Public Employees and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

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The result is further encroachment upon rights reserved to the states—a trend which has characterized recent decisions of the Supreme Court—thus driving another "vital blow to the very heart and framework of our constitutional republic." 110

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Introduction

"...[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized." 1 The realization of this privilege was the outgrowth of the long conflict between those who championed the spirit of individual liberty on the one hand and the advocates of the "collective power" of the state on the other. 2 Though, by its terms, the applicability of the constitutional provision was limited to criminal cases, 3 it was not long before the courts held that it could be invoked in any federal government proceeding where the evidence thus secured might later be used to convict the witness of a federal crime. 4 Thus, today, the privilege, if properly invoked, will excuse one from answering questions posed in civil cases, 5 before grand juries 6 and in depositions, 7 and also from

108 "It will be said that this latest development [the report of the Ullmann case at trial level] is a dangerous usurpation of state's rights. The accuracy of this statement will not be disputed, but in view of the past decisions of the Supreme Court it would seem clear that the constitutional validity of this amendment to the statute will also be upheld by that court." 9 Sw. L.J. 474, 476 (1955).
3 "... nor shall any person ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. ..." U.S. Const. amend. V (emphasis added).
4 See McCormick, Evidence 259 (1954); Finkelhor and Stockdale, The Professor and the Fifth Amendment, 16 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 344, 352 (1955); see also cases cited notes 5-9 infra.
refusing to furnish testimony in hearings before legislative committees and administrative boards. Of equal import, as a factor in elevating this constitutional safeguard to the lofty status it enjoys today has been the oft repeated, though tenuous, utterances of judges in explanation of the privilege. Two corollary views have ensued; first, that the privilege serves to protect not only the guilty but the innocent; secondly, that no presumption of guilt or perjury arises from its invocation. Together with the expanded scope attributed to the privilege, these two views have served to make it an effective shield against the inquisitorial powers of the state.

That the significance of the privilege has reached gigantic proportions in contemporary society may properly be attributed to the increased use of the investigative power by modern legislatures. Since 1939 there has been an increasing concern about the possible presence of disloyal personnel in government employment. The zealous efforts of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senate Sub-Committee on Internal Security set off a drive to purge the federal service of disloyal and subversive officers and employees. In recent years, however, the work of these committees has been impeded by the long chain of witnesses called before them who have exercised their privilege against self-incrimination. Aside from this problem, however, the frequent invocation of the privilege by government employees hinders the exercise of three important governmental functions. The gathering of information by legislative committees and grand juries is made more difficult; the prosecution of public employees for crimes committed during their employment is impeded; and the removal of corrupt and disloyal personnel from the public service is less easily accomplished. In answer to these problems, government has devised four methods of discouraging the exercise of the privilege. The granting of immunity from prosecution in return for compelled testimony has perhaps enjoyed the most widespread use among these methods. The theory of the immunity statute is that

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if the threat of prosecution is removed the justification for the exercise of the privilege ceases, and thus the witness must legally answer. A second device is the requiring of a waiver of immunity as a condition of continuing employment.\textsuperscript{16} Closely resembling it is the proposed requirement that an applicant for a government job waive his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.\textsuperscript{17} Waiver provisions have been used widely in many jurisdictions and appear to present no serious constitutional question. The fourth means used by state and local governments to facilitate the performance of the governmental functions discussed above is the dismissal of the employee for refusing to answer self-incriminatory questions. This method forms the basis of the problems discussed in this note, and will be explained more fully below.

\textbf{Government Employment}

Nearly 2,500,000 civilians work for the federal government.\textsuperscript{18} In 1947 the Census Bureau reported that 6,000,000 men and women were employed by our federal, state and local governments.\textsuperscript{19} From a standpoint of policy as well as law the status and rights of such a large number of persons has posed many problems. Because of their relation to the government, these employees are subject to limitations not applicable to other citizens.\textsuperscript{20} It has been held repeatedly that a government job is not the property of the holder,\textsuperscript{21} but rather, it is a privilege conferred upon such holder by the state.\textsuperscript{22} The state may impose reasonable conditions upon the privilege of public employment.\textsuperscript{23} Statutes in various jurisdictions have set up certain

\textsuperscript{16} E.g., N.Y. Pen. Law § 2446 (waiver of immunity); N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6; N.Y.C. Charter § 903 (Tanzer 1937) (make waiver a condition of employment).


