Internal Transfers of Control Under Poison Pill Preferred Issuances to Shareholders: Toward a Shareholder Approval Rule

Virginia G. Goelz
NOTES

INTERNAL TRANSFERS OF CONTROL UNDER POISON PILL PREFERRED ISSUANCES TO SHAREHOLDERS: TOWARD A SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL RULE

The rise in number of tender offers\(^1\) for control of publicly-held corporations\(^2\) has engendered widespread debate over the proper role of corporate management in takeover struggles.\(^3\) The

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\(^1\) See Note, The Developing Meaning of “Tender Offer” Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Developing Meaning]. Tender offers typically occur when an acquirer publicly offers shareholders of a targeted company a price, above market value, at which they may tender their shares. Id.; see also 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS 106 (1978) (tender offer defined). Tender offers provide a means of “determining when and under what terms . . . corporate assets [will] be sold.” Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 266 (1984). Partial and two-tier tender offers facilitate the change in control of a corporation. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 727 (1982). In a partial tender offer, the acquirer offers to purchase a controlling interest in a corporation, but less than all of its shares. See Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The “Poison Pill” Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1964, 1965 n.9 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Protecting Shareholders]. A two-tier tender offer consists of an offer to buy a set number of shares at a premium price, followed by an offer to buy the remaining shares at a lower price than was paid in the first tier. See id. at 1965 n.10. Tender offers are frequently executed without the approval of the target company’s board of directors. See Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 650 (1984).

\(^2\) See Greene & Junewicz, supra note 1, at 649-50, 652-53; Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 257. The number of significant tender offers increased from eight in 1960 to more than 100 in 1966. See Greene & Junewicz, supra note 1, at 650 n.3. In the 1982 fiscal year there were 94 tender offers. Id. Tender offers have gained popularity because stock values have not kept pace with inflation and the corresponding rise in the underlying value of many corporations’ assets. See Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 258. Additionally, banks today are more willing to provide financing to acquirers of corporations. See Toy, The Raiders, BUS. WK., Mar. 4, 1985, at 80-84. For a discussion of characteristics that make corporations attractive as targets, see E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1-9 (1973).

\(^3\) See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, TRANSMITTED TO THE CONGRESS, TOGETHER WITH THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS 206 (Feb. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Note, Developing Meaning].
debate frequently concerns the propriety of tender offers in general\(^4\) and the legality of defensive devices used by corporate man-

\(^4\) See Sommer, Critical Issue, supra note 3, at 19, col. 1. Critics argue that tender offers place undue emphasis on short term earnings and result in a decline in competitiveness. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1231, 1233 (1980) (quoting E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 100-01 (1981)); Toy, supra note 2, at 82; Drucker, Taming the Corporate Takeovers, Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1984, at 30, col. 3. But see Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of Recommendations xvii (1983) (little evidence that management emphasizes short term results at expense of long-term growth) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee Report]; Toy, supra note 2, at 83 (European companies are overprotected and complacent since takeovers are infrequent in Europe). It has also been suggested that takeovers are often motivated by greenmail, the practice of purchasing a bidder’s stock holdings at a premium to prevent a takeover by that bidder. See Norris, Enough Greenmail, N.Y. Times, March 3, 1985, at E21, col. 1; see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 n.3 (Del. 1985) (court upheld selective stock repurchase to defeat greenmailer). Additionally, critics contend that the expansion of debt in the economy, a result of takeover activity, will magnify business cycles and could cause bankruptcies. See Sommer, Critical Issue, supra note 3, at 19, col. 2; Toy, supra note 2, at 82. Finally, critics argue that dislocations in the economy also result from takeover activity. See Sommer, Critical Issue, supra note 3, at 19, col. 2; Saul, Hostile Takeovers: What Should Be Done?, 5 HARv. Bus. REv. 22 (1985).

Commentators in favor of tender offers argue that they create efficiency in the marketplace by making management more accountable. See Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. Rev. 819, 841, 843-44 (1981); Toy, supra note 2, at 82, 89-90; Icahn, Stop the Oppression of Shareholders, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1983, at 2F, col. 2. These proponents maintain that shareholders are among the ultimate beneficiaries of tender offers. See Gilson, supra, at 841-42; Toy, supra note 2, at 80. But see Sommer, Critical Issue, supra note 3, at 24-25 (dispelling “myths” that takeovers benefit shareholders and society).

The SEC Advisory Committee found insufficient evidence to support the statement that “takeovers are per se beneficial or detrimental” to the economy, corporations, or shareholders. See Advisory Committee Report, supra, at xvii. The Committee suggested that federal regulations favor neither the acquirer nor the acquiring company. See id. at 15. Currently, federal regulations are oriented toward full disclosure and consumer protection and away from promoting or discouraging tender offers. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2458, 2463 (1985); Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982); L. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 2, at 67-68. See generally Greene & Junewicz, supra note 1, at 654-55 & n.38 (summary of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provisions relating to disclosure).
The director or officer will usually try to show that the board's action was motivated primarily by the standard of reasonableness (business judgment rule), if the plaintiff proves that a director's actions arose from bad faith or a conflict of interest, the burden shifts to management to demonstrate the fairness of the standard of reasonableness, and reasonableness of the transaction. If it isn't broke, don't fix it: The Legal Propriety of Defenses Against Hostile Takeover Bids, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 977, 977-80 (1983); Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51, 51 (1982). Many commentators suggest that shareholders should have a greater role in determining the propriety of defenses to tender offers. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 4, at 876; Greene & Junewicz, supra note 1, at 731; Harrington, supra, at 1024-25. Greater shareholder participation in such decisions would alleviate the concern that shareholders may be hurt by takeover defenses that deprive them of the ability to tender their shares at a profit or depress the value of their shares if the offer fails. See Greene & Junewicz, supra note 1, at 702-03.

