Parol Evidence–Admissability of Oral Warranty–Explanation of Words in Writing (Waters, Inc. v. March et al., 269 N.Y. Supp. 420 (1st Dept. 1934))

St. John's Law Review
Parol Evidence—Admissibility of Oral Warranty—Explanation of Words in Writing.—Plaintiffs, dealers in New York, contracted in writing to buy a quantity of "No. 1 and No. 2 hareskins of winter hair or type A," from the defendants-manufacturers in China. Negotiations were conducted by the defendants' New York agents, who orally warranted the fur yield of these hareskins. In an action for breach of warranty, the plaintiff sought to introduce parol evidence to explain the meaning of "No. 1 and No. 2 hareskins * * * etc." and also parol evidence to establish the warranty. Held, admissible as to the former, but inadmissible as to the latter. (Waters, Inc. v. March et al., — App. Div. —, 269 N. Y. Supp. 420 (1st Dept. 1934).

It is the established rule that if the language of the writing is such that the court does not understand it, extrinsic evidence may be received to ascertain the real meaning.1 It should be noted that this evidence does not contradict the terms of the document but merely tends to explain or construe them.2 This principle applies if the writing is in a foreign language,3 if technical words are used,4 if the words have gained a local or trade usage,5 if the words have gained a limited meaning in some branch of business,6 or if the words are ambiguous or unintelligible.7 This rule also applies where the words

---


2 Jones, Evidence (3rd ed. 1924) §455.

3 Id. §456.


RECENT DECISIONS

are of a doubtful meaning or are obscure.\textsuperscript{8} But such principle will not apply unless some difficulty arises as to the construction of the writing from its context, or from the circumstances attending the making of it.\textsuperscript{9} Hence, if the writing is plain and unambiguous, the courts will construe it according to its terms rather than receive collateral evidence to show the secret intention of the parties, or that any other than the natural and primary meaning of the language used was intended.\textsuperscript{10} This latter rule is not inconsistent with the one first laid down.\textsuperscript{11}

When a writing embodies the terms of a sale, and it is apparently complete in all respects, parol evidence to show a warranty or any other additional term not included in the instrument, is inadmissible.\textsuperscript{12} It is more natural to suppose that the document would cover such warranty as accompanied the sale, because the warranty is certainly a part of the agreement and not a separate obligation.\textsuperscript{13} But, obviously, where only some of the terms of the sale are included in the writing, and thus the instrument is incomplete since there must have been other terms, extrinsic evidence is admissible to com-

\textsuperscript{8} *Supra* note 3.
\textsuperscript{12} 5 WIGMORE, *EVIDENCE* (2d ed. 1923) §2434.
plete the writing.\textsuperscript{14} It is within this rule that oral warranties will be accepted.\textsuperscript{15} However, wherever possible the courts treat the writing as the sole expression of the transaction as to warranties.\textsuperscript{16} Yet, in certain circumstances, it has been permitted by parol to show such warranties,\textsuperscript{17} but these cases must be held to their peculiar facts.

S. B. S.

Pleading and Practice—Suppression of Deposition—
Rules of Practice May Not Be Inconsistent with Any Statute.
—Pursuant to §288 of the Civil Practice Act, appellant had taken by deposition, testimony of one Loomis, since it appeared, because of his illness, that he would be unable to attend the trial of the action. Loomis died before the minutes were transcribed. On respondent’s motion, the deposition was suppressed solely because it had not been read over and subscribed in accordance with rule 129 of the Rules of Civil Practice. On appeal, held, reversed. Said rule is invalid as


\textsuperscript{15} Supra note 13.


\textsuperscript{17} Chapin v. Dobson, 78 N. Y. 74 (1879); Eighmie v. Taylor, 98 N. Y. 288 (1885); Thomas v. Scutt, 127 N. Y. 133, 27 N. E. 961 (1891).