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EMERGING JURISDICTIONAL DOCTRINES OF THE BURGER COURT: A DOCTRINE OF CONVENIENCE

As originally conceived by the Framers of the Constitution, the judiciary was intended to be the only branch of the federal government physically unable to enforce its own rulings.¹ Thus arose the characterization of the judiciary as the weakest branch of government.² Due to the need for impartial federal judges, this structure was deemed necessary because the federal judiciary is the only branch of government that is inherently undemocratic.³ Recognizing that the dependence of the judiciary on the coordinate branches for enforcement of its decisions places it in a uniquely sensitive position in the scheme of the federal government, the Supreme Court consistently has sought to maximize the power of the judicial branch through two basic, distinct jurisdictional devices.⁴ One approach seeks to maximize federal judicial power through an expansive reading of article III of the Constitution,⁵ thus extending the original and appellate jurisdiction of the courts to hear cases that may only tangentially “arise under” article III, but that never-

¹ See The Federalist No. 78, at 490 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961). “The judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever.” Id.; see also 1 C. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 178 (T. Nugent trans. 1873).

² See R. Hodder-Williams, The Politics of the U.S. Supreme Court 109 (1980); see also M. Wendell, Between the Federal and State Courts 26 (1949) (since Court does not have power to enforce its decisions, others must be relied upon to legitimize its mandates).

³ See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (Court cannot entertain cases that are political in nature); see Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 605, 623 (1981).

⁴ See infra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text.

⁵ U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Article III, § 2 provides, in pertinent part:

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; . . .

. . . In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

Id. Congress has specifically provided for Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction of state court decisions addressing federal questions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982); see also infra note 133 (discussing construction of § 1257).
The other approach, used more frequently today, attempts to increase judicial power through the imposition of prudential judge-made limitations upon congressionally created jurisdictional statutes. By refusing to hear cases that technically are within the jurisdiction of the federal courts but that do not invoke significant federal interests, the dilution of judicial power is minimized through judicial restraint, and the legitimacy of the judicial branch is preserved. In recent years, however, the Burger Court has rendered inconsistent jurisdictional decisions in habeas corpus and adequate and independent state grounds cases, thereby undermining the foundation upon which broad federal jurisdiction is based.

To establish legitimacy, the early Supreme Court broadly defined its powers under the Constitution and the first Judiciary Act. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 820-23 (1824) (power of judiciary is necessarily co-extensive with power of legislative branch); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 342-43 (1816) (federal appellate jurisdiction not limited to cases containing federal questions that arise in federal courts); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (establishing Supreme Court power of judicial review). Specifically, Chief Justice Marshall contended that federal jurisdiction could exist whenever a federal interest was at stake. See Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 823. Chief Justice Marshall's theory of federal jurisdiction is broad because it requires only the potential of a federal issue to justify jurisdiction. See id. at 824; see also M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 54-59 (1980) (discussion of various interpretations of Osborn).

See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (federal court will not enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution absent extraordinary circumstances); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672 (1950) (to "arise under" the Constitution, federal question must be affirmatively established in complaint); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (Court will not hear federal constitutional issue when difficult question of state law remains unresolved).


See infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text. Until recently, the Supreme Court had fostered easy access to claimants pursuing a federal forum when Congress had provided for one, and when an issue of federal law was in question. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972) (federal court in § 1983 action can grant injunction to stay proceeding pending in state court); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963) (habeas petitioner not denied federal forum unless he deliberately waived state procedural rule).

See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. The Court generally has denied access to a federal forum when a state decision may be based on an adequate state ground and involves only an inchoate federal issue. See, e.g., Murdock v. Memphis, 87 (22 Wall.) 590, 636 (1874) (adequate and independent state ground doctrine).

See infra notes 131-144 and accompanying text. Both habeas corpus jurisdiction and the adequate and independent state ground doctrine reflect the Court's interest in ensuring that the federal Constitution has been at least minimally upheld without losing sight of the goal of maintaining federal-state comity. See Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297, 297 (1977) (Supreme Court decisions represent minimum protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights); see
This Note will address these two areas in which the Burger Court has instituted unprecedented jurisdictional policies. First, in discussing the adequate and independent state ground doctrine, the Note will focus on recent precedent that permits Supreme Court review whenever the grounds of a state case are not clearly based in state law. Second, the Court's recent trend of constricting federal habeas relief for state prisoners, in spite of the legislative directive for broad federal collateral review, will be examined. The Note will concentrate on the Court's unprecedented inclination toward upholding state procedural requirements regardless of the substantive merits of the claim being considered. Finally, the Burger Court's policies in these areas will be assessed in light of the theories underlying federal jurisdiction and this Note will conclude that a more prudential policy is essential to maintain the legitimacy of the Court as an institution.

