Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment

Joseph M. Snee, S.J.
By reason of his scholarly writings, Father Snee has earned a reputation as a constitutional lawyer which lends authority to his declaration: "[S]tate activity which does not in any way infringe the religious freedom of the individual should not be forbidden to the states simply because it happens to fit the Supreme Court's idea of a 'law respecting an establishment of religion'—"

Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment*

JOSEPH M. SNEE, S.J.

The precise question in this paper is whether the religious freedom now guaranteed against state interference under the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment places exactly the same restrictions upon state action as are placed by the First Amendment upon federal activity — not only under the free exercise clause but under the establishment clause as well. First, it is essential to determine whether the two clauses are synonymous or whether they can be distinguished. Secondly, if they can and should be distinguished, can the establishment clause legitimately be read into the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?

It is my contention that these two clauses of the First Amendment can and must be distinguished, and that the establishment clause per se should not, and historically and logically cannot, be incorporated into the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The validity of this contention must be sought in the history which led to the adoption of the First Amendment in its present form as well as in the judicial interpretation of the Amendment. A careful investigation of these sources leads me to the conclusion that the establishment clause of the First Amendment, as distinguished from the free exercise clause, both in the mind of the framers of the Amendment and their contemporaries, as well as in the judgment of the Supreme Court during the last century, was meant to accomplish one or both of two purposes. It is clearly regarded: (1) as a reservation of power to the respective states; and (2) possibly as a politically wise means of forestalling any abridgment of the religious freedom of the free exercise clause on the part of the then suspect federal

*Digested from an article appearing in 1954 Washington Law Review, No. 4 at 372.

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1 I say "per se" because certain types of establishment would be forbidden under the Fourteenth Amendment, not because they are establishments, but because they are such as to infringe the religious liberty protected by that Amendment.
power. These two purposes are found expressed side by side in the debates in the ratifying conventions and in the legislative history of the First Amendment. Either purpose implies an intent to impose upon the federal government a political duty, rather than to confer upon the citizen a constitutional right, and what is not a constitutional right under the First Amendment can hardly be a fundamental concept of liberty protected by the Fourteenth!

Debates in the Ratifying Conventions

The debates in the ratifying conventions of the several states, and the amendments which they proposed to the Constitution, show the contemporary understanding of the relation of the federal government to the subject of religion. The absence of a federal Bill of Rights safeguarding, among other things, religious freedom was excused on the ground that the federal government was one of delegated powers only; that religion had not been so delegated and hence remained within the exclusive cognizance of the respective states.

This general argument was made in Pennsylvania on 23 October 1787 by Mr. Wilson, and in Massachusetts on 23 January 1788 by Mr. Bowdoin and Mr. Parsons. Other advocates of the Constitution entered more fully into the precise question of religious freedom.

In Virginia, Patrick Henry objected strenuously to the absence of a Bill of Rights in general, and of a guarantee of religious freedom in particular — probably because he found this not so much a stumbling block as a convenient peg on which to hang his opposition to the whole proposed Constitution. His objections were ably met by both Governor Randolph and James Madison in terms which left no doubt of their own views on the relation of the federal government to religion. Thus, on 10 June 1788, Governor Randolph, in reply to Patrick Henry, found a guarantee of religious freedom in the prohibition against any religious test and vitiated further difficulties in these words:

It has been said that, if the exclusion of the religious test were an exception from the general power of Congress, the power over religions would remain. I inform those who are of this opinion, that no power is given expressly to Congress over religion. The senators and representatives, members of the state legislatures, and executive and judicial officers, are bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution. This only binds them to support it in the exerc-
And on 15 June Governor Randolph again urged this lack of any federal power over religion in reply to further objections by Mr. Henry:

He [Patrick Henry] has added religion to the objects endangered, in his conception. Is there any power given over it? Let it be pointed out. Will he not be contented with the answer that has been frequently given to that objection? . . . No part of the Constitution, even if strictly construed, will justify a conclusion that the general government can take away or impair the freedom of religion.10

James Madison, whose views will be discussed later at greater length, made the same point on 12 June 1788, again in reply to the worrisome Patrick Henry:

There is not a shadow of right in the general government to inter-meddle with religion. Its least interference with it would be a most flagrant usurpation.11

It is clear from the debates in the ratifying conventions that many of the most ardent supporters of the Constitution argued, and evidently succeeded in convincing their colleagues, that religion was a subject reserved to the states, over which the Constitution delegated to the federal government no power whatsoever.

Their success is evinced by the failure in several states to propose any amendments on religious freedom, and by the form which the proposed amendments on this subject assumed in other states. This is all the more striking in view of the vigorous debates on religious freedom in the various state ratifying conventions. The nine amendments proposed by Massachusetts12 contained no mention of religion at all. South Carolina, where the Protestant religion was declared in so many words to be the established religion of the state,13 was content to suggest that the third section of Article VI of the Constitution be amended to read: “but no other religious Test shall ever be required.”14 The Committee on Amendments in the Maryland Convention rejected the proposed amendment: “That there be no national religion established by law; but that all persons be equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty.”15

In Virginia, the Committee Report on the Declaration of Rights and on Amendments was accepted by the Convention and voted into the ratification of the Constitution. The Committee, of which Madison was a member, included in the declaration of rights a paragraph on religious freedom

