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Judicial Interpretation and Determination of Section 7A of the N.I.R.A.

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The Supreme Court finds that motive rather than mode of enforce-
ment is to guide the President under such section. He is given un-
fettered discretion to act in accordance with his belief concerning
the best course. There is no express standard, no specific and par-
ticular criterion governing his determinations; there is no require-
ment of findings by the executive as a condition precedent to action;
the guiding policy under which he is to act is vague and altogether
too general in scope. The requisite that executive action within the
pattern of a declared Congressional policy must be susceptible of
judicial review is not met; no tangible or intangible framework of
policy on which a court may operate is distinguishable.

"New Dealers," exercised over the curtailment of Presidential
authority, might urge that the rule of expediency supersedes the rule
of basic principle. The Supreme Court has held otherwise, Justice
Cardozo dissenting. The problem of enforcement of the Recovery
Act resolves itself into Constitutional questions rather than into
programs of expediency. The difficulty of enforcement has loomed
as an obvious problem for solution; it will continue so to loom.
There have been numerous obstacles in the path of such enforce-
ment; some have been on a constitutional basis. The Panama case
has raised and solved the important issue of executive powers dele-
gated by the Congress. If, by subtle stages, governmental sover-
eignty may be converted into governmental tyranny and executive
pronouncement into dictatorial and arbitrary manifesto, a return to
fundamental concepts of American government is essential. The
Panama case, therefore, cuts deeper into the core of American politi-
cal theory than would appear at first blush.

EMIL F. KOCH.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND DETERMINATION OF SECTION 7A OF
THE N. I. R. A.

Section 7 (a) of the N. I. R. A. and code provisions relating
to hours and wages, constitute the primary contributions of the Re-
covery Act to labor law. Prior to its enactment the labor unions
were slowly but surely sinking into stagnation. Its enactment was
hailed by labor as its resurrection. It guaranteed labor free reign

20 "President Roosevelt has said: 'All employers in each trade now band
themselves faithfully in these modern guilds.' It will be interesting and
instructive to note the construction which the courts will put (or be forced to
put) on the words 'all' and 'faithfully' when applying them to powerful indus-
trial units." (1934) 8 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 406.
2 NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 3, 1934, at 210, 211.
3 TODAY, Feb. 10, 1934, at 3.
in organization; it abolished and prohibited the fretful "yellow dog" contract—it granted and guaranteed to labor substantive rights and privileges together with remedial and procedural methods for the enforcement of those rights.4

Until the enactment of the Recovery Act there was no doubt that all employers might discriminate against union men or against members of any particular union.5 In Adair v. United States,6 which is representative of the attitude of the courts prior to the enactment of 7 (a), the court said, "It is not within the functions of the Government to compel any person in the course of his business and against his will to accept or retain the personal services of another or to compel any person against his will to perform services for another. The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is-in its essence the same as the right of the purchaser to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it. * * * It was the legal right of the defendant-no matter however unwise such a course might have been—to discharge Coppage because of his being a member of a labor organization. * * * In all such particulars the employer and the employee have equality of right and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract which no government can legally justify in a free land."7 That the attitude of the Government, in these times of stress, has changed considerably with regard to labor legislation requires no explanation.

Section 7 (a) in substance provides: That employees are granted the right to collective bargaining; compulsion to join or refrain from joining a union is prohibited and the employer is required to comply with code hours, minimum wage, and other provisions.8 At

4 (1934) 44 Yale L. J. 105.
6 Supra note 5.
7 Contra, Justice Holmes, dissenting opinion.
8 "Every code of fair competition, and license approved, prescribed or issued under this title shall contain the following conditions:

"1. That employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing and shall be free from the interference, restraint and coercion of employers of labor or their agents in the designation of such representatives in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.

"2. That no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition of employment to refrain from joining, organizing or assisting a labor organization of his own choosing and

"3. That employers shall comply with the maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay and other conditions approved or prescribed by the President."
a first reading of the statute its terms appear plain and simple, devoid of any ambiguity; but in fact it has created so much controversy and dissension in the ranks of labor with regard to its interpretation and explanation that it threatens to wreck the administration's entire recovery program. The National Labor Board was improvised to adjust industrial disputes arising out of the interpretation and operation of the Code. Its distinct powers were to settle differences between employers and employees by mediation and arbitration; to authorize and maintain regional boards; promulgate rules concerning its procedure and to review its findings. To remedy the discontent and dissension arising under the divergent interpretations of Section 7 (a), Senator Wagner of New York has introduced a bill in Congress to tighten the collective bargaining provisions of the law and to make permanent the National Labor Board, but to date Congress has not acted upon it. For the enforcement of the substantive rights guaranteed by Section 7 (a), it has been provided that a violation or interference with the right of collective organizing and bargaining is punishable as a statutory crime.