\textsuperscript{18} \textsc{Fund For The Republic, Digest of the Public Record of Communism in the United States} 39 (1955).

\textsuperscript{19} \textsc{Cushman, Leading Constitutional Decisions} 95 (10th ed. 1955).

\textsuperscript{20} See \textsc{Cushman, op. cit. supra} note 19; Note, 38 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 613, 616 (1948); 54 Mich. L. Rev. 126, 127 (1955).


\textsuperscript{23} Canteline v. McClean, 282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E.2d 972 (1940); Lerner v. Casey, 2 A.D.2d 1, 154 N.Y.S.2d 461 (2d Dep't 1956); Steimetz v. California State Bd. of Educ., 271 P.2d 614 (1954), \textit{aff'd}, 44 Cal. 2d 816, 285 P.2d 617 (1955), \textit{cert. denied}, 351 U.S. 915 (1956); McAulliff v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). "There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered..."
qualifications on the holding of government office and provide for vacatur of office in the event these conditions are broken.\textsuperscript{24} Thus, where the public officer accepts another office during his term of office,\textsuperscript{23} or refuses to file the official oath required by statute,\textsuperscript{26} automatic dismissal results. Similarly, other statutes provide for vacatur where the office holder is adjudicated insane\textsuperscript{27} or convicted of a felony.\textsuperscript{28} The apparent reasonableness of these qualifications is perhaps responsible for their failure to raise any serious constitutional questions.

More controversial have been governmental attempts to restrict the constitutional rights of public employees. The first such attempts took the form of restrictions on the ownership of property.\textsuperscript{29} In \textit{Ex parte Curtis},\textsuperscript{30} the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a federal statute which punished by dismissal the requesting, giving to, or receiving of money or property for political purposes from any other federal officer by an officer of the United States. Some years later, the same Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute which imposed the penalty of discharge upon a state railroad commissioner, who, in violation of the statute, acquired the stocks or bonds of any railroad company.\textsuperscript{31} The Court said:

'...[I]t could only be in very exceptional circumstances that this court would feel justified in saying that there had been a failure of due legal process. We might ourselves have pursued a different course...but that is not the test. The plaintiff...must have been deprived of one of those fundamental rights, him. On the same principle the city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control.' McAuliffe v. New Bedford, \textit{supra} at 517-18.

\textit{"It is a question of power. The People had the power to accomplish that which in plain words they said they wished to accomplish. They are sovereign...They have the power, by a constitution, to set conditions, with which there must be compliance, if one is to be or continue to be a public officer."} Canteline v. McClelan, \textit{supra} at 171, 25 N.E.2[d] at 974.

\textsuperscript{24} E.g., \textsc{N.Y. Pub. Officers Law} § 30 (Supp. 1956); \textit{id.} § 35-3; \textsc{N.Y.C. Charter} § 895 (Tanzer 1937); \textsc{Ariz. Code Ann.} § 70-138 (Supp. 1952); \textsc{Cal. Educ. Code Ann.} § 12601 (West 1955); \textsc{Cal. Gov. Code Ann.} §§ 1020, 1021, 1028 (West 1955); \textsc{La. Rev. Stat.} § 14:362 (Supp. 1955).

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{E.g.}, \textsc{N.Y.C. Charter} § 895 (Tanzer 1937).

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{E.g.}, \textsc{N.Y. Pub. Officers Law} § 30(h) (Supp. 1956).

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Id.} § 30(f).

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Id.} § 30(e), \textsc{Davis v. Impelliteri}, 197 Misc. 162, 94 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (construing the predecessor statute); \textsc{Cal. Gov. Code Ann.} § 1028 (West 1955).

\textsuperscript{29} In 1789 the first session of Congress passed a statute which made it unlawful for certain officers of the Treasury Department to own a vessel, purchase public lands or the public securities of the state or federal governments or to otherwise engage in any trade or commerce. A similar provision was enacted in 1791. Similarly, an act prohibiting members of Congress from having any interest in contracts with the United States was enacted in 1868. See \textit{Ex Parte Curtis}, 106 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1882); \textsc{Cushman, Leading Constitutional Decisions} 95 (10th ed. 1955).