Defensive strategies range from the sale of a corporation's valuable property or "crown jewel," e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp., 669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir. 1981) (sale of valuable mineral rights), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (sale of assets at price below market value), to the "Pac Man defense," a counter tender offer by the target company, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 625 (D. Md. 1982) (target company made offer to buy acquiring company's stock); see Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 249-50. A target corporation may also issue shares to a friendly third party, see, e.g., Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1980) (issuance of shares upheld under business judgment rule); see E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, supra note 2, at 247-49, to employees, see, e.g., Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984) (stock option plan upheld), or to an employee stock option ownership plan (ESOP), see 1 A. Fleischer, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 95-101 (rev. perm. ed. 1984). See generally E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, supra note 2, at 234-76 (overview of substantive defense tactics); E. Aranow, H. Einhorn, & G. Berlstein, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 193-202 (1977) (examination of defensive strategies) [hereinafter cited as TENDER OFFERS]. For a practitioner's guide to defensive strategies, see P. Davey, DEFENSES AGAINST UNNEGOTIATED CASH TENDER OFFERS 6-25 (1977); 1 A. Fleischer, supra, at 291-387; M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, supra note 1, at §§ 1.9, 6.1-6.6.

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Commentators often divide the obligations owed by corporate managers into a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 BUS. LAW. 1591, 1599-1604 (1978); Harrington, supra note 5, at 987-90. The duty of care involves application of the standard of reasonableness, see Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra, at 1601, while the duty of loyalty involves the standard of good faith, see Harrington, supra note 5, at 989; Arasht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 115-18 (1979). Under the business judgment rule, if the plaintiff proves that a director's actions arose from bad faith or a conflict of interest, the burden shifts to management to demonstrate the fairness and reasonableness of the transaction. See Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); 1 A. Fleischer, supra note 5, at 194-95; see also Note, Protecting Shareholders, supra note 1, at 1969 (initial burden of proving director's bad faith always on plaintiff). The director or officer will usually try to show that the board's action was motivated primarily by the standard of reasonableness. Generally, courts have upheld management actions under the business judgment rule based on
an unwillingness to substitute the courts' judgment for that of corporate directors presumed to be acting in the best interests of the corporations. Defensive devices adopted in anticipation of hostile tender offers have also gained a significant degree of acceptance in the courts. Such devices frequently involve an amendment to the corporate charter or bylaws.


* See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Greene & Junewicz, supra note 1, at 711-12. Courts try to avoid giving directors the "Hobson's choice . . . between accepting any tender offer . . . above market, or facing the likelihood of personal liability if they reject it." Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984).


Professor Gilson places shark repellent amendments into three categories. See id. at 780. The first category "impedes transfer[s] of control of the board of directors." Id. For example, staggering the board or limiting the ability of shareholders to call special meetings or act by written consent may cause an undesirable delay in the transfer of control. Id. at 781-82; see Friedenberg, supra, at 41-42. The second category erects "barriers to second-step transactions." Gilson, supra, at 783. Supermajority provisions that require anywhere from a two-thirds to 95% shareholder vote to approve second-step transactions such as mergers or tender offers fall within this category. Id. The provisions normally contain an exception to the supermajority requirement; however, that exception operates in the event that continuing directors negotiate a friendly takeover. Id. at 785. The third category con-
Recently, several courts have approved the issuance of "poison pill" preferred rights to shareholders of potential target corporations prior to the announcement of any tender offers for the corporations. The rights in these cases were designed to be triggered in the event of a change in control. When exercised, they would either cause massive dilution of the stock of the acquiring corporation or would otherwise make the acquisition extremely expensive. Additionally, upon issuance of the poison pills, the respective boards of directors received greatly increased power to negotiate with bidders for corporate control. Nevertheless, the concerns "[fair price and compulsory redemption provisions."

Id. at 786. These provisions focus on the rights of minority shareholders subsequent to a tender offer and ensure that minority shareholders are treated fairly in a second-step transaction by guaranteeing that their shares will be purchased at a price that equals or exceeds the price paid in the tender offer. See id. at 787-88; Friedenberg, supra, at 44-45; see also Smith, Fair Price and Redemption Rights: New Dimensions in Defense Charter Provisions, 4 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 12-27 (1978) (practical considerations of implementing fair price provision and redemption rights provision).