10S.C. Const. art. XXXVIII (1778). This provision betrays some of the contemporary confusion between the establishment of a religious sect and the incorporation of religious societies: when it was eliminated in Article VIII, Section 1, of the North Carolina Constitution (1790), it was felt necessary to provide that this change did not affect property rights of the various religious societies [S.C. Const. art. VIII, §2 (1790)]. The same confusion may be seen in Madison’s message vetoing a bill to incorporate an Episcopal church in Alexandria, D.C. See 22 Annals of Cong. 982, 983 (1811). The same confusion is present in the cases of Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113 (1804); Selden v. Overseers of Poor, 38 Va. (11 Leigh) 127 (1840); and in state constitutional provisions forbidding such incorporation. For the latter, see Va. Const. art. IV, §32 (1850); Va. Const. art. IV, §30 (1864); Va. Const. art. V, §17 (1870); Va. Const. art. IV, §59 (1902); W. Va. Const. art. XI, §2 (1861-63); W. Va. Const. art. VI, §47 (1872). This prohibition is still contained in the constitutions of Virginia and West Virginia.

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13 Elliot 204.

14 id. at 469.

15 id. at 330.
taken from the Virginia Bill of Rights. But significantly, religious freedom was not the subject of any of the amendments recommended by the Committee and proposed to Congress by the Convention, probably because this was thought to be provided for by the first of the amendments recommended and proposed, which read:

That each state in the Union shall respectively retain every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Constitution delegated to the Congress of the United States, or to the departments of the federal government."

The procedure adopted in Virginia was followed to the letter by North Carolina and Rhode Island, i.e., the inclusion of religious freedom in the declaration of rights and its omission from the list of proposed amendments, among which was, however, the “reservation of powers” amendment as proposed by Virginia.

Only New York and New Hampshire made any definite recommendations to Congress on the relation of the federal government to the subject of religion. The declaration proposed by New York was:

That the people have an equal, natural, and unalienable right freely and peaceably to exercise their religion according to the dictates of conscience; and that no religious sect, or society ought to be favored or established by law in preference to others."

The wording of the New Hampshire proposal reflects the same policy which underlies the phrasing of the First Amendment, to which it is very similar: “Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or to infringe the rights of conscience." New Hampshire’s constitution required profession of the Protestant religion as a qualification for the offices of state senator, representative and governor, and empowered the state legislature to authorize the municipalities to provide for the “support and maintenance of public protestant teachers of piety, religion and morality.” It seems not unreasonable to infer that the precise wording of the New Hampshire amendment was designed to prevent the federal government not only from infringing the liberty of New Hampshire citizens by some other religious establishment but also from passing any laws “touching” the then existing New Hampshire establishment.

The Drafting of the First Amendment

Considerable light is shed on the precise question now before us by a careful investigation of the legislative history of the First

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16 The Virginia guarantee of religious freedom is found in Va. Bill of Rights §16 (1776).
17 3 Elliot 659. See also the Preamble, 3 id. at 656.
18 id. at 242-47.
19 id. at 334-37.
21 id. at 326.
22 id. at 328.
Amendment from Madison's first introduction of proposed amendments on 8 June 1789 until they were sent in final form to President Washington on 24 September 1789 for submission to the states. A discriminating study of its history and context will, I believe, justify a conclusion that the establishment clause was meant to reserve powers to the several states, while the free exercise clause was meant to guarantee religious liberty of the individual citizen against federal encroachment.

Madison submitted his amendments, including the "Bill of Rights," to the House of Representatives on 8 June 1789. Two of his amendments, the fourth and fifth, dealt expressly with the subject of religion. His fourth amendment was to be inserted in Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution in the following terms: . . . The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.

His fifth amendment, to guarantee religious freedom against encroachment by the states, was to be inserted in Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution in this form:

No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.

And finally he proposed a new article to the Constitution which, after expressly providing for a separation of powers among the three branches of the federal government, declared:

The powers not delegated by this Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively.

A comparison of these three amendments proposed by Mr. Madison, especially in view of the theories which he had professed in the Virginia ratifying convention, leads to some interesting conclusions.

Both the federal and state amendments proposed by Mr. Madison (his fourth and fifth amendments, respectively) protect the "equal rights of conscience," the one against infringement by the federal government, the other against violation by the states. But the federal amendment placed further restrictions upon the exercise of federal power, which the state amendment did not impose upon state competence in the matter of religion. For the federal amendment expressly further commanded the federal government that "[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or

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\text{\textsuperscript{97}}\text{1 Annals of Cong. 431-42 (1789). Madison proposed two amendments to secure religious freedom. His fourth amendment restricted federal activity, and his fifth amendment guarded against state action. For brevity I refer to these in the text above as his "federal amendment" and "state amendment," respectively. His state amendment was eliminated by the Senate. His federal amendment, as altered by the House, was the third of those actually submitted to the states for ratification. The first two failing of ratification, this became our present First Amendment. These facts lend a certain touch of ironic humor to Mr. Justice Jackson's statement: "This freedom was first in the Bill of Rights because it was first in the forefathers' minds. . . ." See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18, 26 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
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\text{\textsuperscript{98}}\text{1 Annals of Cong. 913, 914 (1789).
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\text{\textsuperscript{99}}\text{Under the rubric "Limitations upon Powers of Congress."}
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\text{\textsuperscript{100}}\text{1 Annals of Cong. 434 (1789).}
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worship, nor shall any national religion be established. . . ."