Section 7 (a) has so strengthened the right to bargain collectively that by implication the employer must treat with the representative so selected. This implication is a radical development in the labor law. Although there is some danger that the majority group might not adequately protect the interests of the minority such an interpretation would strengthen the bargaining power of the employees and prevent the employer from interfering with self-organization by favoring a friendly minority union. The minority however should have the right to bargain separately where the interest of the two groups are so fundamentally opposed that it would be unreasonable to permit one to represent the other.

An exclusive bargaining agent, a majority non-company union, would be able to eliminate rival organizations if the prior legality of closed shop agreements is unaffected by the Recovery Act. Did Congress intend to prohibit all such agreements? There is much difference of opinion with regard to the question. It has been said

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9 Ibid.
10 (1934) 8 St. John's L. Rev. 417.
11 Subject to a fine of $500 per day and an injunction procurable by the District Attorney.
13 (1934) 44 Yale L. J. 106.
14 (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 1531, 1532.
15 Ibid.
that the legislative history of 7 (a) negatives such a construction while on the other hand to require dissenters to belong exclusively to a majority union might be a denial of their rights to organize under Section 7 (a) (1).18 It has been held however that joining the majority organization may constitute a waiver of this right.19

Another uncertainty regarding the interpretation of 7 (a) is the legal significance that is to be given to the company union. It has attained a new significance as a means of appearing a potentially dangerous labor force aroused by the promises of 7 (a).20 The only condition in 7 (a) relating to the company union prohibits making membership therein a condition of employment.21 But it is obvious that it may be illegally promoted and nevertheless qualify as a bargaining agency.22 It has been intimated that the mere act of drawing up a company union plan may itself be a violation of 7 (a);23 since the lending of financial support and solicitation of membership exercise an undue influence in inducing employees to join the company union. The National Labor Relations Board has ordered employers to cease such sponsorship.24 They have assumed the position however that a company union will not be deprived of its place on the ballot so long as its form of organization permits it, though not without difficulty, to represent employees in collective bargaining.25 The most recent case interpreting this phase of Section 7 (a) is the case of Sherman v. Abeles.26 The action was brought by a union of motion picture operators in New York City against the Independent Theatre Owners Association and The Allied Motion Picture Producers Union for injunctive relief in that the two defendants had violated Section 7 (a) (2) in requiring as a condition of employment

17 The bill in its original form [S. 1712, H. R. 5664, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933)] prohibited an employer from requiring employees as a condition of employment to join any labor organization but was changed at the request of organized labor. Senator Wagner has stated that 7 (a) (2) was directed only at employer-dominated organizations and that a closed shop agreement with a legitimate union would still be permissible; see Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 5664, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 115, 116.
19 In re Bennett Shoe Co., N. L. R. B. No. 159, Dec. 10, 1934. Members of a minority union joined the majority association in accordance with the terms of a closed shop agreement, at the same time retaining their membership in their own organization; subsequently they were discharged; held, proper on the ground that by joining they had ratified the agreement.
20 (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 1537.
21 7 (a) (2), supra note 8.
26 Supra note 22.
that motion picture operators join the Allied union (the evidence
discloses that it is a company dominated union). The Allied had
entered into a ten-year contract with the theatre owners' group for
the employment of its members as operators to the exclusion of
members of Local 306. An injunction pendente lite was granted in
the Supreme Court and upheld in the Appellate Division, but was
reversed in the Court of Appeals. Several questions were certified
to the higher Court one of which was the constitutionality of Sec-
tion 7 (a). The Court avoided its dilemma by holding that there
had been no violation of Section 7 (a) (2), "since the proof was
insufficient to show that anyone seeking employment from the de-
fendant exhibitors had been required as a condition of employment
to join Allied, or refrain from joining, organizing or assisting a
labor organization of its own choosing." The holding of the Court
is based on the view that there was no evidence of specific overt
acts or expression on the part of the defendants which were suffi-
cient to show that operators were required, as a condition precedent
to employment, to become members of the Allied union. But was not
the conduct of the defendants illegal by implication? The Allied
organization was of recent origin; there was sufficient evidence to
constitute it a company union, the contract of employment provided
for a ten-year period of employment to members of Allied to the
exclusion of members of another union; operators of Local 306
were discharged and replaced by members of Allied. By implica-
tion the only effective means of reinstatement would require mem-
bership in Allied.