See, e.g., Household, 500 A.2d at 1349 (holders of 1/100 of a share of preferred stock able to purchase $200 worth of acquirer's stock for $100); Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1243 (triggering event plus tender offer for less than $85 allows holder to exchange one share common stock for $65); Ferrara & Phillips, supra note 10, at 13, col. 2-3.

See, e.g., Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1244.
courts held that the boards were not required to secure shareholder approval before issuing the rights,\textsuperscript{14} on the theory that "blank-check" preferred statutes in the particular states obviate the need for shareholder approval.\textsuperscript{15} These blank-check statutes authorize boards to issue various types of preferred stock at their own discretion.\textsuperscript{16}

It is submitted that the issuance of poison pill rights accomplishes an internal transfer of control of the corporation from shareholders to the directors. Therefore, it is suggested that shareholder approval should be required in such instances. This Note will examine the shift in control upon the issuance of a poison pill and will suggest that a rule requiring shareholder approval should apply when rights are issued either before or after a tender offer is announced.

THE TREND TO UPHOLD THE \textit{Household} VARIETY OF RIGHTS PLANS

The lead case on the legality of poison pill preferred rights is \textit{Moran v. Household International}.\textsuperscript{17} Perceiving a vulnerability to hostile takeover attempts, the board of directors of Household International created a poison pill\textsuperscript{18} designed to render a partial or two-tier hostile tender offer for the company virtually impossible.\textsuperscript{19} The poison pill or "rights plan" implemented by the board consisted of the issuance of warrants, or "rights," as a dividend, which would trade with common stock and would not be independently

\textsuperscript{14} See \textit{Household}, 500 A.2d at 1348; \textit{Revlon}, 501 A.2d at 1251.
\textsuperscript{15} See, e.g., \textit{Household}, 500 A.2d at 1348; National Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co., No. 7278, slip op. at 8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1983); see \textit{Note, Protecting Shareholders}, supra note 1, at 1973-75 (board power to issue blank-check stock should be expansive).
\textsuperscript{17} See \textit{Household}, 500 A.2d at 1346 (Del. 1985); see \textit{Horwitz}, 604 F. Supp. at 1136; Hertzberg, \textit{Delaware Court Upholds the Use of 'Poison Pills,'} Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1985, at 2, col. 3.

Prior to the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in \textit{Household}, there were few cases concerning poison pills. See, e.g., Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1984); National Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co., No. 7278, slip op. (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1983).
\textsuperscript{18} See \textit{Household}, 500 A.2d at 1349.
\textsuperscript{19} See \textit{id. at 1352; Ferrara & Phillips, supra} note 10, at 13, col. 1. In a letter to its shareholders, Household stated that the plan would "deter any attempts to acquire your company in a manner or on terms not approved by the Board." Ferrara & Phillips, \textit{ supra} note 10, at 13, col. 1.
The rights would separate from the common stock and become exercisable if "triggered" by a twenty percent accumulation of Household’s common stock or by an offer to purchase thirty percent of the stock. Once the rights were triggered, Household shareholders would be entitled to purchase non-redeemable preferred stock at an initially uneconomical price of one-hundred dollars per one one-hundredth of a share. However, the rights would be redeemable by Household for fifty cents per right at any time prior to a twenty percent triggering event. In the event of a business combination with Household, the holder of a right would be entitled to purchase two-hundred dollars worth of the common stock of the surviving company for one-hundred dollars, the exercise price of the right. This "flipover," if it occurred, would result in severe dilution of the acquirer’s stock.

Attacked by a group of potential bidders, the plan was upheld in the Delaware Supreme Court. The court placed on the plaintiffs the burden of proving that the board either acted in bad faith or for purposes of entrenchment. Household’s board had the burden of showing that the action was reasonable in relation to the perceived threat of two-tier tender offers. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s contention that issuance of the rights caused an unlawful transfer of power from the shareholders to the board by reasoning

21 See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985). The rights would be “triggered” even if an acquirer merely achieved the right to purchase or vote 20% of Household’s common stock or “announce[d] formation of a group of persons holding 20% to act together.” Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1066 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). The group proviso prevents persons acting in concert from taking control while individually remaining below the 20% threshold. See id. at 1080.
22 See Household, 500 A.2d at 1349.
23 See id. at 1349. The triggering devices of the plan encourage negotiation with the board. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1066 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). The board could redeem the rights if an acquirer with whom the board chose to deal were to announce an offer to purchase 30% of Household stock. See Note, Protecting Shareholders, supra note 1, at 1965. The board could also refuse to redeem in any event. Id. Should the acquirer choose to proceed with a business combination, it would be forced to swallow the poison pill. Id.
24 See Household, 500 A.2d at 1349.
25 See id.
26 See id. at 1356-57.
27 See id. at 1366. The Household court determined that the rights plan was a reasonable defensive mechanism to protect the company against coercive acquisition techniques. See id.
that successful hostile tender offers could still be launched.28

A rights plan similar to Household’s was at issue before the District Court of Nevada in Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc.29 Southwest Forest’s board had issued rights which, in the event of a merger, would entitle the holder of a right to purchase one-hundred dollars worth of the acquirer’s stock for fifty dollars.30 The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate probable success on the merits since he would likely be unable to show bad faith, self-dealing or an abuse of discretion by the board.31 The court believed that management’s actions were sound under the business judgment rule and that the rights plan was probably legal.32

In MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc.,33 a rights plan issued by Revlon, Inc., designed to strengthen the board’s bargaining position, was held valid absent other considera-

28 See id. at 1354. The Household court distinguished between governance structure and value structure. See id. The court reasoned that there was little change in the governance structure of the corporation since “[t]he [b]oard has no more discretion in refusing to redeem [r]ights than it [has] in enacting any defensive mechanism.” Id. The court also concluded that Household’s rights plan caused less harm to the value structure of the corporation than other defensive devices that increase the debt of a corporation. See id. The court dismissed plaintiff’s contention that the rights plan constituted a sham by observing that the rights can and will be exercised. See id. at 1352.