When this difference is read in the context of his "reservation of powers" amendment, it is clear that he concedes to the states power over religious matters which he would deny to the federal government. This conclusion may be established on either of two grounds. First, the federal amendment expressly declares that the federal government shall have no power to abridge civil rights on account of religious belief or worship, or to establish a national religion. Such powers are, therefore, not delegated to the federal government by the Constitution and hence, by the provisions of the "reservation" amendment, are to be deemed reserved to the states respectively. Secondly, while the state amendment prohibits the states from violating the equal rights of conscience, it does not place upon them the further restriction put by the federal amendment upon the federal government. It does not forbid the states to abridge the civil rights of its citizens on religious grounds (as clearly distinguished from "equal rights of conscience"), nor does it forbid them to establish a religion, provided only that the equal rights of conscience be not violated. Since these powers are not prohibited to the states by the Constitution they are, by the provisions of the "reservation" amendment, to be deemed reserved to the states.

From the original draft of the amendments, as proposed by Madison, two points are clear. First, in Madison's view, a law infringing or violating the equal rights of conscience is one thing; and a law which abridges civil rights on religious grounds or establishes a religion is quite another. Otherwise, it would be logically unsound to make the distinction which he does make, in two juxtaposed amendments, between restrictions upon federal power and those upon state power. It would betray not only unsound logic but faulty draftsmanship. Secondly, when the difference between these two amendments is read in the light of the "reservation" amendment, the conclusion is inescapable that both amendments protect the religious liberty of the citizen against encroachment by either federal or state governments, while the state amendment has the added function of reserving to the states certain other powers over the subject of religion, provided only that there be no violation of the equal rights of conscience by any state in the exercise of the powers thus reserved.

Madison's concept of the function of the establishment clause of the federal amendment is strikingly clarified by his defense of his proposed fifth amendment. Mr. Tucker of South Carolina, where the state constitution expressly established the "Christian Protestant religion," objected to this restriction upon state power:

This is offered, I presume, as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, but it goes only to the alteration of the constitutions of particular states. It will be much better, I apprehend, to leave the State Governments to themselves, and not to interfere with them more than we already do; and that is thought by many to be rather too much. I therefore move, sir, to strike out these words."

Madison's reply in defense of his pro-

See the remark of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 31 (1947) (dissenting opinion), approving James Madison's conclusion that the First Amendment is a "Model of technical precision, and perspicuous brevity."

S.C. Const. art. XXXVIII (1778).

1 Annals of Cong. 755 (1789).
posed restrictions upon state power, and the reasons he advances for their adoption, are highly significant in arriving at his understanding of the two proposed amendments on the subject of religion, and especially of the function of the establishment clause. His reply is thus reported:

MR. MADISON conceived this to be the most valuable amendment in the whole list. If there were any reason to restrain the Government of the United States from infringing upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary that they should be secured against the State Governments. He thought that if they provided against the one, it was as necessary to provide against the other, and was satisfied that it would be equally grateful to the people. 

Madison, whose interpretation of the First Amendment seems to carry great weight with the present Supreme Court, thought it "equally necessary" to restrain both federal and state governments "from infringing upon these essential rights." In attempting to accomplish this equally necessary purpose, he did not regard it as essential that state governments as well as the federal should be commanded by the Constitution that "no religion shall be established by law." It is indeed stressing the obvious to conclude that, in his mind at least, the two were quite distinct and that the establishment of a religion by law is not per se an infringement of the equal rights of conscience. Further, the prohibition against establishment is not a prerequisite of religious freedom. Hence, however great his desire to protect religious freedom — and he regarded the restriction upon state power as "the most valuable amendment in the whole list" — he would encroach upon the reserved power of the states only to the extent necessary to protect the equal rights of conscience; he would leave it to the individual states to adopt such measures in the field of religion as they saw fit, provided only that they did not thereby infringe those rights. It is highly unfortunate that, in view of the recent judicial interpretation of the First Amendment as read into the Fourteenth, it should now be necessary to stress the obvious!

During the next several months the legislature hotly debated these original amendments and on 7 September 1789 the Senate finally rejected the proposed amendment restricting state power over religion. A short time later, as the result of a joint legislative conference on the remaining amendments, the following formula was produced for what is now the First Amendment:

... Congress shall make no LAW RESPECTING AN ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of Speech, or of the Press; or the right of the People peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for a redress of Grievances. . . .

Whatever may have been the effect of the Senate's rejection of the amendment limiting state power over religion, the accepted formula clearly reserved to the states any and all power over religion, provided only that the equal rights of conscience were not thereby infringed. Now that the latter restriction (Madison's fifth amendment) had been removed, the states were left ab-
olutely free to legislate on the subject of religion. Congress could not prohibit the free exercise of religion, but it was left powerless to interfere with the states if they chose to do so. Only the establishment clause, as an explication of the general reservation of power in the Tenth Amendment, explains this Congressional impotence. It would be more than naive to suggest that Congress was unable to protect the religious liberty of American citizens against state action on the ground that it was forbidden "to prohibit the free exercise" of religion!