Labor's most effective weapon is the strike. The right to strike
is not specifically mentioned in the N. I. R. A.; both legal periodi-
cals and courts have been quick to point out this fact. To outlaw
strikes would have the effect of making arbitration compulsory.
This is opposed on grounds of public policy by some writers.21
Because of the majority rule, strikes by minority groups to compel
separate treatment will be properly restrained by injunction; however,
protest against the agreement reached by the majority stands on a
different footing. The employees would seem to be without rem-

27 Instant case at 385.
29 (1934) 19 Iowa L. Rev. 346.
30 Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Federation of Silk Workers, supra
note 12.
31 (1934) 34 Calif. L. Rev. 175, 177.
32 A. R. Barns and Co. v. Beery, 156 Fed. 72 (S. D. Ohio 1917); Meltzer v.
Kaminer, 133 Misc. 813, 227 N. Y. Supp. 459 (1927); International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, 48 S. W. (2d) 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). These
cases proceed on the theory that calling of the strike will amount to a
repudiation of the contract. Breach by the employer will, however, justify an
otherwise illegal strike in protest. Greenfield v. Central Labor Council, 104
Ore. 236, 192 Pac. 783 (1920). But see Grassi Contracting Co. v. Bennett,
justify a solely punitive strike).
edy when they struck against conduct which they erroneously supposed to be illegal. 33 But where the employer proceeds to rehire them he will apparently not be permitted to discriminate against particular strikers on the basis of their union activities. 34

It has been generally felt that Section 7 (a), without much difficulty and with adequate precedent, could be readily held constitutional. As a result of the recent decision handed down by Federal District Judge John P. Niels, holding Section 7 (a) unconstitutional as applied to the Weirton Steel Co. case, 35 this view becomes doubtful. It is conceded that if Section 7 (a) will be upheld as constitutional, the power of Congress to enact such legislation is to be derived only from the "Interstate Commerce" clause 36 of the Constitution. Judge Niels in his decision stated, "Manufacturing operations conducted by the defendant in its various plants or mills do not constitute interstate commerce. The relation between defendant and its employees do not affect interstate commerce. Manufacturing is a cooperative enterprise. Production in quantities and quality with consequent wages, salaries and dividends depends upon a sympathetic cooperation of management and workmen." 37 Thus the legal arguments as to constitutionality turn upon whether a manufacturer or one who buys materials and sells products in another state comes under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has previously held that the power of Congress to regulate commerce does extend to local matters which, though not themselves a part of interstate commerce, are inextricably intermingled with it or so closely related thereto as to make their regulation essential to the effective regulation of interstate commerce. 38 It is within the province of the Supreme Court to decide that industry or manufacturing, however remote from a clear unequivocal undisputed conception and interpretation as to what constitutes in-

34 In re Ira Wilson & Sons Dairy Co., N. L. R. B. No. 62, Aug. 9, 1934.
35 New York Sun, Feb. 27, 1935, at 1 and 16.
37 Supra note 35, at 1.
terstate commerce, is within the purview of the "Interstate Commerce" clause. It is submitted that 7 (a) will be upheld by the Supreme Court in conformity with the liberal trend and loose construction of the Federal Constitution as displayed in upholding other New Deal legislation. The Nields opinion doubtless will encourage unfriendly companies to continue their defiance of the law; the national welfare requires that the Supreme Court act promptly in deciding the constitutionality of 7 (a).

IRVING L. KALISH.

WARRANTIES—CONSULTATIONS—EVIDENCE—IN INSURANCE.

The term warranty as used in insurance law seems to be the brain child of the market place, foisted upon the courts by "stammering for a word" lawyers, applied loosely by judges until it secured such a firm grasp upon the terminology of insurance law that it is universally employed and as widely undefined. A warranty is a term of the insurance contract, similar to a condition precedent, providing that a fact exists or will exist, which partly forms the inducement and consideration of the insurer's promise to assume the risk.

In the early days of insurance, marine being the first kind known to the law, the assured was bound to comply strictly with the terms of his warranties. The theory was as follows: the underwriter was

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4 Supra note 35.

1 See (1931) 6 St. John's L. Rev. 91.

2 Patterson, Warranties in Insurance (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 602, "A warranty in insurance law is (1) a term of an insurance contract (2) which prescribes, as a condition of the insurer's promise, (3) a fact, the presence of which, regarded as of the time of contracting, will or may render less probable than its absence the occurrence of the insured event." Richards on Insurance (4th ed. 1932) §86; Donahue, Outline of Insurance (1st ed. 1927) 20 (defines by showing effect of); May, Insurance §151 and Bliss, Life Insurance §34 (a warranty is a condition precedent); Kasprzyk v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 79 Misc. 263, 140 N. Y. Supp. 211 (1915).

3 The first reported insurance case is Dowdale's case, 6 Coke R. 476 (1589). In 1601 a special tribunal for the trial of marine insurance cases was established in England. In 1756 Lord Mansfield was appointed Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench. He is accepted as the father of insurance law. Richards on Insurance §9.