THE ADEQUATE AND INDEPENDENT STATE GROUND DOCTRINE

Until recently, in deciding whether to review a state case when it is unclear if the state court has rendered its decision primarily on state or federal constitutional grounds, the Supreme Court had either dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction,\(^2\) granted a continuance to obtain clarification from the state court,\(^3\) or, most frequently, vacated the decision and remanded it to the state.\(^4\) In the also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508 (1953) (separate opinion of Justice Frankfurter) (habeas relief must be broad to ensure constitutionality of incarceration); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945) (adequate and independent state ground doctrine protects state courts from "unwitting interference").

\(^2\) See, e.g., Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1934) (federal ground must appear affirmatively on record to establish Supreme Court jurisdiction in ambiguously grounded state cases).

\(^3\) See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945) (continuance granted to allow petitioner to obtain clarification from state court as to state ground of decision). The Court advocated continuance and clarification as the easiest means of assuring deference to state courts without renouncing federal review when it is proper. See id.; see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 276 (1979) (dictum) (Court could remand for clarification if ambiguity existed); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 583 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (case should be remanded to Ohio court for clarification of basis of decision). Under the continuance method, the state court judgment remains intact and the burden of sustaining review remains with the petitioner. See Comment, Michigan v. Long: Presumptive Federal Appellate Jurisdiction over State Cases Containing Ambiguous Grounds of Decision, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1081, 1089 (1984).

\(^4\) See, e.g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 556 (1940). In National Tea, the Supreme Court of Minnesota had determined that the graduated tax law of Minnesota violated both the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 552. The Supreme Court of the
past, considerations of comity and judicial restraint have caused the Court to exercise its prudential power to constrict the boundaries of federal jurisdiction created by Congress when federal interests would not otherwise be furthered. Since neither the Constitution nor Congress has authorized Supreme Court jurisdiction over state cases presenting only the mere possibility of a federal issue, it is arguable that the traditional policy of denying review United States would not review the case on the merits because there was "considerable uncertainty as to the precise grounds for the decision." Id. at 555-56. The Court reasoned that state courts should be free to review cases arising under the United States Constitution. Id. at 557. To achieve this jurisdictional balance, the Court vacated and remanded the case to the state court. Id. The vacation method is expansive because, by shifting the burden of sustaining review onto the state court, the petitioner does not automatically lose. See Comment, supra note 13, at 1088-89. The policy of vacating and remanding ambiguously grounded state cases has been repeatedly followed by the Court. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 241-42 (1978) (per curiam) (remanded to determine if decision of state court based on federal constitutional claims or on adequate and independent state grounds); Department of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425, 426 (1973) (per curiam) (remanded to determine basis of decision of state court); Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143, 146 (1952) (remanded to see if decision of state court based on adequate and independent state grounds or on federal constitutional claims).

See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 555, 557 (1940); Comment, supra note 13, at 1087; see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3154 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (Court should follow policy of judicial restraint no matter how appealing constitutional issue may be). The adequate and independent state ground doctrine may be viewed merely as a doctrine of judicial restraint because § 1257 of Title 28 technically provides the Supreme Court with the power to review state law cases when questions of federal constitutional law are at issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1982). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 95 (2d ed. 1983) (state decision resting on an adequate non-federal ground is a concrete controversy rendering the federal decision moot rather than advisory). But cf. Vitiello, Independent and Adequate State Grounds: A Stone Unturned by Louisiana's Criminal Defense Bar? 25 Loy. L. Rev. 745, 753 (1979) (if Court reviews only federal question in an adequate and independent state ground case, it would be rendering an advisory opinion). This view is consistent with the principle that a federal court can review any case or controversy arising under article III that involves a federal ingredient. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824); infra note 117 and accompanying text. However, the Court has stated that Congress would have affirmatively granted the federal courts jurisdiction over cases with adequate and independent state grounds if Congress intended for the federal courts to have such power. See Murdock v. Memphis, 87 (22 Wall.) 590, 619 (1874). Furthermore, when the ambiguity results from a potential misconstruction of the federal Constitution as overly broad, the state case is not within the purview of § 1257(3), which permits Supreme Court review only when an actual federal issue exists. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1982) (certiorari may be granted when "any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution"); infra note 133.