\textsuperscript{30} 106 U.S. 371 (1882).

the observance of which is indispensable to the liberty of the citizen, to justify our interference. 32

Another instance in which the rights of government employees have been restricted, is in the area of political activities. Ever since Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out that "the petitioner [a policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman," 33 it seems to be well settled that a government may reasonably restrict the political activities of its employees as a condition of employment. 34 This principle was recently reinforced in United Public Workers v. Mitchell. 35 There, certain employees of the executive branch of the federal government sued to enjoin the Civil Service Commission from enforcing against them Section 9(a) of the Hatch Act and for a declaratory judgment that the section was unconstitutional. Section 9(a) forbids such employees from taking "any active part in political management or in political campaigns" 36 at the risk of loss of employment. The Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the Act, pointed out that:

... [The] fundamental human rights [guaranteed by the first, fifth, ninth and tenth amendments] are not absolute ... [and] this Court must balance the extent of the guarantees of freedom against a congressional enactment to protect a democratic society against the supposed evil of political partisanship by classified employees of government. 37

Furthermore, since the holding of a government office is neither "life, liberty or property" within the meaning of the due process clause, a quasi-judicial hearing would appear to be unnecessary in affecting a dismissal for a condition broken. 38 Indeed, the Lloyd-La Follette Act, 39 in effect since 1912, provides that "no examination of witnesses nor any trial or hearing shall be required except in the discretion of the officer ... directing the removal. . . ." 40 Neither is the mere dismissal of a government employee "punishment," 41 which can lawfully be inflicted only by complying with the provisions of the sixth

32 Id. at 594.
35 Supra note 34.
37 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, supra note 34, at 95-96.
38 See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
40 Id. § 652.
amendment. Thus, it would seem, that an employee in a dismissal proceeding is neither entitled to trial by jury, confrontation of witnesses or the assistance of counsel as guaranteed by this amendment. As pointed out by a federal court in Bailey v. Richardson, "to hold office at the will of a superior and to be removable therefrom only by constitutional due process of law are opposite and inherently conflicting ideas."  

Dismissal for Refusal to Testify—Generally

Before considering the problem of dismissing public employees on the ground of refusal to testify it may be worthwhile to point out that disbarment of attorneys for the same reason presents an excellent analogy. Though not strictly a public employee, an attorney is an officer of the court and as such subject to its discipline. Invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination in response to charges regarding the attorney's loyalty is said to be in conflict with the oath taken by an attorney upon admission to the bar. Thus, disbarment has resulted by viewing the refusal to testify both as an inference of guilt or as sufficient cause in itself for revocation of his license.

That an attorney's invoking of the privilege presents considerations similar to the manifestation of like conduct by public employees has recently been rejected, however, in Sheiner v. State. There, a Florida court pointed out that an attorney's "... position is not in the class with that of the teacher, the police officer, the security risk or others in public employment," and thus refused to discipline an attorney who had refused to testify before a federal congressional committee.

In various jurisdictions, courts have upheld the dismissal of policemen and public school teachers without any express statu-

43 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
44 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
47 See Note, Use of the Fifth Amendment by an Attorney as Grounds for Disbarment, 31 Notre Dame Law. 465, 466-67 (1956).
48 See In re Fenn, 235 Mo. App. 24, 128 S.W.2d 657 (1939) (per curiam).
49 See Welanko's Case, supra note 46.
50 82 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1955).
51 Sheiner v. State, 82 So. 2d 657, 662 (Fla. 1955).
tory authority. In the case of policemen, a refusal to testify has been viewed both as "conduct unbecoming an officer"54 and a breach of duty,55 thus justifying a discharge. In the leading case of Christal v. Police Commission,56 the petitioning police officers had refused to produce records or testify before a grand jury investigating their alleged taking of bribes. Pursuant to a departmental rule they were discharged for "conduct unbecoming an officer" and immediately instituted court action claiming that their removal had been both unconstitutional and unjustified. In the light of both the departmental rule and the constitutional privilege the court viewed the situation as giving rise to a voluntary choice. The court pointed out that whereas duty required them to answer, privilege permitted a refusal. The exercise of the privilege, however, was wholly inconsistent with their duty as police officers. In affirming their right to exercise the privilege, the court rejected the notion that they could, at the same time, insist upon retaining their positions.57

Very recently, the Supreme Court of the United States appears to have adopted this view. In Orloff v. Willoughby,68 that Court had before it for decision a case involving the withholding of an officer's commission by the Army to one who had been inducted as a physician under a special conscription statute because he had invoked the privilege in refusing to answer questions regarding alleged Communist Party membership. The physician claimed he was being punished for exercising a privilege which the constitution guarantees and sought to compel the Army to either discharge him or grant him a commission. The Court, denying the petition, stated:

"No one, at least no one on this Court which has repeatedly sustained assertions by Communists of the privilege against self-incrimination, questions or doubts Orloff's right to withhold facts about himself on this ground. No one believes he can be punished for doing so. But the question is whether he can at the same time take the position that to tell the truth about himself might incriminate him and that even so the President must appoint him to a

54 Christal v. Police Comm'n, supra note 52; Souder v. Philadelphia, supra note 52.
55 Christal v. Police Comm'n, supra note 52; Drury v. Hurley, supra note 52, at 735 (dictum); Scholl v. Bell, 125 Ky. 750, 102 S.W. 248, 261-62 (1907) (dictum).
57 This principle was clearly stated by the trial judge in the Sheiner case (see text at note 50) where a Florida attorney was disbarred for refusing to testify in regard to charges affecting his loyalty. The court pointed out that Sheiner "... emerged from the court room with the right guaranteed him by the Fifth Amendment unimpaired, but he left divested of the privilege to practice law. ... He has protected himself by invoking the Fifth Amendment, we shall protect ourselves by invoking the State's right to withdraw from him the privilege which he has abused." Quoted in Blackwell, When Lawyers Plead the Fifth Amendment—The ABA Position, 27 N.Y. BAR BULL. 247, 251 (1955). On appeal, the Sheiner case was reversed. See Sheiner v. State, 82 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1955).
58 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
post of honor and trust. We have no hesitation in answering that question 'No.'

The dismissal of public school teachers who invoke the privilege seems to be a product of the extensive loyalty investigations inaugurated in recent years. In addition to "conduct unbecoming a teacher" and breach of duty, the exercise of the privilege by a teacher in response to questions relating to Communist Party membership has been held "adequate cause" for discharge. It has been said that "the public will . . . and . . . ought not . . . stand, for such reticence or refusals to answer by the teachers in their schools." A refusal to answer questions touching upon a teacher's loyalty to the country which permits him to teach tends to weaken the confidence placed in him by his students and the institution which employs him. In addition, it disparages the whole profession in the eyes of the public and thus, would seem to justify his dismissal. Certainly, the inconsistency between a public school teacher's duty and his right not to incriminate himself with respect to membership in disloyal organizations is at least as great as in the instance of a policeman who asserts similar rights in regard to other activities.

If public employees may be removed from office for refusing to testify before legally authorized bodies in regard to their official conduct in the absence of statute, express enactments clearly defining the conduct which will result in discharge would appear to be all the more justified. At least four jurisdictions have enacted such statutes. The Louisiana statute is patterned after Section 903 of the New York City Charter. It is applicable to all employees of the cities of Louisiana as well as employees of the state or political subdivisions thereof. Under it, a refusal to testify regarding the affairs or government of the city or the conduct of any city officer before any court or body authorized to conduct any hearing or inquiry will subject the offender to a forfeiture of his government office. However, unlike

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59 Id. at 91.
61 Faxon v. School Comm., supra note 60.
63 Davis v. University of Kansas City, supra note 62 at 718.
its New York City counterpart, which bars the holding of office permanently, it proscribes the holding of any city job for a period of only two years. On the other hand, the California statute is much more limited. It appears to be applicable only before administrative boards and legislative committees though it does contain an express provision extending its applicability to refusals to testify before federal legislative committees. The most distinguishing feature of the California statute, however, is that dismissal is predicated on a refusal to answer questions relating to only four activities specified therein. All these questions relate to past and present disloyal advocacy or membership in subversive organizations. In Steinmetz v. California State Board of Education, the court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. There, the court pointed out that the dismissal had not been predicated on a presumption that the activity inquired of was true, but on a refusal to answer questions relating thereto. It was further held that the fact that the questions asked might tend to incriminate if answered, did not divest the state of the power to require an answer as a condition of employment.