The First Amendment, therefore, is not only an express guarantee of personal religious freedom against the threat of federal action, but also an application of the principle of federalism. The two purposes must be clearly and unequivocally distinguished, as must the two clauses in which these purposes are separately expressed. The two clauses together were intended to remove the subject of religion completely from the federal competence. Much ink has been spilt over Jefferson's metaphorical description of the First Amendment as building a wall of separation. As Cardozo once remarked, a metaphor is indeed a dangerous and shifting foundation for a rule of law, but at the risk of making confusion worse confounded, I make bold to suggest that the First Amendment built not one, but two walls of separation. It built a wall between the federal government and the American citizen, because it forbade Congress to make any law "prohibiting the free exercise" of his chosen religion. When Congress was further forbidden to make any "law respecting an establishment of religion," a second wall was built. But, in the mind of the framers of the First Amendment, the establishment clause drew a line of demarcation, not between federal power and personal freedom, but between federal and state sovereignty. It is difficult to understand by what logical or historical tour de force the wall erected by the establishment clause between those two sovereignties, which left the states free to interfere at will with the religious freedom of their own citizens, can be construed to be a positive guarantee of religious freedom. The establishment clause expressly made it impossible for the federal government to give to the American citizen positive protection in the exercise of the very freedom which by the free exercise clause it was forbidden to infringe; this was something reserved to the states. By what magical metamorphosis does a clause which, under the First Amendment is expressly a reservation of power to the states, become a denial of that very power by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment?

"That Jefferson, in his letter to the Danbury Baptists, was dealing with this first wall of separation is clear from even a casual reading of the document:

Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative power of government reach actions only, and not opinions. . . .

Ibid. None of these truths give rise to "establishment" problems, unless the establishment clause be given the peculiar interpretation which it received from Mr. Justice Roberts in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Justice Roberts' construction of the clause will be considered later in this paper.
The legislative history of the First Amendment would indicate therefore that the establishment clause was meant by its framers to remove the whole subject of religion from the jurisdiction of the federal government and to make it exclusively a matter for state cognizance. By reserving this power to the states, the establishment clause imposed a political duty upon the federal government without directly conferring a constitutional right upon the citizen, while the free exercise clause directly guaranteed to the citizen a right of religious freedom against encroachment by the federal government.

**Religion and the States before the Fourteenth Amendment**

Though the Supreme Court, in *Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore*, had held that the Fifth Amendment was not a restriction upon the states, it was not until 1845, in *Permoli v. First Municipality*, that it considered whether the religious guarantees of the First Amendment protected against state action. The Court decided there was no such protection and stated its decision in language which left no doubt that the protection and regulation of religious liberty was a power reserved under the Constitution to the states:

> The Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective States in their religious liberties; this is left to the State constitutions and laws: nor is there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect on the States."

Though the case does not expressly rely on the distinction between the establishment and free exercise clauses, this distinction is implicit in the holding of the case. By being precluded from "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion, the federal government is not precluded from protecting the citizen against the states in that exercise. It is expressly so precluded precisely because it may "make no law respecting an establishment of religion." The principle of federalism formed the basis for the Court's rejection of the contention that state action violated the guarantees of religious freedom in the 1787 Northwest Ordinance and in the 1811 Enabling Act for Louisiana. Of these statutes the Court said:

> So far as they conferred political rights, and secured civil and religious liberties (which are political rights), the laws of Congress were all superseded by the state constitution; nor is any part of them in force, unless they were adopted by the constitution of Louisiana, as laws of the state. It is not possible to maintain that the United States hold in trust, by force of the ordinance, for the people of Louisiana, all the great elemental principles, or any one of them, contained in the ordinance, and secured to the people of the Orleans territory, during its existence.

Provisions made, therefore, to protect the religious freedom of the inhabitants of a territory, and even an enacting act requiring the minimal guarantees of religious freedom

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*Id. at 610.*

"2 Federal and State Constitutions 957 (Thorpe ed. 1909). Rights guaranteed by this Ordinance of 1787 were extended to the Mississippi Territory by the Act of April 7, 1798, 1 Stat. 549, 550 (1798); and by the Act of March 2, 1805, 2 Stat. 329 (1805), the inhabitants of the Territory of Orleans (now the State of Louisiana) acquired all the rights of the people of the Territory of Mississippi.


"Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 610 (1845)."
in the state to be admitted, could not operate to deprive the state of its exclusive competence, for good or for evil, in the sphere of religion—a power reserved by the Constitution to the several states.

The treaty of 1803 with France, ceding the Louisiana Territory to the United States, also contained guarantees of religious freedom for the inhabitants. Counsel in the Permoli case did not argue the applicability of these provisions. It would be interesting, but unrewarding, to speculate whether the Court would have held them to be applicable. There is, therefore, no case directly in point to the effect that the federal government under its treaty-making power might have interfered to a limited extent with state establishments—as had been suggested in the debates of the North Carolina ratifying convention. The result, however, which might be expected is indicated by Municipality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church. The question there raised was whether the Church in Puerto Rico had juridical personality, with capacity to sue and be sued or to acquire and possess property, independently of any incorporation by the government of the island. The Court considered this question to be settled in the affirmative by the provisions of Article 8 of the Treaty of Paris, which expressly secured the existing capacity of ecclesiastical bodies in Puerto Rico and other former Spanish territories to acquire and possess property. The Court also took judicial notice of the position of the Holy See in international law.

The case clearly involved federal action respecting an establishment of religion. It secured to the Catholic Church in the former Spanish territories the same juridical personality (at least as to capacity to sue and be sued, and to acquire or hold property), as it had possessed under Spanish law as the sole state-recognized church. To some extent it gave a favored position to the Catholic Church, since it was in fact the only religious body then legally existing in Puerto Rico. But there could be no claim that this provision was one which prohibited the free exercise of religion, provided at least that the other religious bodies which later found their way into these territories should be given the opportunity of acquiring legal personality by means of incorporation.

