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THE ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
DOCTRINE: APPROACHING ABSOLUTE
IMMUNITY?—SHELTON v. AMERICAN
MOTORS CORP.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules") pro-
vide for liberal pretrial discovery which contemplates full disclo-
sure of all relevant, non-privileged facts. In accordance with the
Federal Rules governing discovery, the work product of an attor-
ney, prepared in anticipation of litigation, is protected against un-
necessary intrusion. Consequently, there have been numerous at-

1 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37. Rule 26(b)(1) provides for "discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Discovery provisions have been liberally interpreted by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Schlagenhau v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1964) (Rules 26-37 must be broadly interpreted to carry out their intended purpose); United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682-83 (1958) (discovery Rules require disclosure of facts to fullest extent practicable); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (deposition and discovery rules must be liberally construed). In Hickman, Justice Murphy summarized the purposes of the new discovery procedure as follows:

[Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501.

Under Rule 26(a), "[p]arties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a).

2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Rule 26(b)(3) provides in part: "In ordering discovery . . . the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation." Id.


In Hickman, the Supreme Court recognized the need to protect an attorney's work product stating that:

[It is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to
tempts to apply this work product protection to prevent revelation of crucial information otherwise discoverable under the Federal Rules.\(^3\) Notwithstanding these attempts to thwart the discovery process, federal courts confronting the issue have consistently allowed litigants to discover at least the existence of related facts to ensure the most comprehensive judicial review and equitable disposition of the action at bar.\(^4\) Recently, however, in Shelton v. American Motors Corp.,\(^5\) the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the attorney work product doctrine bars inquiry into an attorney’s knowledge of the existence or non-existence of cer-

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\(^4\) See infra note 47 and accompanying text.

\(^5\) 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986).
tain non-privileged documents. In Shelton, the plaintiffs’ sixteen-year-old daughter, Colletta Shelton, was killed in a “roll-over” accident while driving a Jeep CJ-5 manufactured by the defendant. Shelton’s parents, as co-administrators of her estate, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas alleging negligence, strict liability, and failure to warn as alternate theories of recovery. Shortly after filing suit, the plaintiffs sought to depose twenty-one individuals employed by American Motors Corporation (“A.M.C.”). In response, A.M.C. moved to quash the depositions but eventually was compelled to produce for examination six of the initially requested deponents. Following a dispute over whether these six individuals possessed the specific knowledge or information sought by plaintiffs, the district court referred the discovery proceedings to the United States Magistrate. Ultimately the magistrate allowed plaintiffs to depose additional A.M.C. personnel, including its in-house litigation counsel, Rita Burns (“counsel”).

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6 Id. at 1330. After reversing the district court's decision that the information at issue was not protected by the work product doctrine, the Shelton majority declined to decide whether the attorney-client privilege was applicable. Id. at 1329. See Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 106 F.R.D. 490, 494 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (mem.), rev'd, 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986).

7 Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1324. The defendants, American Motors Corporation, American Motors Sales Corporation and Jeep Corporation [collectively, “A.M.C.”] designed, manufactured and marketed the Jeep CJ-5 model involved in this action.

8 See id.

9 Id. at 1325. The plaintiffs designated several categories of matters to be examined pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), which provides in part:

A party may in the party's notice and in a subpoena name as the deponent a public or private corporation or a partnership or association or governmental agency and describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested. In that event, the organization so named shall designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents ... and may set forth, for each person designated, the matters on which the person will testify.

FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6).

10 See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1325. A.M.C. moved to quash the depositions of the twenty-one individuals specifically named and sought a protective order for several of the categories identified by the plaintiffs under Rule 30(b)(6). Id. The district court required A.M.C. to produce only six individuals who A.M.C. claimed possessed knowledge of the ten categories described by the plaintiffs. Id.

11 See id. At the deposition of the six individuals, who A.M.C. originally provided under court order, several of the deponents refused to answer certain questions at the direction of A.M.C.'s trial counsel, claiming that the information sought was protected either by a privilege or the work product doctrine. See Shelton, 106 F.R.D. at 491. Following the deponents’ refusals to answer, plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgment and the district court referred the discovery proceedings to the United States Magistrate. Id.