Section 903—New York City Charter

Pursuant to legislative authorization, the New York City Charter was adopted by the people of that city at the general election held in 1936 and became effective January 1, 1938. Section 903

68 Though the statute purports to apply to state and county as well as city employees, it inconsistently purports to bar the offender from holding any city job for 2 years. Ibid.
70 CAL. GOV. CODE ANN. § 1028.1 (West 1955).
71 The statute directs the employee to answer questions relating to
   "(a) Present personal advocacy by the employee of the forceful or violent overthrow of the Government of the United States or of any state.
   (b) Present knowing membership in any organization now advocating the forceful or violent overthrow of the Government of the United States or of any state.
   (c) Past knowing membership at any time since September 10, 1948, in any organization which, to the knowledge of such employee's, during the time of the employee’s membership advocated the forceful or violent overthrow of the Government of the United States or of any state.
   (d) Questions as to present knowing membership of such employee in the Communist Party or as to past knowing membership in the Communist Party at any time since September 10, 1948." Ibid.
73 Laws of N.Y. 1934, c. 867.
74 TANZER, NEW YORK CITY CHARTER 1 (1937).
75 "If any councilman or other officer or employee of the city shall, after lawful notice or process, wilfully refuse or fail to appear before any court or judge, any legislative committee, or any officer, board or body authorized to conduct any hearing or inquiry, or having appeared shall refuse to testify or
was included as a measure aimed at the elimination of graft and corruption as a result of recommendations made in the Seabury Report.\textsuperscript{76} The section is applicable to all officers and employees of New York City. The conduct proscribed includes the failure or refusal to appear, testify or waive immunity \textit{before any} court, grand jury, legislative committee or administrative body. The questions asked or the investigation undertaken, however, must relate to either the government, property and affairs of the city, or the official conduct of any employee thereof. Violation of the statute results in vacatur of office plus permanent proscription from holding any other city office by appointment or election, \textit{i.e.}, the employee is not only automatically dismissed from his present position but becomes thereafter ineligible to hold any other city job.

Though framed in broad language, the statute is limited in a few important aspects. Thus, it has been held that Section 903 is inapplicable where the conduct proscribed is not engaged in \textit{before} the body conducting the investigation.\textsuperscript{77} Similarly, the section is not applicable where the employee is guilty of perjury.\textsuperscript{78} Finally, the fact that admissions of guilt in answer to the questions posed do not give rise to an operation of the statute\textsuperscript{79} points up the purpose of the statute, which is to induce answers to pertinent questions in order to supply needed information to legally authorized bodies.

Similar in purpose and effect to Section 903 is Article I, Section 6 of the New York State Constitution.\textsuperscript{80} This provision, however,
is limited to instances where a public officer invokes the privilege against self-incrimination before a grand jury only. Also, the state constitutional provision lacks the permanent proscription from office feature of its New York City Charter counterpart. The resulting weakness of a statute lacking such provision was demonstrated in *People v. Harris.*

There, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the immediate reappointment to another office involving similar duties of a public employee who had violated the constitutional provision. This weakness was partly remedied, however, when the provision was amended to make a violator ineligible for office for a period of five years.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 903 the New York courts have sustained the dismissal of firemen and teachers as well as other employees found guilty of the conduct proscribed therein. The question of whether the charter provision is applicable to teachers in the New York City schools, however, has been subject to serious controversy. It has been argued that teachers are not city but state employees, but since their salaries are paid out of funds in the city treasury, they are within the definition of the term as contained in the Administrative Code. Thus, they have been held city employees by the New York courts. Under the Education Law a teacher, after acquiring “tenure” may only be removed from his position for four specified causes and after notice and hearing. It has been

be removed from office by the appropriate authority or shall forfeit his office at the suit of the attorney-general.” N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6.

81 294 N.Y. 424, 63 N.E.2d 17 (1945).


85 Koral v. Board of Educ., 197 Misc. 221, 94 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (mechanical engineer); accord, Lerner v. Casey, 138 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup. Ct. 1955); aff’d, 2 A.D.2d 1, 154 N.Y.S.2d 461 (2d Dep’t 1956) (dismissal of a subway conductor sustained on ground that Section 903 was expressive of the public policy of the state).


87 The Administrative Code defines an employee as “Any person whose salary in whole or in part is paid out of the city treasury.” N.Y.C. ADMIN. Code § 981-1.0(7).

88 Daniman v. Board of Educ., supra note 84; Goldway v. Board of Higher Educ., supra note 84; accord, Koral v. Board of Educ., supra note 85.

89 ‘Tenure’ shall mean the right of a person to hold his position during good behavior and efficient and competent service, and not to be removed therefrom except for cause . . . .” N.Y. Educ. Law § 6206(1)(d).

90 Id. § 6206(10).

91 Ibid.
held, however, that there is no conflict between these provisions and Section 903. It is reasoned that while the sections in the Education Law govern the removal of teachers for cause generally, the Charter provides for a forfeiture of office for a particular cause.