At the same time, there can be no doubt that the federal government would be absolutely precluded from using even the treaty power as a pretext for prohibiting the free exercise of religion in the acquired territories or in the territories within the jurisdiction of individual states. The difference can be explained only on the ground that the establishment clause removed the question of religion from the jurisdiction of the United States as an application of the principle of federalism, and this reservation of power is subject to the exception of a legitimate use of the treaty power, just as is every other power reserved to the respective states. A

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38 It is interesting to note that it was not until 1868 that Louisiana enacted a constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. La. Const. tit. I, art. 12 (1868). The earlier constitutions of 1812, 1845, 1852, and 1864 did not provide an express guarantee.


50 See construction given a similar treaty provision in The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).

51 210 U.S. 296 (1908).

52 30 Stat. 1758 (1898).
treaty might provide that citizens or former citizens of a foreign power be guaranteed complete religious liberty, and to that extent interfere with state sovereignty and state establishments. Such would be a valid use of the treaty power, and such agreements have frequently been made with foreign nations. But, at least prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal government could not by agreement with a foreign nation provide that all inhabitants of the individual states, whether foreign nationals or American citizens, be granted the most complete religious freedom and that all state establishments be eliminated, any more than it could thereby provide that inheritance throughout the states should henceforth be per capita and not per stirpes. Nor could a treaty ever operate to restrict the inhabitants of the several states in the exercise of such religious freedom as was conferred by the constitutions and laws of those states. The command that Congress, or the federal government, shall not prohibit the free exercise of religion is, within its proper scope, absolute and restricts that government in the exercise of each and every power which it possesses under the Constitution. No treaty could operate to prohibit this free exercise of religion, because this is a constitutional guarantee running from the federal government to every person within the United States. That is not the case with the establishment clause. This, like so many other clauses of the Constitution, draws a line between federal and state sovereignty — a line which the federal government may legitimately, per modum exceptionis, overstep in the exercise of the treaty-making power.

The Establishment Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment became effective in 1868. It was not until 1940, almost seventy-two years later, that the Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut expressly held that this Amendment incorporated the religious freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Cantwell decision, however, had already been foreshadowed by a dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Berea College v. Kentucky and by dicta in Meyer v. Nebraska. Eleven years after the Meyer dicta, the Supreme Court in Hamilton v. Regents denied that students had a right, because of conscientious scruples, to be exempted from military training at the University of Cali-

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\[9\] See Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with Mexico art. IX (1848) [1 Federal and State Constitutions 381 (Thorpe ed. 1909)]; Treaty Ceding Louisiana art. III (1803) [3 Federal and State Constitutions 1360 (Thorpe ed. 1909)].

\[50\] I prescind here from the question whether this might be done under the treaty known as the United Nations Charter.

\[51\] Although the words of the First Amendment refer only to Congress, there can be no doubt that it was intended as a restriction upon all branches of the federal government. Cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), where it was applied to judicial proceedings.

\[52\] See 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

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\[54\] Language used in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115 (1952), raises the interesting question whether the constitutional protection extends to those who are outside the jurisdiction of the United States.

\[55\] See the classic case of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).

\[56\] See 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908) (dissenting opinion).

\[57\] 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).

\[58\] I omit mention of Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), since — despite its religious overtones — it was not concerned with religious freedom.

\[59\] 293 U. S. 245 (1934).
The Court there made this comment on the "liberty" of the Fourteenth Amendment:

There need be no attempt to enumerate or comprehensively to define what is included in the "liberty" protected by the due process clause. Undoubtedly it does include the right to entertain the beliefs, to adhere to the principles and to teach the doctrines on which these students base their objections to the order prescribing military training.

These cases, while intimating that religious freedom is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, do not do so by incorporating into that Amendment the prohibitions of the First. The earliest suggestion that this is, or should be, the case was made by Cardozo concurring in Hamilton v. Regents:

I assume for present purposes that the religious liberty protected by the First Amendment against invasion by the nation is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by the states.

Accepting that premise, I cannot find in the respondents' ordinance an obstruction by the state to "the free exercise" of religion as the phrase was understood by the founders of the nation, and by the generations that have followed. . . . The First Amendment, if it be read into the Fourteenth, makes invalid any state law "respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Instruction in military science is not instruction in the practice or tenets of a religion. Neither directly nor indirectly is government establishing a state religion when it insists upon such training. Instruction in military science, unaccompanied here by any pledge of military service, is not an interference by the state with the free exercise of religion when the liberties of the constitution are read in the light of a century and a half of history during days of peace and war.

The "incorporation" theory, whereby Cardozo for the first time read into the Fourteenth Amendment the guarantee of religious freedom as formulated in the First, was followed by Mr. Justice Roberts' express holding to this effect in Cantwell v. Connecticut.

The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.

Roberts here explains the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, as does Cardozo, in terms of the First Amendment formula. Roberts and Cardozo include in the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment both the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First. But both of them explain the establishment clause in terms of an establishment which is also of its very nature an interference with the free exercise of religion. For Cardozo it meant "government establishing a state religion." Roberts, relying like Cardozo on the similar interpretation given to establishment in Davis v. Beason also explains the forbidden

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"Id. at 262.


"See 293 U.S. 245, 265 (1934) (concurring opinion).


"310 U.S. 296 (1940).

"Id. at 303.