12 Id. at 491-92. The magistrate denied the plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment, but
Throughout two depositions, counsel, claiming work product protection, repeatedly refused to answer questions concerning the existence or non-existence of certain documents. Counsel’s refusal to answer those questions prompted the district court to grant plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment on the issue of liability.

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit, expressing its displeasure with the growing practice of deposing attorneys, reversed the district

ordered A.M.C. to produce additional deponents, including Rita Burns. Id. at 492.

13 Id. at 492-93. During Burns’ first deposition on October 24, 1984, she refused to acknowledge the existence or non-existence of certain documents, including a list of all lawsuits filed against A.M.C. that involved a Jeep CJ-5. Burns also would not comment on the existence of roll-over propensity tests other than those previously disclosed or whether she knew of any documents, films, prints or memoranda which had been suppressed for the purposes of Jeep overturn cases. Id. Similarly, Burns refused to acknowledge the existence of documents and video tapes of the Jeep Celebrity Challenge Races, computer modeling data, the intentional destruction of the “McCord” test film, and several other items. Id.

Based on Burns’ refusals, plaintiffs again moved for a default judgment. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1325. The magistrate denied plaintiffs’ second motion and directed Burns to appear for a second deposition at which the magistrate could expeditiously resolve any claims of privilege or work product that Burns might raise. Id.

During her second deposition, despite being ordered to respond by the magistrate, counsel continued to refuse to answer questions about the existence or non-existence of various documents. Id. at 1325-26.

14 Id. at 1326. On the recommendation of the magistrate, the district court issued an order directing Burns to answer the questions and show cause why her contemptuous conduct should not be subject to sanctions, including default judgment. Id. Notwithstanding the court’s directive, Burns and A.M.C. responded that they would “stand on [their] position” and not answer the questions. Id. Judge Waters, in a memorandum opinion, concluded that neither the attorney client privilege nor the work product doctrine protected Burns’ refusal to answer questions seeking to establish merely the existence of documents. Shelton, 106 F.R.D. at 494-95.

The district court relied on the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Arkansas National Bank v. Cleburne County Bank, 258 Ark. 329, 331, 525 S.W.2d 82, 84-85 (1975), to dispense with defendant’s claim of work product protection. See Shelton, 106 F.R.D. at 493-94. After determining that the work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege did not prohibit inquiry into Burns’ knowledge of the existence of documents, the district court found that the defendant’s conduct during the depositions constituted willful contempt and entered a default judgment in favor of plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2). See id. at 495-98; Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).

15 See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327. Referring to the practice of deposing opposing counsel, the Shelton court stated:

In recent years, ... the practice of taking the deposition of opposing counsel has become ... increasingly popular .... We view ... [this] as a negative development in the area of litigation . . . .

Undoubtedly, counsel’s task in preparing for trial would be much easier if he could dispense with interrogatories, document requests, and depositions of lay persons, and simply depose opposing counsel in an attempt to identify the information that opposing counsel has decided is relevant and important to his legal theories and strategy. The practice . . . , however, [is] . . . disrupting [to] the adversarial nature of our judicial system.
court's holding with respect to the work product doctrine.\textsuperscript{16} The majority held that the work product doctrine did indeed protect counsel from acknowledging whether or not certain documents existed.\textsuperscript{17}

Writing for the Eighth Circuit, Judge Gibson concluded that the information sought by plaintiffs deserved work product protection, as counsel's recollection of a specific document's existence would be reflective of her mental impressions.\textsuperscript{18} The court determined that the seemingly innocuous questions threatened to establish more than the mere existence or non-existence of documents, and would result in the improper disclosure of counsel's opinion work product.\textsuperscript{19} Judge Gibson reasoned that because of the voluminous nature of A.M.C.'s files, counsel's knowledge of the existence of specific documents, if revealed, would be tantamount to exposing her mental process of selection and compilation.\textsuperscript{20} Additionally, the court noted that the sanction of default judgment imposed by the district court was unwarranted since A.M.C. was forced either

\textit{Id.} at 1327 (citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Id.} at 1330. The court asserted that "where . . . the deponent is opposing counsel and has engaged in a selective process of compiling documents from among voluminous files in preparation for litigation, the mere acknowledgment of the existence of those documents would reveal counsel's mental impressions, which are protected as work product." \textit{Id.} at 1326.