30 See id. at 1132. Like Household International, Southwest Forest could redeem its rights for a nominal amount before certain triggering events occurred. See id.; supra note 23 and accompanying text.

31 See Horwitz, 604 F. Supp. at 1136. The Horwitz court noted that the trend in other jurisdictions indicated that Southwest Forest’s conduct was “probably legal in the absence of improper motive or intent.” Id. As a practical matter, the court feared that to remove the rights from the New York Stock Exchange and from Southwest Forest stock certificates would confuse the company’s management as well as investors. See id. at 1135-36. Therefore, the balance of the equities in this proceeding for a preliminary injunction weighed in favor of Southwest Forest, according to the court. Id.


33 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch. 1985).
The issuance of the rights, however, was determined to be invalid because the Revlon board breached its fiduciary duties to shareholders when it implemented a lock-up agreement that effectively terminated further bidding for the corporation in an active bidding market.

**Shortcomings of the Primary Purpose Test**

Courts frequently have inquired into a board of directors' motivations to determine the validity of a defensive issuance of stock. If the primary purpose of a board's action is to maintain control of the corporation, the action will not be sustained, despite the deference afforded the board under the business judgment rule. The burden of proving that the board acted with an improper purpose generally lies with the plaintiff. In certain in-

34 See id. at 1247. The Revlon court determined that directors have a duty to defend their corporation against a takeover attempt that they believe is adverse to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders. See id. (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)). Revlon's rights plan involved the issuance of a right, which when triggered allowed all holders except the hostile bidder to exchange one share of common stock for $65 in notes. See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1243. The rights were triggered when a person acquired 20% of the company unless the person promptly purchased all of the company's remaining shares for at least $65 each. Id. The board could redeem the rights for a nominal amount prior to the triggering event. Id. at 1243-44.

35 See 501 A.2d at 1247-48. The court burdened the board with proving the rationality of actions taken in connection with the lock-up agreement. See id. at 1250. Because the lock-up agreement terminated bidding for Revlon in an active market and relieved the directors of certain damaging consequences of the defensive devices that they had adopted, the court determined that the directors had failed to demonstrate the rationality of their actions and thus were not protected by the business judgment rule. See id.

36 See, e.g., Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977) (stock issuance to directors and officers not invalid if proper corporate goal is principal purpose); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 369, 230 A.2d 769, 775 (1967) (stock issuance to third party must not be for improper purpose); A. Fleischer, supra note 5, at 184.

37 See, e.g., Yasik v. Wachtel, 17 A.2d 309, 313 (Del. Ch. 1941) (breach of duty for directors to issue shares for improper purpose such as enabling person or group to take voting control from shareholders); Tender Offers, supra note 5, at 200. In Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., it was determined that the directors did not act improperly in issuing stock to a white knight and were therefore protected under the business judgment rule. See 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Inc., 301 F. Supp. 706, 711-12 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (board was protected under business judgment rule when plaintiff was unable to prove board's desire to remain in office was sole or primary motive). At least one commentator has speculated that the "primary purpose test" lies somewhere between the business judgment rule and fairness tests of state law. See Gutman, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 16 Sec. L. Rev. 325, 357 n.162 (1984). For an overview of the business judgment rule, see supra notes 6-7.

38 See Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Inc., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 360, 230 A.2d 769, 776-77 (1967); Har-
stances, however, the defendant directors are required to justify their actions by showing that the board's decision to adopt a defensive mechanism was reasonable.39

Commentators have criticized the motivational or "primary purpose test," suggesting that its application is impractical when a board acts with mixed motives.40 It is submitted that in the area of rights plans, the primary purpose test is even more problematic. In Household, for example, the court required the board to show that it had reasonable grounds to believe a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed.41 A showing that the board feared a harmful takeover and sought to prevent coercive two-tier tender offers was deemed sufficient to satisfy this burden.42 It is suggested
that it is difficult to prove that the board acted to solidify management’s control, not primarily as a means of protecting shareholders, but rather as an end in itself. In early defensive stock issuance cases, courts frequently tried to justify a finding that the plaintiff failed to prove the board acted for an improper purpose by asserting that shareholders received tangible consideration, such as a benefit to the corporation’s employees, an increase in the corporation’s capital, or an opportunity for the corporation to

956 & n.12 (Del. 1985); Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 254, 309. In partial tender offers, shareholders may not wish to risk continued investment in the new entity and may feel compelled to abandon their investment. See Note, Protecting Shareholders, supra note 1, at 1966-67.

