat, the arguments posed by the court in favor of their holding, \textit{i.e.}, that the legislature has had ample time to correct any alleged error and that calendar delay demanded the decision.

\textbf{NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW}

\textit{Ins. Law}\ § 167: Defense of failure to cooperate difficult to establish.

Section 167 of the Insurance Law provides that, upon the service of notice, a judgment creditor of an insured may maintain a direct suit against a judgment debtor's insurance company in order to satisfy a judgment. The insured's failure to cooperate with the insurer is a defense of the insurer to this direct action. However, the burden of proving such lack of cooperation is upon the insurer.\textsuperscript{173}

In \textit{Thrasher v. United States Liability Insurance Co.},\textsuperscript{174} plaintiffs, judgment creditors of an insured, sought to satisfy their judgments against the judgment debtor's insurer. The defendant

\textsuperscript{169} Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gottlieb, 54 Misc. 2d at 185, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
\textsuperscript{170} Andolina v. MVAIC, 23 App. Div. 2d 958, 259 N.Y.S.2d 938 (4th Dep't 1965); MVAIC v. Coccaro, 40 Misc. 2d 1038, 244 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1963).
\textsuperscript{171} "Although the specific provisions of sections 1450 and 1458(2) are omitted from the CPLR, the new arbitration provisions were 'not intended to eliminate trial by jury if it is desirable or constitutionally required.'" 4 \textit{WEINSTEIN, KORN \& MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE} § 4101.28 (1966). \textit{See also} 8 id. § 7503.25; "[T]here was no intention on the part of the draftsmen to eliminate the right to trial of the issues of the existence of an arbitration agreement and compliance with the agreement when a jury trial is desirable or constitutionally required."
\textsuperscript{172} 7B \textit{McKinney's CPLR} 7503, commentary 488 (1963).
\textsuperscript{173} \textit{N.Y. INS. LAW} § 167(5).
\textsuperscript{174} 19 N.Y.2d 159, 225 N.E.2d 503, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1967).