"133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
establishment in terms which clearly indicate a problem in religious liberty as such:

The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion... freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.6

These two opinions represent the first judicial attempt to read the establishment clause into the concept of the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Both cases dealt with problems of religious freedom and the free exercise of religion. The establishment clause is explained in terms of that freedom. It means freedom to believe and worship, while the free exercise clause refers only to freedom to act in accordance with one’s chosen belief.

Seven years later, in *Everson v. Board of Education,*7 the Supreme Court was confronted with a case in which Roberts’ interpretation of the establishment clause proved inadequate. There a New Jersey taxpayer questioned the constitutionality of state action authorizing reimbursement to parents of sums expended by them in providing bus transportation of their children to and from school, including parochial schools. His challenge was not based on the ground that this constituted an interference with the free exercise of his religion, but on the theory that it was a “law respecting an establishment of religion.” It was obvious that there was no interference with his freedom of belief or worship. The Supreme Court, therefore, attempted to present a more comprehensive definition of the establishment clause and, for the first time, to justify its incorporation into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Justice Black’s justification for including the establishment clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, while both facile and fascinating, is hardly illuminating:

The meaning and scope of the First Amendment, preventing establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, in the light of its history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress, have been several times elaborated by the decisions of this Court prior to the application of the First Amendment to the states by the Fourteenth... The broad meaning given the Amendment by these earlier cases has been accepted by this Court in its decisions concerning an individual’s religious freedom rendered since the Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to make the prohibitions of the First applicable to state action abridging religious freedom.... There is every reason to give the same application and broad interpretation to the “establishment of religion” clause. The interpretation of these complementary clauses was well summarized in a statement of the Court of Appeals of South Carolina... quoted with approval by this Court in *Watson v. Jones*... “The structure of our government has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasions of the civil authority.”8

This represents the only attempt by the Supreme Court to state the reasons why the establishment clause, especially with the

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6310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
7330 U.S. 1 (1947).
8Id. at 14, 15.
broad interpretation later given it, should be read into the "liberty" of the Fourteenth Amendment. The reasoning of Mr. Justice Black will, therefore, bear close analysis. Such analysis and a study of the cases cited show that his conclusion, to put it kindly, is far from conclusive.

(1) Terrett v. Taylor, decided by Mr. Justice Story in 1815, is first cited to show the meaning and scope of the First Amendment as elaborated by the Supreme Court. In that case Virginia statutes of 1776, 1784 and 1785 confirmed to the Episcopal Church in Virginia the title to lands acquired when it was the established church, and also incorporated the individual vestries. On the ground that these statutes were inconsistent with the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, the legislature attempted in 1798 and 1801 to divest the Episcopal Church of its glebe lands and destroy the corporations earlier created. The Supreme Court, reviewing a decision of the lower federal court for the District of Columbia, held this attempt to be void as an unlawful seizure of private property. The decision was not based on the First Amendment—of which the Court made no mention whatever. Of the Virginia Bill of Rights guaranteeing religious freedom, the Court made this surprising statement:

Consistent with the constitution of Virginia the legislature could not create or continue a religious establishment which should have exclusive rights and prerogatives, or compel the citizens to worship under a stipulated form of discipline, or to pay taxes to those whose creed they could not conscientiously believe. But the free exercise of religion cannot be justly deemed to be restrained by aiding with equal attention the votaries of every sect to perform their own religious duties, or by establishing funds for the support of ministers, for public charities, for the endowment of churches, or for the sepulture of the dead. And that these purposes could be better secured and cherished by corporate powers, cannot be doubted by any person who has attended to the difficulties which surround all voluntary associations. While, therefore, the legislature might exempt the citizens from a compulsive attendance and payment of taxes in support of any particular sect, it is not perceived that either public or constitutional principles required the abolition of all religious corporations.

It is asserted by the legislature of Virginia, in 1798 and 1801, that this statute was inconsistent with the bill of rights and constitution of that State, and therefore void. Whatever weight such a declaration might properly have as the opinion of wise and learned men, as a declaration of what the law has been or is, it can have no decisive authority. It is, however, encountered by the opinion successively given by former legislatures from the earliest existence of the constitution itself, which were composed of men of the very first rank for talents and learning. And this opinion, too, is not only a contemporaneous exposition of the constitution, but has the additional weight that it was promulgated or acquiesced in by a great majority, if not the whole, of the very framers of the constitution.

Of the other cases cited by Mr. Justice Black after this inauspicious beginning, Watson v. Jones was not a First Amend-
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ment case and will be considered below. *Davis v. Beason* and *Reynolds v. United States* upheld the validity of statutes of the Territories of Idaho and Utah, respectively, placing legal sanctions on the practice of polygamy; both cases hold that the free exercise clause does not confer immunity for practices otherwise criminal. In *Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp*, the Court refused to declare invalid a federal contract with the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions to pay for the Catholic education of Indian children at the request of their parents from certain funds held by the federal government. These "treaty funds" and "trust funds," though held by the government, were considered as belonging to the Indians. They were not public moneys and hence did not fall under a statutory prohibition against expenditure of public moneys for sectarian purposes. Of the contract with the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions, the Court said: "It is not contended that it was unconstitutional, and it could not be." The Court further held that to forbid the Indians to spend their own money for sectarian purposes, even though their funds were administered by the federal government, would be an interference with the free exercise of their religion.