\textsuperscript{17} See \textit{id.} Discussing the work product doctrine, Judge Gibson stated that an attorney's "thought processes, opinions, conclusions, and legal theories" all merit work product protection. \textit{See id.} at 1328 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947); \textit{In re Murphy}, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977)).

\textsuperscript{18} See \textit{Shelton}, 805 F.2d at 1329. The court distinguished the case at bar from those cited by the plaintiffs, see \textit{Smith v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.}, 30 F.R.D. 534, 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1962) (knowledge of existence of memoranda not protected as work product); \textit{McCall v. Overseas Tankship Corp.}, 15 F.R.D. 467, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (same), in contending that the existence or non-existence of work product was discoverable by noting that the answers sought would reveal more than the documents existence. \textit{Shelton}, 805 F.2d at 1329.

\textsuperscript{19} See \textit{id.} The court reasoned that "[u]nder these circumstances we believe that any recollection Burns may have of the existence of documents in A.M.C.'s possession likely would be limited to those . . . she has selected as important to her legal theories . . . Thus . . . the questions asked require more than merely acknowledging the existence of certain documents." \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Id.} The \textit{Shelton} court noted the importance of an attorney's selection and compilation of documents in cases where a large volume of documents are involved in discovery. \textit{Id.} In support of its position that the selection process of an attorney constitutes opinion work product, the \textit{Shelton} Court cited the Third Circuit's decision in \textit{Sporck v. Peil}, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir.), \textit{cert. denied}, 474 U.S. 903 (1985). The \textit{Shelton} court noted that "Burns' selective review of A.M.C.'s numerous documents was based upon her professional judgment of the issues and defenses involved in this case. This mental selective process reflects Burns' legal theories and thought processes which are protected as work product." \textit{Shelton}, 805 F.2d at 1329.
to disobey the district court's orders to answer or to divulge the knowledge of counsel claimed to be attorney work product.21

Dissenting, Judge Battey reasoned that neither the work product doctrine nor the attorney-client privilege protected counsel's knowledge of the existence or non-existence of documents.22 Judge Battey stressed that the majority holding failed to comport with earlier precedent in the Eighth Circuit23 and would condone the "stonewalling" strategy in which he felt the defendants had engaged.24 Finally, Judge Battey determined that the defendants' persistent attempts to avoid and protract the discovery process constituted a "willful failure," the element required to support the imposition of Rule 37 sanctions.25

It is suggested that, in an effort to protect an attorney's complex trial preparation process from unfair discovery tactics, the Shelton court's decision unjustifiably enlarged the scope of the attorney work product doctrine, and, accordingly, will impede the operation of the federal discovery mechanism. After reviewing the history of the work product doctrine,26 this Comment will assert that the Shelton court mischaracterized the underlying nature of the requested factual information and overemphasized its probative value regarding counsel's "mental impressions" of the case. In contrast to the holding in Shelton, this Comment will suggest that requiring counsel to divulge knowledge of the mere existence or non-existence of documents will reinforce the strong policy considerations supporting the discovery process without jeopardizing opinion work product. Finally, this Comment will examine the possible detrimental effects of the Shelton decision, which, it is sub-

21 See id. at 1329-30, 1330 n.7.
22 See id. at 1331 (Battey, J., dissenting).
23 Id. (Battey, J., dissenting). Judge Battey asserted the privilege claimed here did not pass the five-point test established in Investors Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1333 (Battey, J., dissenting).
24 See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1331 (Battey, J., dissenting). Judge Battey noted that:
[t]his case is replete with evidence of [the defendant's] repeated acts and attempts to avoid the discovery of documents in its possession. . . . The constant, growing tendency of litigants to frustrate the trial discovery process such as was done by A.M.C. is dangerous and "chilling" to a process which is geared toward a search for truth.
Id. (Battey, J., dissenting).
25 See id. (Battey, J., dissenting).
mitted, will dilute the United States District Courts' regulatory power over discovery proceedings and encourage a reversion to the common-law system of a trial by surprise.\textsuperscript{27}

**WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE**

The modern discovery system\textsuperscript{28} provides for pre-trial discovery of all materials relevant to ensuing litigation which do not fall within the protection of an established evidentiary privilege.\textsuperscript{29} The Supreme Court in *Hickman v. Taylor*\textsuperscript{30} held that the public's interest in full disclosure of the facts must yield at some point to the need to protect the privacy of an attorney's work in preparation for trial.\textsuperscript{31} However, the work product doctrine as enunciated in *Hickman*, did not contemplate the limiting effect on meaningful

\textsuperscript{27} Cf. *Developments in the Law—Discovery*, 74 *Harv. L. Rev.* 940, 1028 (1961) (difficulty of reconciling use of work product with "principle of an open proceeding in which surprise is minimized").

\textsuperscript{28} Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, see 308 U.S. 645 (1949), parties to an action at law generally were precluded from taking depositions of witnesses and other parties and using interrogatories for discovery purposes. See National Cash-Register Co. v. Leland, 94 F. 502, 504-05 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 175 U.S. 724 (1899); see also Cohn, *supra* note 26, at 918 (after procedural merger of law and equity, "the game of blindman's buff [sic] continued" because litigants only knew contents of pleadings and bills of particulars). Moreover, state laws allowing for such discovery were preempted by the federal statutes then in force. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-35 (1940) (recodified and revised by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869); see also *Ex Parte Fisk*, 113 U.S. 713, 721 (1885) (New York procedural statute conflicting with federal statute inapplicable); *National Cash-Register*, 94 F. at 503-05 (Massachusetts statute prescribing interrogatories inapplicable in federal court); *Developments in the Law, supra* note 27, at 950 (liberal state discovery procedures unavailable to federal litigants).

*Persons in need of discovery prior to the Federal Rules could file in equity a bill of discovery to aid their action at law. See Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union P.R.R., 240 F. 135, 136-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). The equitable bill of discovery was of limited use, however, because of conflicts over its proper scope. See id.; see generally F. James & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.1 (3d ed. 1985) (discussing bill of discovery in prior equity practice).*


\textsuperscript{29} See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

\textsuperscript{30} 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

\textsuperscript{31} See *id.* at 510-11. Writing for the Court, Justice Murphy stated that "[n]ot even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney." *Id.* at 510.
discovery which would result from the Eighth Circuit’s decision in *Shelton*. The *Shelton* court assumed that plaintiffs would be able to secure the factual information needed through other means of discovery. It became apparent, however, that neither plaintiffs nor the district court were able to acquire the desired information from A.M.C. during the lengthy course of the discovery proceedings. The magistrate purposely allowed plaintiffs to take counsel’s deposition following the original deponents’ failure to respond to relevant questions due to their inadequate knowledge or asserted privilege. The *Shelton* court, by cloaking counsel’s knowledge of the document’s existence with work product protection, may have foreclosed the plaintiffs’ only alternative method of uncovering facts necessary to prepare their case. It is submitted that the *Shelton* court erroneously identified counsel’s knowledge of the existence or non-existence of documents with the mental process of sifting through and selecting documents, which has

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28 See id. at 507. The *Shelton* court, however, by holding that in-house counsel’s knowledge of such facts was within the ambit of work product protection, denied the plaintiffs access to relevant facts, namely, the existence or non-existence of documents. See *Shelton*, 805 F.2d at 1329.

23 See *Shelton*, 805 F.2d at 1327. In *Shelton*, the Eighth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs would be able to obtain, or had already obtained, the information sought through A.M.C. personnel other than in-house counsel Burns. Id. This finding, however, ignored the fact that A.M.C.’s trial counsel earlier had instructed employees of A.M.C. not to answer similar questions, which, ironically, eventually led the magistrate to allow Burns to be deposed. See id. at 1325.

34 See *Shelton*, 106 F.R.D. at 497. While discussing the sanction of default judgment, Judge Waters noted that:

> Although defendants argue that the information sought was available to plaintiffs through other avenues, having considered the materials submitted by the parties, the court concludes that such attempts were made and were relatively unsuccessful. The court is satisfied that defendants have “played games” with the federal discovery process in the course of Jeep CJ rollover litigation. To cite some minor examples, the court notes that the defendants’ engineers have repeatedly objected to various questions, contending that they do not understand such plain English terminology as “propensity to roll over.” However,... [A.M.C. engineers] used similar terminology in studies and prepared charts...