See National Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co., No. 7278, slip op. at 10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1983) (management entrenchment may constitute “inevitable byproduct” of preferred stock dividend); cf. Gilson, supra note 9, at 805 (shark repellents in general have both purpose and unavoidable consequence of making management more secure). The plaintiff’s burden of proof is significant because the plaintiff does not have access to facts probative of a defendant’s motivation. See Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 259, 271-72 (1966); Note, Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders with Corporate Funds, 70 Yale L.J. 308, 317 (1960).

See infra notes 45-47. Courts have struck down stock issuances when the corporation or its shareholders received no consideration. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 1984) (“no real consideration was received from the ESOP for the shares”); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 360, 230 A.2d 769, 777 (1967) (issuance of stock to subsidiary of white knight brought no funds into corporate treasury); Bowen v. Imperial Theatres, Inc., 13 Del. Ch. 120, 122, 115 A. 918, 921 (1922) (directors gave nothing for voting stock to themselves). Some courts have considered a defendant’s claim that consideration was received and have rejected it as a pretext when the directors’ primary purpose was to manipulate the corporation to entrench their control. See, e.g., Podesta v. Calumet Indus., Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,433, at 93,552, 93,556 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (determination that employee, tax and financial benefits were pretext); Ward Foods, Inc. v. Lambert, 1 Del. J. Corp. L. 137, 143 (Del. 1972) (plan was adopted to thwart threat to management notwithstanding claims by defendant that plan was designed to improve job satisfaction and corporate competitiveness). A court will generally refrain from determining the adequacy of consideration when it has not sensed an improper purpose. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980) (adequacy of consideration left to directors unless disproportionate); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1162 (1st Cir. 1977) (“assessment of the adequacy of consideration received for an issue of stock” is responsibility of board); Fogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 625 (Del. 1984) (only need “reasonable relationship” between value of options and value of benefits passing to corporation).

See, e.g., Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1161 (1st Cir. 1977) (proper purposes for issuing stock include promoting loyalty of key personnel and ensuring that they remain with corporation); Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343, 351 (D. Del. 1948) (issue proper since options based on legal consideration); Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 250, 17 A.2d 309, 312-13 (1941) (shares issued to employee for valuable consideration).

See, e.g., Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977) (issue of new shares to officers and directors raised new capital for corporation); see Lynch v. Steinberg, supra note 6, at 936.
enter into a beneficial business combination. In cases involving Household-type rights plans, however, courts have concluded that a board can act for a proper primary purpose despite the wholesale absence of such independent justification.

**IMPOSITION OF A SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL REQUIREMENT**

Under traditional corporate law theory, the general authority of the board of directors extends to managing the business and affairs of a corporation. The shareholders, not management, have the authority to effect radical changes in the power structure of a corporation. As corporations have grown in size and complexity, however, board authority has expanded to include the formulation of business policy, and a board's managerial function has been characterized as the monitoring of key management executives.

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47 See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382-83 (2d Cir. 1980) (board was moving Treadway toward business combination with Fair Lanes); Northwest Indus. Inc., v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 711 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (officers and directors determined that $35,000,000 acquisition of joint venture was in best interests of corporation).


51 See Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law: An Essay for Bill Cary, 37 Miami L. Rev. 187, 204-05 (1983); Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 6, at 1603. The Model Business Corporation Act states that "[a]ll corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation." 2 Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.01(b) (3d ed. 1985) (emphasis added). The American Law Institute has suggested that corporate boards have the authority to "initiate and adopt major corporate plans, commitments, and actions [and] [a]ct as to all . . .
While under state law board authority may extend even to the approval of mergers and the sale of substantially all assets, it is submitted that the board should not have the authority to change unilaterally the structure of the corporation to prevent shareholders from tendering their shares to persons who seek control of the corporation. It is submitted that a board of directors issuing a *Household*-type poison pill effects such an unwarranted shift of power.

Courts have held that a board that adopts a poison pill plan effectively seizes the power to bargain in the event of a tender offer. In *Household*, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected this corporate matters not requiring shareholder approval. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 251, 271 (1983); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 902, 909 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984).

*See Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMP Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1260 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (mem.); Dumon v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 107 F.R.D. 761, 765 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (court not convinced that poison pill plan does not implicate “legitimate procedures to gain control”). A board’s action may be impermissible, even though it is technically legal, when it undermines principles of corporate governance. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984); Ferrara & Phillips, supra note 10, at 18, col. 2. In the Norlin case, Judge Kaufman wrote that:

> Our most important duty is to protect the fundamental structure of corporate governance. While the day-to-day affairs of a company are to be managed by its officers under the supervision of directors, decisions affecting a corporation’s ultimate destiny are for the shareholders to make in accordance with democratic procedures.

