Contract–Deceit–Accountant's Liability to Third Parties (State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104 (1938))

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Contract—Deceit—Accountant’s Liability to Third Parties.—Plaintiff granted a loan to a factor in reliance upon a certified balance sheet prepared by defendant, a firm of accountants. It was contended that defendant, though aware that the balance sheet would be used to obtain credit, failed (1) to verify fictitious accounts fraudulently inserted by the factor and (2) to point out the stagnant condition of, and the inadequate reserves for other accounts. It was further claimed that thirty days later—after the loan had been made—defendant sent an accurate description of the latter condition to the factor but no attempt was made to notify creditors. Plaintiff brought an action for deceit against defendant for misrepresentation as to the solvency of the factor. The Appellate Division affirmed a decision of the trial court which set aside a verdict for plaintiff. Upon appeal, held, reversed and new trial granted. A prima facie case in deceit was established by evidence of gross negligence from which the jury in the instant case would be authorized to infer fraud. State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N. Y. 104, 15 N. E. (2d) 416 (1938).

Most of the early actions for deceit, like their modern counterparts, were brought when plaintiff was misled into some business venture by defendant’s misrepresentation. Since early common law the elements of the action have remained substantially the same: a false statement of a material fact, knowingly made, which is intended and does induce the deceived to act to his detriment. Accountants
are no exception to liability for deceit when all the elements are proved. Where, however, as in the case at bar, an accountant makes negligent misrepresentations two questions arise: (1) To whom is he liable on the theory of negligence? and (2) Can negligence be equivalent to deceit?

In general, liability for negligent misrepresentation tends to be restricted to cases where there is a contractual relationship. But assaults have been made on this "citadel of privity". In Glanser v. Shepard, defendant was liable to the third party when he knew that reaching the plaintiff was the sole purpose of the transaction. And in Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix National Bank, a recovery was allowed where the third party, though not known to defendant, as above, was a member of a definitely ascertainable class of people who would

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7 O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931); Tindle v. Birkett, 171 N. Y. 520, 64 N. E. 210 (1902) (defendant owed a duty to creditors and investors to make the balance sheet they prepared for their employer without fraud when from the circumstances they could tell the employer didn't intend to keep it to himself).

8 Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931); Craig v. Angon, 212 App. Div. 55, 208 N. Y. Supp. 259 (1st Dept. 1925), aff'd, 242 N. Y. 569, 152 N. E. 351 (1926); Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 Atl. 783 (1919); Note (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 858. In the absence of statute, in cases involving: attorneys in instances other than where they have prepared abstracts, good inspectors, tax collectors, notaries, public accountants, and banks, responsibility for statements negligently made has been restricted to instances of contractual relationship.

9 MacPherson v. Buick Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916) (a manufacturer owes a duty of care to anyone likely to be harmed by a defective article which is dangerous to life or limb if not properly made. Originally this case was limited to dangerous instrumentalities. By analogy to this case, it is submitted that an accountant's statement might be considered a dangerous instrumentality); Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639 (1918) (in which the Court of Appeals explains the four situations in which a third party beneficiary may maintain an action); Whitney, Contracts (3d ed. 1937) 200-208; Cardozo, C. J., in Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 180, 174 N. E. 441 (1931): "The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace". Nichols v. Clark, MacMullen & Riley, Inc., 261 N. Y. 118, 184 N. E. 729 (1938); Notes (1938) 12 St. John's L. Rev. 281; (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 126.

10 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922) (a seller of beans hired defendant public weigher, to weigh the beans. In reliance upon the certificate of weight the buyer paid the seller. The certificate was erroneous and defendant was liable to the buyer for negligence though privity was lacking. Defendant knew his certificate was solely for the purpose of the buyer; and then again, defendant was engaged in a public calling, i.e., public weigher. Where an accountant knew that reaching a certain third person was the end and aim of the transaction the court would probably extend liability under the reasoning of this case; but the court would not consider the accountant as engaged in a public calling, it is public only in that the accountant offers his services to the public.

11 253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574 (1930) (a trustee under a deed of trust to secure an issue of bonds, certified them falsely and was liable to a subscriber of the bond because the certification was made for the very purpose of influencing the conduct of such subscribers); Note (1930) 5 St. John's L. Rev. 76.
ordinarily rely upon the statements. But in Ultramares v. Touche, although defendant accountants knew "prospective creditors" were likely to rely upon the balance sheet, the Court of Appeals refused to hold defendant liable on the theory of negligence because of the absence of privity. However, though defendant was not held liable on the theory of negligence, the court held that the facts might lead to an inference of fraud by the jury, and ordered a new trial for a determination of these facts.

But intent is an essential element of deceit, while in negligence intent plays no part. Therefore, negligence can not be equivalent to deceit. But, in Ultramares v. Touche and in the instant case, by holding that acts or omissions which are heedless and reckless may be evidence from which fraud may be inferred, the court attempts to bridge this gap between intentional wrongdoing and negligent miscon-duct; gross negligence is thus taking the place of intent. As to mere negligence, i.e., honest blunder as distinguished from heedlessness and recklessness, no fraud can be inferred, and recovery can be had only on the theory of negligence if there is privity.

It is only fitting that accountants should be held to a high degree of care. They know the faith and credit placed upon their work

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255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931) (defendant accountants prepared a balance sheet they knew would be used for credit purposes, but failed to verify $700,000 of accounts fraudulently inserted in the books by their employer). This is the leading New York case on accountants' liability to third parties.

Id. at 179, "... otherwise accountants may be liable in an indeterminate amount, for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." Cf. Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank, 253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574 (1930). It is difficult to see why "prospective creditors" are not members of the "reasonably ascertainable class" that the subscribers were in the Doyle case, supra note 11.

"255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931)."


255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).


In the instant case the court described the negligent conduct which would take the place of deliberate intent as follows:

(1) A representation certified as true to the knowledge of the accountant when knowledge there is none.

(2) A reckless misstatement, or an opinion based on grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief in its truth.

(3) A refusal to see the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful if sufficiently gross.

(4) Heedless and reckless disregard of consequence.

In the light of this description the question of whether fraud could be inferred in the instant case was properly left to the jury.

The Securities Act of 1933, as amended (48 Stat. 74 [1933], 15 U. S. C. §77a [1934]) has considerably extended liability of accountants to third party investors, for innocent but negligent misrepresentation, and fraud, in connection with auditing books and furnishing statements used in furthering the sale of securities. "77k(a): In case any part of the registration statement * * * contained an untrue statement of a material fact required to be stated therein, * * * any person acquiring such security * * * may either at law or
and the group of people who would ordinarily rely upon it. The law in New York as developed from the Ultramare case and the instant case may be summarized as follows:

1. In the absence of privity an accountant is not liable to third persons for honest blunder, on the theory of negligence, because he owes no duty of care.\(^2\)

2. In the absence of privity an accountant is not liable to third persons for gross negligence on the theory of negligence, because he owes no duty of care.\(^2\) But he is liable to third persons on the theory of deceit for gross negligence, because from this a jury may infer fraud.\(^2\)

3. Negligence, no matter how gross, is never equivalent to fraud as a matter of law; it always remains a question of fact.\(^2\)

R. A. K.

**Courts—Province of Federal and State Courts—Questions of General Law—Validity of Doctrine of Swift v. Tyson.**—Plaintiff sues to recover for personal injuries allegedly sus-