Another example indicates that defendants have disguised rollover testing as “tire tests” and falsely denied... that any written documentation of those tests were made.

Id.

35 See id. at 491-92; supra note 13.

36 See *Shelton*, 805 F.2d at 1328-29; supra note 33.

37 See *Shelton*, 805 F.2d at 1328-29. The Eighth Circuit in *Shelton* agreed with A.M.C.’s contentions that:

Burns’ acknowledgment of the existence of documents referred to by plaintiffs’ counsel would reflect her judgment as an attorney in identifying, examining, and
been held to be within the scope of the work product doctrine.\textsuperscript{38}

**Expansion of the Work Product Doctrine**

Federal Rule 26(b)(3)\textsuperscript{39} represents a codification and attempted clarification of the work product doctrine.\textsuperscript{40} It prescribes a “substantial need” test for the discovery of ordinary tangible work product which cannot be obtained elsewhere without “undue hardship.”\textsuperscript{41} Further, Rule 26(b)(3) is a reminder that an attorney’s thought processes, opinions, mental impressions and legal theories, selecting from AMC’s voluminous files those documents on which she will rely in preparing her client’s defense in this case. In these circumstances Burns’ recollection of the documents concerning a certain subject will be limited to those documents she has selected as significant and important with respect to her legal theories. Therefore, ... requiring Burns to testify that she is aware that documents exist ... is tantamount to requiring her to reveal her legal theories and opinions concerning that issue. \textit{Id.} at 1328.

The court further discussed the process of selection and compilation of documents, noting that an attorney’s recollection of selected documents would be likely to indicate the attorney’s theories regarding the case. \textit{See Shelton,} 805 F.2d at 1329; \textit{see also} Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir.) (attorney’s document selection reflects counsel’s legal theories and therefore protected as opinion work product), \textit{cert. denied,} 474 U.S. 903 (1985); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D. Del. 1982) (same). The \textit{Shelton} court’s application of this rationale, however, far surpasses the protection afforded in such cases as Sporck. \textit{See infra} note 38 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{See Sporck,} 759 F.2d at 315. In \textit{Sporck}, however, the documents were selected by defendant’s counsel from among thousands of documents already produced by the defendant during discovery. \textit{Id.} at 313-14. Therefore, the court deemed discovery of the selection process itself as lacking any meaningful factual content since the documents themselves had already been produced. \textit{Id.} at 316. Indeed, the court in \textit{Sporck} noted that there were no allegations that the defendant had failed to produce or intentionally concealed any documents requested by the plaintiff. \textit{Id.} at 313.

In \textit{Shelton}, however, the existence of certain documents had not yet been established. \textit{See Shelton,} 805 F.2d at 1325-26. It is submitted, therefore, that unlike the process of selecting documents from among those already produced during discovery, the factual knowledge of counsel concerning the existence of documents not yet produced during discovery is of utmost value, and should clearly be discoverable, where allegations exist that one party has failed to comply with the discovery process.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); supra note 2.}

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See generally 4 Moore’s, supra note 28, § 26.63, at 26-310 to -347. Subdivision (b)(3) was added to Rule 26 to eliminate confusion which had arisen over the proper showing required for production of trial preparation materials. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), advisory committee’s note of 1970.}

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); supra note 2. The advisory committee explained that the new test required a special showing to be made: “substantial need of the materials in the preparation of [the] case and . . . [inability] without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), advisory committee’s note of 1970.
commonly referred to as opinion work product, shall remain inviolate absent a showing of rare circumstances. Case law interpreting Rule 26 consistently has declared that the work product doctrine does not encompass an attorney’s knowledge of the existence of facts. Departing from this established principle, the Shelton court asserted that an attorney’s recollection of the existence of documents contained in voluminous files could be used to forecast such attorney’s legal strategy. It is submitted, however, that an attorney’s recollection of the existence of documents fails to supply opposing counsel with more than that fact, as opposing counsel may only speculate as to whether the document recalled has actually been selected or simply reviewed and discarded. Moreover,
after establishing existence, the discovering party may not inquire further into what significance, if any, counsel has attached to a specific document.47 Therefore, the Shelton court, it is suggested, satisfied its displeasure with the increasingly popular practice of deposing attorneys by curtailing discovery of essential facts.48 Furthermore, the decision in Shelton blurs the well-settled distinction between counsel’s knowledge of related facts, such as the existence of documents, which historically has not been considered work product,49 and counsel’s opinion as to such documents, which may constitute work product if formed with a view towards litigation.50