(2) The *Everson* opinion then states that the "broad meaning given the [First] ... Amendment by these earlier cases" has been applied by the Court to state action involving an infringement of religious freedom. Seven cases are cited, all decided since 1940, upholding the free exercise of religion, especially freedom of evangelizing by Jehovah's Witnesses, against state interference. A casual reference is also made to *Bradfield v. Roberts*, holding that Congress was not precluded under the establishment clause from contracting with a Catholic hospital for the care of indigent patients in the District of Columbia.

(3) Against this background of judicial interpretation of the First Amendment, Mr. Justice Black finally reaches the crucial question why the establishment clause should also be applied to the states *via* the Fourteenth Amendment. This problem is solved, neatly and with dispatch, by the bland assertion: "There is every reason to give the same application and broad interpretation to the 'establishment of religion' clause." It is assumed, but not shown, that the two clauses of the First Amendment are both interrelated and complementary; and their interrelation is asserted to be well summarized by a quotation from an 1843 South Carolina decision, cited with approval by an 1872 opinion of the Supreme Court — although neither case dealt with the First Amendment!

In the case relied on, *Harmon v. Dreher*, the court refused to recognize any rights to church property in a Presbyterian minister who had been excommunicated and unfrocked by church authorities. Together with hundreds of cases before and since, the

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133 U.S. 333 (1890).

98 U.S. 145 (1878).

210 U.S. 50 (1908).

*Id.* at 81.

**Footnotes:**


67 175 U.S. 291 (1899).


69 Speers Eq. 87, 120 (S.C. 1843).
South Carolina court accepted as final the excommunication imposed by the church synod. It held that any re-adjudication of this question by a civil court would be an unwarranted intrusion by government into the internal affairs of a religious body, to the detriment of religious freedom. This was quoted with approval in *Watson v. Jones*, where the court recognized as lawful owners of a Presbyterian church in Louisville that faction of the congregation which was recognized by the General Assembly of the Church. In both cases, even though civil property rights depended on membership in the church, a determination by lawful church authority on the question of membership was regarded as controlling and binding upon the civil courts. Both cases rely on general principles of American jurisprudence, rather than on constitutional guarantees, and neither case mentions in this context the First Amendment.

The *Harmon* case certainly does not stand for the proposition for which it is cited in *Everson* — that the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment are so interrelated that both should be read into the “liberty” of the Fourteenth. The first dictum in the *Harmon* case, which says that civil liberty has been preserved by rescuing temporal institutions from religious interference, is most probably a reference to a peculiar South Carolina constitutional provision making clergymen ineligible for state offices. Such a provision today would be suspect as a violation of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment — certainly it would not be regarded as a prohibition of establishment. Further, it is difficult to see what the interrelation, if any, expressed in the *Harmon* case has to do with the objective of the *Everson* opinion — the incorporation of the establishment clause into the Fourteenth Amendment. Whatever interrelation is expressed by the *Harmon* dicta, it is at most some connection between the rescue of temporal institutions from religious interference and the protection of religious liberty from governmental interference. Does Mr. Justice Black equate “no law respecting the establishment of religion” with the rescue of “temporal institutions from religious interference”? It is ordinarily supposed that aid

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98 S.C. Const. art. I, §23 (1790). The interrelation between this provision and the guarantee of religious freedom [S.C. Const. art. VIII, §1 (1790)] becomes even more tenuous when we remember that it was retained from Article XXI of the South Carolina Constitution of 1778; this Constitution also provided in Article XXXVIII:

That all persons and religious societies who acknowledge that there is one God, and a future state of rewards and punishments, and that God is publicly to be worshipped, shall be freely tolerated. The Christian Protestant religion shall be deemed, and is hereby constituted and declared to be, the established religion of this State. That all denominations of Christian Protestants, demeaning themselves peaceable and faithfully, shall enjoy equal religious and civil privileges.

See comments in notes 96 and 97 *supra*. 

95 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1872).

96 That opinion [*Watson v. Jones*] has been given consideration in subsequent church litigation — state and national. The opinion itself, however, did not turn on either the establishment or the prohibition of the free exercise of religion.” Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 110 (1952). The principle of the *Watson* case has been severely criticized by one authority on the ground that it is destructive of religious freedom. Zollmann, American Civil Church Law 198-235 (1917).
by the state to religion may result in domination of religious bodies by the state, not vice versa. Nor does such freedom of temporal institutions from ecclesiastical domination appear prominent in the meaning of the establishment clause as defined by Mr. Justice Black in the very next paragraph of his opinion:

The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbelief, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between Church and State."

The Court has never since squarely faced the problem why the "liberty" of the Fourteenth Amendment should include the establishment clause of the First; and the cavalier solution attempted in the Everson case is far from satisfactory. The rest of the story is soon told. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, the Court assumed that it was so included and expressly refused to distinguish or overrule its "holding" to that effect in the Everson case. The clause was there held to forbid the use of public school buildings to conduct classes in religion for pupils whose parents so requested. In Doremus v. Board of Education, the Court made the same assumption but denied the standing of a taxpayer to enjoin the reading of the Old Testament and the Lord's Prayer in New Jersey public schools. In the recent case of Zorach v. Clauson, the Court allowed the New York public schools to release, during certain hours, those pupils who wished to attend religious instruction conducted off the school premises. The Zorach case again affirmed the "holding" of the McCollum opinion that the establishment clause was made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.

It is clear from these later cases that the problem of the application of the establishment clause to the states has not been faced since the Everson decision. Indeed, the problem has been largely lost sight of. Since 1947, the Court has simply asked itself one question: Does the challenged action violate our concept of the "separation" which we

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8See the remark of Mr. Justice Jackson on this danger in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 27 (1947) (dissenting opinion).