In defense to the application of Section 903 to teachers who invoke the privilege when asked questions regarding their membership in the Communist Party, it has been pointed out that other statutes specifically deal with the removal of disloyal teachers. For example, Section 3021 of the Education Law provides for the removal of a teacher found guilty of seditious conduct. Section 12-a of the Civil Service Law disqualifies from public employment any person who advocates the overthrow of government by force or violence. Section 3022 of the Education Law, which is part of the Feinberg Law, makes membership in any organization advocating the conduct proscribed by the two proceeding statutes, *prima facie* evidence of disqualification for office. Furthermore, Sections 25 and 26-a of the Civil Service Law forbid the asking of questions concerning the political beliefs and associations of Civil Service employees to determine their fitness to hold office. Dismissing this argument, however, Adler v. Wilson held that these statutes do not affect a disciplinary proceeding brought against a teacher for failure to answer questions regarding Communist Party membership. The court there added, that the provisions in the Civil Service Law prohibiting the asking of questions regarding an employee's political beliefs and associations were not applicable to Communist Party membership.

Another argument on behalf of the teacher is that his automatic dismissal for exercising a constitutional right violates the basic principle of academic freedom. Under this principle, a teacher acquiring "tenure" is removable only if found to be incompetent, upon conviction of a serious crime, or so morally delinquent as to be unfit for association with students. Academic freedom has been described as the "freedom to follow one's conscience within the law." Con-

84 N.Y. Educ. Law § 3021.
85 N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 12-a.
86 N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022.
90 Byse, *Teachers and the Fifth Amendment*, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 871, 879 (1954). A University "... is not and must not become an aggregation of like-minded people all behaving according to approved convention. It is a temple of the open-minded. And so long as in his instruction, his scholarship, his relations with his associates and juniors a teacher maintains candor, and truth as he sees it, he may not be required to pass any other test." Id. at 882.
91 Id. at 879.
ceding that freedom, doesn't a teacher and his profession have at least as great an obligation to set an example of patriotism and loyalty to country, as to defend the right to freedom of thought and expression? 102 As was pointed out by a New York court, "academic freedom . . . is the freedom to do good and not to teach evil." 103

Finally, it is claimed that a teacher may be morally justified in invoking the privilege. 104 Though he be innocent of any charge directed to him, the teacher may be unwilling to implicate others or may have exercised the privilege by mistake, inadvertence or because he followed erroneous legal advice. Assuming the validity of this argument, it is equally certain that the state is morally justified in dismissing him, since, when questioned regarding his loyalty, a teacher who invokes the privilege tends to weaken the confidence reposed in him by his students and to subvert the character of the whole profession in the eyes of the public. 105 Notwithstanding any of these arguments, however, the New York courts have consistently held Section 903 applicable to teachers. 106

The broad terms of the charter provision have provided an opportunity for the courts to hold it applicable to testimony before federal legislative committees. 107 Furthermore, the view has been taken that questions regarding alleged subversive activities of employees are inquiries into his official conduct. 108 As interpreted by the New York courts, the provision, insofar as it effects a termination of employment, is self-executing. 109 Thus, "the assertion of the privilege against self incrimination is equivalent to a resignation." 110 Since the act which gives rise to the vacatur of office is either admitted or a matter of public record, it has been pointed out that there is no necessity for notice and hearing in effecting a dismissal. 111 In upholding Section 903 as a reasonable condition imposed by a city upon the holding of an office within its control, the New York courts have expressed the view that the charter provision violates neither the state nor federal constitution. 112

102 See Life, May 21, 1956, p. 44.
104 See Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today (1955); Byse, supra note 100; Life, May 21, 1956, p. 44.
106 See note 84 supra.
107 See cases cited note 92 supra.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
111 See Koral v. Board of Educ., 197 Misc. 221, 224, 94 N.Y.S.2d 378, 382 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
The Slochower Case

But the Supreme Court of the United States is of a different view. In *Slochower v. Board of Higher Education*, the question of the constitutionality of Section 903 came before that Court for decision for the first time. Slochower was an associate professor at Brooklyn College, an institution maintained by the City of New York. He had invoked the privilege against self-incrimination before a committee of the United States Senate in response to questions concerning his past membership in the Communist Party. Shortly thereafter, his position was declared vacant pursuant to Section 903 of the Charter. Seeking reinstatement, Professor Slochower challenged the validity of the charter provision on the ground that it violated due process. The Court held that the summary dismissal of the petitioner, under the circumstances, violated due process of law.

Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the majority, stated:

At the outset we must condemn the practice of imputing a sinister meaning to the exercise of a person's constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment. The Court construed the statute as converting an exercise of the privilege by city employees into a conclusive presumption of guilt and pointed out that "the privilege . . . would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its exercise could be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption of perjury." It was felt that summary dismissal of a public employee under these circumstances was arbitrary action of a kind which the due process clause was meant to prevent.

In *Adler v. Board of Education*, the Court had upheld a New York statute which authorized the school authorities to dismiss employees who, after notice and hearing, were found to advocate the forcible overthrow of government or could not satisfactorily explain membership in organizations with that purpose. It was said there that "one's associates, past and present, as well as one's conduct, may properly be considered in determining fitness and loyalty." In *Garner v. Board of Public Works*, the Court upheld the power of a city to discharge employees who refused to file an affidavit disclosing past and present knowing membership in the Communist Party. In *Wieman v. Updegraff*, however, they struck down an
Oklahoma statute which required as a condition of employment, the furnishing of a “loyalty oath” by public employees in which a denial of membership in certain organizations for the preceding five years had to be included. The Court there pointed out that the statute did not distinguish between innocent and knowing membership and thus resulted in an arbitrary classification. That case established the proposition that “... constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.” 120

In the Garner case Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, remarked:

It would give to the Due Process Clause an unwarranted power of intrusion into local affairs to hold that a city may not require its employees to disclose whether they have been members of the Communist Party. . . . 121

In Slochower the Court, pointing to the fact that the discharge had been based solely on events occurring before a federal congressional committee, distinguished the Garner case on the ground that there the city itself was seeking the information the employees refused to furnish. Mr. Justice Reed, who dissented, however, while conceding this fact, pointed out that Section 903 “... is directed at the propriety of employing a man who refuses to give needed information to appropriate public bodies.” 122

Nevertheless, the result of the decided cases seems to be that while state or local governments may require their employees to furnish information regarding the employee’s knowing membership in subversive organizations as a condition of employment, it may not summarily discharge an employee who refuses to furnish the same information to a body charged with the primary duty to elicit it.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s conclusion that Professor Slochower’s dismissal had violated due process of law appears to be based on the view that inherent in Section 903 is an implied presumption of guilt arising from the witness’ refusal to testify. But the New York Court of Appeals had not placed this construction on the statute. In fact, it had expressly stated that it did not presume that Slochower, by his action, had “... shown cause to be discharged under the Feinberg Law . . . since no inference of membership in the Communist Party may be drawn from the assertion of one’s privilege against self

incrimination.” Therefore, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Harlan in dissent, “since § 903 is inoperative if even incriminating answers are given, it is apparent that it is the exercise of the privilege itself which is the basis for the discharge, quite apart from any inference of guilt.” Thus, though it may well be that to punish by dismissal the exercise of the privilege by a public employee in response to questions relating to his official conduct violates due process, the Supreme Court never reached this question.

Furthermore, it is not clear from the opinion what the status of Section 903, from a constitutional point of view, is today. Either the Court meant to hold the charter provision invalid in all cases, or merely where the privilege is exercised before federal investigative bodies. Clarification of this question and the more fundamental one of whether a state may constitutionally use the invocation of the privilege as a basis for dismissal must await future consideration by the Court. In the meantime, the Slochower case has created confusion in this area of the law. As pointed out previously, the Court has upheld restrictions on the exercise by government employees of rights guaranteed by the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments. While it is not denied that the exercise of the fifth amendment privilege is a right which cannot be denied any citizen, is the privilege against self-incrimination more sacred than other analogous constitutional guarantees?

Recent Developments in the Law of Motion Picture Censorship

The Mutual Cases

Censorship of motion pictures originated as the state’s answer to an urgent need. During its infancy, the movie industry harbored many shoestring operations concerned with quick profits by means of

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125 See text at notes 29-37.
126 “As no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference, so none should suffer subordination or deletion.” Frankfurter, J., Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956). “... [I]t seems to us that the question [of restricting the constitutional rights of governmental employees] is practically settled in the Federal field by [the] United Public Workers ... [case]. We do not see that the right not to incriminate oneself stands on any higher ground in a democracy than the right to take an active part in elections.” Faxon v. School Comm., 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772, 775 (1954).