744 F.2d at 258. Commentators have suggested that allowing boards to assume a plenary bargaining role could upset the statutory structural scheme that gives management the authority to veto mergers and sales of assets, but not tender offers. See Harrington, supra note 5, at 1003; Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 266; Masters, *Poison Pill Takeover Defense Stirs Controversy, Uncertainty*, 6 Legal Times 1, col. 2 (1983). But see Lipton, *Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom*, 35 Bus. Law. 101, 108-09 (1979) (board should have some authority to respond to mergers as tender offers); Mullaney, *Guarding Against Takeovers—Defensive Charter Provisions*, 25 Bus. Law. 1441, 1461 (1970) (same policies underlying board approval of mergers and tender offers support board veto power in event of both). Some courts have endeavored to safeguard the privilege shareholders enjoy in determining the outcome of tender offers. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 267 (2d Cir. 1984) (court refused to permit “wholesale wresting of corporate power from the hands of the shareholders, to whom it is entrusted by statute”); Conoco Inc. v. Seagram Co., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (directors could not enjoin Seagram’s tender offer and thereby deny [shareholders] their right to pass upon [the tender] offer’); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 361, 230 A.2d 769, 777 (1967) (improper stock issuance “strikes at the very heart of corporate representation”); see also E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, supra note 2, at 195 (defensive amendments to certificates “are contrary to the basic principles of corporate democracy”).

*See, e.g., MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1244 (Del. Ch.) (board assumed plenary negotiating authority by issuing rights plan), aff’d, [curr-
POISON PILL PLANS

1985

conclusion by contending that a hostile takeover attempt for a company that has adopted a rights plan could be successful, and that therefore, in adopting a plan the board does not unilaterally transfer corporate power to itself. However, as long as the board's actions in considering hostile takeover attempts remain within the substantial protection of the business judgment rule, the directors have the exclusive power to accept or reject any tender offers. Thus, it is submitted that by issuing a rights plan such as the one approved in Household, a board of directors unilaterally changes the structure of the corporation by transferring control from the shareholders to itself. It is suggested that the potential for abuse and the questionable authority of boards to issue Household-type rights plans, point to a need for shareholder approval of such plans.


See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353-54 (Del. 1985). In Household, the Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that in deciding whether to redeem the rights upon a tender offer, Household's board will be held to the fiduciary standards applicable to the adoption of defensive devices, and therefore the board will not be able to reject hostile tender offers arbitrarily. See id. at 1354. The Delaware Supreme Court also pointed to the takeover of Crown Zellerbach Corporation by Sir James Goldsmith despite Crown Zellerbach's prior adoption of a rights plan. See id. However, it should be noted that the shareholders did not have the opportunity to tender their shares for a premium in connection with Goldsmith's takeover of Crown Zellerbach. See Stewart, Goldsmith's Move on Crown Zellerbach Prompts 'Poison Pill' Potency Questions, Wall St. J., May 16, 1985, at 6, col. 2; see also Dwyer, Dobrzynski, Who's Afraid of the Poison Pill?, Bus. Wln, Aug. 12, 1985, at 22, col. 3 (poison pill remains a substantial inhibition to takeovers despite Goldsmith's takeover of Crown Zellerbach).

See supra note 55; Ferrara & Phillips, supra note 10, at 13, col. 3, & 17, col. 2; SEC Seeks Antidote for Poison Pill, 1 SEC REG. (P-H) ¶ 7.2 (Apr. 4, 1985).

Judicial deference to corporate boards under the business judgment rule undermines the argument that hostile tender offers may be successfully executed once a corporation has adopted a rights plan. See Note, Protecting Shareholders, supra note 1, at 1069 (directors decisions seldom overturned under fiduciary duty claims); supra notes 40-48. But see, e.g., MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1251 (Del. Ch.) (having issued poison pill, board failed in its fiduciary duty to shareholders when it ended bidding and negotiations involving and all offer for cash), aff'd, [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 92,357 (Del. Nov. 1, 1985).


See supra notes 49-53; Coffee, supra note 8, at 1147-48 n.3. Some issuances of preferred stock or rights are less egregious than others. Compare Household, 490 A.2d at 1066.
Finally, shareholder approval frequently is required before a board may implement a takeover device designed for use before a tender offer has been announced. Courts generally have upheld antitakeover amendments when shareholders have validated them. Rights plans such as Household’s, have been analogized to antitakeover amendments that require shareholder approval. It is submitted that because these defensive antitakeover devices are adopted for similar reasons, poison pills should not be treated differently from them, and therefore, adoption of a rights plan should be subject to validation by the shareholders.

(dilution of acquirer’s stock is devastating) with Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1243 (acquirer could overcome rights plan by paying $65 per share for all shares); see also Note, Protecting Shareholders, supra note 1, at 1967 (Bell & Howell issuance not a complete bar to certain tender offers). The SEC argued that Household’s poison pill constituted a more drastic measure than poison pill plans that act as fair price amendments because the latter only deter bidders who seek to make a two-tier tender offer. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission at 7 & n.5, Amicus Curiae, Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch.) aff’d, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Block, Barton & Radin, Business Judgment Rule Changes, N.Y.L.J. May 28, 1985, at 31, col. 3 n.50.

See Friedenberg, supra note 9, at 34-48; A. Fleischer, supra note 5, at 12.