ADVERSE IMPACT OF THE SHELTON DECISION

Although striving to protect the adversarial basis of our system of jurisprudence, the Shelton court expanded the parameters of work product protection and, alarmingly, aided in the removal of facts from judicial scrutiny.51 The Eighth Circuit’s decision has circumvented earlier case law defining the scope of the work product doctrine52 by aligning knowledge of the existence of underlying facts concerning trial preparation with the process of selecting and compiling documents through trained legal analysis.53 It is asserted that the decision in Shelton will serve only to hinder and prolong the already burdened discovery process by fostering claims of work product protection relating to nonprivileged knowledge of relevant facts. The specific purpose of pretrial discovery is to narrow the issues for trial by compelling parties to disclose such facts.54 The

47 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (attorney’s legal theories must be protected from needless interference).

48 See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327. It is submitted that the Shelton decision severely limits the ability to take opposing counsel’s deposition by deeming counsel’s knowledge of observed facts to be work product. See id. at 1327, 1328-29. In Hickman v. Taylor, however, the Supreme Court determined that “[w]here relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney’s file and where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one’s case, discovery may properly be had.” 329 U.S. at 511.

49 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.

50 See supra note 2.

51 See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1326.

52 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.

53 See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1329; see also supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.

54 See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see generally 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
Shelton decision, however, will help reduce the discovery process to a tactical battle, whereby parties to a lawsuit can avoid disclosing factual information which might expose liability. It is further suggested that the decision in Shelton will undermine the authority of the district courts to moderate the flow of discovery to and from each party. For an orderly progression of discovery to occur, the trial court must decide whether information sought is privileged or protected as work product. The Shelton decision implicitly encourages non-compliance with a district court’s orders compelling discovery pending appellate review. Thus, it is asserted that the Shelton decision will provide an added incentive for the unethical abuse of the discovery process by attorneys and invariable will result in the waste of judicial resources by requiring appellate review of matters rightfully within the discretion of the trial court.

CONCLUSION

The discovery of facts is essential to the proper functioning of

58 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Under Rule 26(c), a district court may upon motion by a party or person from whom discovery is sought fashion a protective order which justly protects that party’s interests. Id. The court, in its discretion, may deny such party’s motion, in whole or in part, and order discovery of the materials for which protection was sought. Id. These orders by a district court are interlocutory and therefore not appealable before final judgment has been rendered. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Vargos, 723 F.2d 1461, 1465 (3d Cir. 1983) (denial of motion to quash held to be non-appealable); see generally 4-8 Moore’s, supra note 28, §§ 26-83[3] (discovery orders not ordinarily appealable before final judgment entered).
59 Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1331 (Battey, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Battey opined that “[t]he ability of the court [to use and threaten sanctions] in a given case, properly supported by the appellate court, contributes greatly to the prompt resolution of the many cases facing the federal trial courts.” Id. (Battey, J., dissenting). Additionally, Judge Battey noted that “the majority opinion will provide added incentive to ... counsel to hide from judicial scrutiny otherwise discoverable documents.” Id. at 1333 (Battey, J., dissenting).
60 See supra note 57. It is asserted that the defiant position taken by the defendant’s and upheld by the court in Shelton, will force district courts to impose sanctions. In effect, this will vitiate the courts’ discretion as to the issuance of protective orders and force appellate review of the ultimate sanction imposed.
our civil trial system. The Shelton decision, however, distorts the traditional boundaries between the work product of an attorney and the underlying non-privileged facts which often become intertwined with such work product. While the nature of the adversarial system dictates that attorneys prepare their cases free from intrusion by opposing counsel, no such protection is justified when it results in the suppression of essential facts.

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