10See the remark of Mr. Justice Jackson on this danger in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 27 (1947) (dissenting opinion).

11Id. at 211.


13V. & T. Education, 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953), held that the First Amendment's establishment clause was violated when the Board allowed distribution of New Testaments after school on public school premises by a Bible Society to those pupils whose parents so requested. The Supreme Court of New Jersey distinguished its earlier holding in Doremus v. Board of Education, 5 N.J. 435, 71 A.2d 732 (1950), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).

assume should exist between church and state? If so, it will be held contrary either to the establishment clause of the First Amendment or to the free exercise clause, as seems best suited to the facts of the case. Thus, in Zorach v. Clauson,\textsuperscript{106} Mr. Justice Douglas flatly stated: "The constitutional standard is the separation of Church and State." And in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,\textsuperscript{107} the test for the Court was whether a New York statute "violates our rule of separation between church and state." The offending statute was therefore banned under the "free exercise" clause.

**Some Conclusions**

(1) In the state ratifying conventions and the first Congress, the relation of the federal government to religion was regarded as a problem in federalism. They feared, not only federal interference with individual religious freedom, but also federal interference with state establishments or quasi-establishments then existing. To them, there was a danger of such interference with state sovereignty by affirmative federal action to establish a national religion, or by negative action disestablishing state establishments.

(2) This concept found complete expression in the formula finally adopted for the First Amendment, as supplemented by the general reservation of powers expressed in the Tenth Amendment. The free exercise clause precluded federal interference with individual religious freedom. The establishment clause prevented any federal interference, whether affirmative or negative, with existing state establishments: it reserved all power in this regard to the several states.

(3) As a reservation of power, the establishment clause is not *per se* a constitutional guarantee of liberty. A clause which in effect told the states in 1789 that they had all power over religion so far as the Constitution was concerned, cannot in 1940 be read into the word "liberty" of the Fourteenth Amendment to mean that they have *no* power.

(4) If Madison and the other framers of the First Amendment considered the establishment clause to be anything more than a reservation of power to the states, it was as a political duty imposed upon the federal government. Even if meant as an additional safeguard to religious freedom from federal encroachment, it does not thereby become a constitutional right of the citizen. Hence, however wise this additional safeguard may be, it is not in itself a liberty, and certainly is not so fundamental as to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.\textsuperscript{108}

(5) Certainly the Fourteenth Amendment does, and should, protect the religious freedom of the citizen against state invasion. I have no fundamental quarrel with those who would achieve this effect by incorporating the constitutional guarantee of the First Amendment. This guarantee is, however, expressed in the free exercise clause. At the same time, any state action — whether called establishment or some sweeter name—which infringes upon the religious freedom of the individual, should be forbidden to the states under the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. But state activity which does not in any way infringe the religious

\textsuperscript{106}Id. at 314.

\textsuperscript{107}344 U.S. 94, 110 (1952).

freedom of the individual, should not be forbidden to the states simply because it happens to fit the Supreme Court's idea of a "law respecting an establishment of religion" — and still less on the even more doctrinaire ground that it violates their concept of "separation of church and state."

(6) The inclusion of the establishment clause into the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court has no firm basis in the history of the clause or in logic; and the sole attempt to justify its inclusion has been unsatisfactory. Further, it is unnecessary. The religious freedom of American citizens has been more than adequately safeguarded by state constitutions and laws. I believe that freedom is safer in the hands of the legislatures and judges of forty-eight states than at the mercy of nine men sitting in Washington. Let the Supreme Court, under the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment, prescribe minimal standards of religious freedom: the states are still free to enlarge these standards by their own constitutions and laws. But the added restriction of the establishment clause by the Court is precisely that use of the Fourteenth Amendment which Holmes so much deprecated. It substitutes the judgment of the Supreme Court for that of local representative bodies in determining the wisdom of such social experiments as were attacked in the McCollum and Zorach cases. It may eventually result in an abridgement of the very religious freedom which the Court desires so earnestly to safeguard.

It is difficult to see how such infringement was present in the Tudor case, cited in note 104 supra, where every precaution was taken to see that no embarrassment came to pupils who were not to receive the Bibles. Nor was there any claim to this effect made in the Everson, McCollum, and Zorach cases — although in these it is easier to see how such constraint might be involved.

The various state constitutions contain, altogether, more than 900 provisions on the subject of religion and religious freedom.

Anyone conversant with the enormous mass of state cases on the subject will agree with the statement that religious freedom has been well protected on the state level.

As but one example of the extremes between which the Court has alternated, compare Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), with West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). While the movement of the Court has been toward greater liberty, there is no guarantee that this will always be true. Meanwhile, it is disquieting to note that, prior to 1940, those aggrieved by state action relied almost exclusively on the guarantees of religious freedom in the state constitutions; since then, almost exclusive reliance has been placed on the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

These are in general much more detailed provisions.


Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948), points to some concrete possibilities, which could be multiplied ad infinitum. Consider, for instance, the extremely valuable aid given to organized religious groups by the exemption of their ministry and theological students from military service; and the very practical effect on the free exercise of religion if the broad interpretation of establishment in the Everson case were to overrule the holding in Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 389, 390 (1918), and United States v. Stephens, 245 Fed. 956 (D. Del. 1917), aff'd per curiam, 247 U. S. 504 (1918). The problem is magnified when consideration is given to the thousand and one areas where the state governments come into contact with religion.