See, e.g., Seibert v. Gulton Indus., Inc., No. 5631 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1979) (reported in 5 Del J. Corp. L. 514, 518 (1980)) (shareholders empowered to enact charter containing supermajority), aff’d, 414 A.2d 822 (Del. 1980); Stockholders Comm. for Better Management of Erie Technological Prods., Inc. v. Erie Technological Prods., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 380, 389 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (board’s purposes in adopting staggered board immaterial when it obtained shareholder approval); see also A. Fleischer, supra note 5, at 12 (most structural changes such as shark repellants require shareholder approval). But see National Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co., No. 7278, slip op. at 12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25 1983) (defensive issuance of preferred stock upheld); Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121, 124 (Del. 1977) (board-instituted scaled voting upheld). Some commentators have suggested that antitakeover amendments affecting the structure of the corporation should require shareholder approval. See Green & Junewicz, supra note 1, at 731; Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 255. Others, however, have argued that shareholder approval may not reflect a shareholder’s actual interests since sophisticated shareholders may not be able or willing to sway the votes of other investors. See Friedenberg, supra note 9, at 78; Gilson, supra note 9, at 825. But see Harrington, supra note 5, at 1025-26 (shareholder vote is not an empty formality).

See Bialkin, Some Strategies to Avoid Unfriendly Acquisitions, N.Y.L.J., May 28, 1985, at 25, col. 2, & 36, col. 3. The justifications for enacting antitakeover amendments are similar to those that the Delaware court used in validating Household’s rights plan: protection of the corporation and its shareholders from coercive acquisition techniques. See, e.g., Friedenberg, supra note 9, at 34 (shark repellants protect minority shareholders in event of successful tender offer); Finkelstein, supra note 10, at 295-96 (fair price, mandatory bid, and flip-over provisions protect all shareholders).

See supra note 61.

It is submitted that had the Household rights plan been placed before the shareholders, its approval would have been unlikely since the Household board initially feared that a fair price amendment would not pass. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1064 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). Generally, management has had increasing difficulty in getting shareholders, particularly institutional investors, to approve various an-
APPLICATION OF THE SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL RULE IN LIGHT OF RECENT DECISIONS

Several courts recently have enjoined a variety of poison pill preferred plans created to defend against an existing tender offer, basing their decisions primarily on statutory grounds. It is suggested that by reasoning that an internal transfer of control would occur, these courts could have enjoined defendants from issuing the preferred stock based on the defendants' failure to obtain shareholder consent.

In Asarco, Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court, the New Jersey District Court enjoined the issuance of a series of preferred shares that would have afforded all shareholders except a 20% holder of common stock or the preferred stock a disproportionately large share of the voting power. The court held that under New Jersey statutory law a board may not redistribute voting power within a single class or series of stock.

P. S. The new book has many different options. See A. Fleischer, supra note 5, at 14; Greene & Junewicz, supra note 1, at 706; Blustein, Measures to Discourage Takeovers Stir Controversy at Annual Meetings, Wall St. J., Apr. 18, 1983, at 29, col. 5. Shareholders of Rorer Group Inc. approved a non-binding proposal to rescind Rorer's poison pill, but the board nevertheless rejected the proposal. Hertzberg, Rorer Group Is Seeking Unit of Pantry Pride, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1985, at 2, col. 2.


See id. at 471, 477-79. In Asarco, the preferred shares, entitled Series C Preferred, were to be issued as a dividend. Id. at 471. Each holder of common stock would receive a one-tenth share of Series C Preferred stock. Id. In the event a person or group became beneficial owner of more than 20% of Asarco's common stock or Series C Preferred stock, each one-tenth share of Series C stock owned by anyone other than the 20% owner would receive five votes in all matters submitted to common stockholders. Id. As a result, the 20% owner would have only 4.1% of the vote. Id. Disproportionate voting rights would be extinguished by an any and all cash tender offer for a fair price. Id. at 472. Defensive devices such as Asarco's that discriminate against the acquirer became popular after the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a selective exchange offer by Unocal Corporation which excluded the bidder, Mesa Petroleum Company. See Cohen, More Firms Using 'Lollipop' Tactics to Fight Takeovers, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1985, at 3, col. 4.

Asarco, 611 F. Supp. at 477. The Asarco court determined that equality of voting power among shareholders of the same class, or series of a class with more than one series, is a basic concept of corporation law. See id. Although conceding that the board had a proper business purpose, the court nevertheless concluded that the stock issuance was unlawful.

Despite the significant potential for abuse created by issuance of the preferred stock,\(^9\) the board’s action withstood scrutiny by the court under the primary purpose test because the board was able to show that it sought to ensure that a takeover could be accomplished only under limited circumstances.\(^{20}\) The court gave little credence to the plaintiff’s argument that shareholders would be better off if bidders were able to make a variety of tender offers for Asarco.\(^7\) It is suggested that under the principles discussed previously, the court could properly have held that the board lacked the authority to effect such a dramatic shift in the control of the corporation without shareholder approval.\(^{72}\)

The District Court for the Southern District of New York, applying New Jersey law, leaned toward such a ruling in Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc.\(^7\) The court stated that “a board of director’s assertion of a unilateral right, under the business judgment rule, to act as a surrogate for the shareholder’s independent right of alienation of his stock is troublesome.”\(^{74}\) In AMF, the board adopted a rights plan which, upon a change in control, would restrict AMF’s ability to incur debt\(^7\) and would give holders of a nontransferable right the ability, upon exercise, to vote on a merger as a class.\(^7\) Without deciding whether the board acted with a proper purpose,\(^7\) the court enjoined the board’s action, holding

\(\text{\textsuperscript{9}}\) Id. at 478. The Asarco court recognized that corporate control could easily be manipulated through readjustment of intra-class voting rights by the issuance of blank-check preferred stock. Id.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{20}}\) See id. at 474. The board’s objective of limiting the circumstances under which takeovers could be accomplished necessarily entailed solidifying management control under the preferred stock issuance. Id. at 470-71. Under the issuance, were Holmes A Court to acquire 80% of both common stock and Series C Preferred Stock, or substantially all shares other than those held or controlled by Asarco, Holmes A Court would have held only 38.3% of the vote. Id. at 471. In effect, management would have had veto power over almost any tender offer. Id. As with the Household variety of poison pill plans, it is difficult to determine whether management has become entrenched as a means of protecting the company from harmful takeovers or as an end in itself. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{7}}\) See supra notes 49-58.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{77}}\) See 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (mem.).

\(\text{\textsuperscript{74}}\) Id. at 1260 n.6. According to the court, “the [r]ight of a shareholder to sell his stock is a private transaction between a willing seller and a willing purchaser and in no way implicates the business judgment rule.” Id.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{79}}\) See id. at 1256.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{76}}\) See id. at 1259.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{77}}\) Id.
that the nontransferability feature violated New Jersey law in several respects. The court determined that a shareholder vote was required to effectuate the change in structure and voting rights that AMF's board sought to accomplish unilaterally. Consequently, this decision supports the corporate norm theory that only the shareholders should have the authority to make a fundamental change in the corporate power structure in connection with contests for control.

Finally, in Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., the District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a preliminary injunction restraining the issuance of a preferred stock on the ground that the preferred rights plan was illegal under Delaware Law. In Unilever, under the threat of a takeover, the board of Richardson-Vicks approved the issuance of preferred stock enabling the holder of a single share to cast twenty-five votes on all matters before the common stockholders. Upon the transfer of a preferred share, however, the transferee could exercise only five of the twenty-five votes for a period of thirty-six months.

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78 See id. at 1257-59.
79 See id. at 1259. The AMF court held that the nontransferability rights unlawfully discriminated against shareholders who purchased shares of AMF after the record date of the rights dividend. Id. at 1257-58. The court determined that under New Jersey law shareholder approval was necessary for this reclassification of common stock. Id. at 1258 & n.4 (citing Asarco v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985)). The court also held that the alienability of the underlying common stock was unreasonably restrained because a shareholder could not transfer the right with common stock and thus the right would lose most of its value upon the transfer of common stock. See AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 1258.
80 See 621 F. Supp. at 1259; supra notes 49-53. The AMF decision highlights the possibility that anomalies will result through the use of the primary purpose test to scrutinize defensive tactics triggered by a change in control. Compare AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 1261 (triggering event raises inference board acted to entrench itself) with Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (directors must show defensive mechanism is "reasonable in relation to threat posed" (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985))) and Asarco Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 474 (D.N.J. 1985) (directors must show reasonableness of their action when defensive device is designed to alter structure of the corporation). Inconsistencies in the application of the primary purpose test in connection with defensive devices which are triggered by a change in control illustrate the inherent shortcomings of the primary purpose test in this context. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
82 Id. at 409-10.
83 Id. at 408. In Unilever, the preferred stock was distributed as a dividend at the rate of one new share of preferred for each five shares of common. Id.
84 Id. The Richardson family controlled over one-third of the stock in Richardson-
The court declared that under Delaware law, board actions that might fundamentally change the structure of a corporation are not protected by the business judgment rule. Thus, without considering the issue of the board’s good faith, the court determined that the issuance was unlawfully discriminatory, that it impermissibly stripped shareholders of their ability to transfer voting power, and that it contravened the corporation’s certificate of incorporation. The court concluded that shareholder approval was required to change the structure of the corporation by reducing both the value of the shares and the transferability of voting rights to the degree contemplated under the stock issuance. Thus, it is submitted that the Unilever court came close to approving a shareholder ratification requirement based on an internal shift in control of Richardson-Vicks.

CONCLUSION

While the preferred issuances in Asarco, AMF and Unilever resulted in somewhat technical violations of state law relating to the transferability of shares and discrimination among shareholders.
ers, these cases support the notion that shareholders should have a voting role in determining fundamental structural changes in the corporation. It is suggested therefore, that shareholder approval should be required when a corporation issues preferred shares to shareholders as a defense either to a perceived or to an announced tender offer, and thereby effects an internal transfer in control from shareholders to the board. Shareholder approval of poison pill rights plans would serve to legitimize the power that the board, as negotiator, has to prevent almost any acquisition of the company and thereby return to the shareholders the authority to determine the fate of their corporation.

Virginia G. Goelz