8 See U.S. CONST. art. III; supra note 5 and accompanying text. Supreme Court jurisdiction is based solely on a specific grant of authority under article III or a Congressional grant of jurisdiction pursuant to article III. See U.S. CONST. art. III. Ambiguously grounded state cases involving only the potential of a misunderstanding of federal law fall neither within the enumerated grants of jurisdiction under article III nor within the broader "aris-
of ambiguously grounded state decisions when no federal right has been denied was a recognition by the Court of a lack of any authority to review such decisions. Moreover, if the Court reviews a state case that, upon clarification, could reveal an adequate nonfederal ground of decision, and the state court on remand asserts that the decision rests solely on the state constitution, the state court could reverse the outcome of the Supreme Court and render the decision of the latter a mere advisory opinion. The adequate and independent state ground doctrine, as historically applied, shielded the Court from rendering advisory opinions by requiring concrete federal grounds for decision prior to invoking federal judicial power.

See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672-73 (1950) (matter in controversy must actually arise under Constitution to establish jurisdiction of federal courts); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (plaintiff's cause of action, not an anticipated defense, must arise under Constitution); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Further, by restricting certiorari review of state cases to actual claims under the federal Constitution, Congress implicitly has refused to extend Supreme Court jurisdiction to state cases that involve only the possibility of a misconstruction of a federal constitutional provision as overly broad. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1982); infra note 133.

17 See, e.g., Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143, 146 (1952) (Court has no jurisdiction to review federal question if state judgment based on adequate state ground); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945) (Court will not review state decision unless clear that it was not decided on adequate and independent state ground); Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52, 54 (1934) (fact that federal question was necessary to decision of state court essential to jurisdiction of Supreme Court). In Lynch, for example, the Court said that although the state court's decision could be construed as resting on federal law, "jurisdiction cannot be founded upon surmise." 293 U.S. at 54. To establish federal jurisdiction, the federal ground must appear affirmatively from the record. Id. The burden of proving that an adequate and independent state ground did not exist is on the party trying to establish jurisdiction. See Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 281 (1955) (Court must take "scrupulous care" that case below was based on federal law).

18 See, e.g., State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425, 427 (S.D. 1984) (on remand, Supreme Court determination not controlling on adequate state ground); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945). As the ultimate authority on state law, a state court, on remand, can either enter judgment or reinstate its prior opinion as controlling. R. Hodder-Williams, supra note 2, at 110-12; see Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979). In South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), the Supreme Court reversed the decision of a South Dakota court to suppress evidence of the refusal of a defendant to submit to a blood alcohol test. Id. at 566. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the South Dakota Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. Id. On remand, the Supreme Court of South Dakota implicitly overruled the United States Supreme Court by basing its decision on state constitutional privileges. State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d at 431. The South Dakota Court emphasized that the opinion of the Supreme Court was not controlling. Id. at 427-28.

19 See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945). The Court has noted that its policy to enforce the adequate and independent state ground doctrine "seems consistent with the respect due the highest courts of states of the Union that they be asked rather than told
In *Michigan v. Long*, however, the Supreme Court recently reformulated the adequate and independent state ground doctrine, holding that unless an adequate nonfederal ground affirmatively appears from the face of the record, an ambiguous state decision can be reviewed on the merits without state clarification on remand. Under *Long*, even if no federal right has been denied, the Supreme Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction provided that the state court potentially may have founded its decision on a misapplication of federal law. The *Long* Court criticized vacation and continuance as inefficient and prone to cause delay, while rejecting dismissal as antithetical to the goal of uniformity of federal law. To remedy these defects, the Court determined that any ambiguity concerning whether a case could have been decided on an independent state ground may be resolved as if the state had relied

what they have intended.” *Id.* This policy protects the state courts from “unwitting interference,” and, at the same time, protects the Supreme Court from “unwitting renunciation.” *Id.* Similarly, in *Minnesota v. National Tea Co.*, 309 U.S. 551 (1940), the Court stated that important federal issues should be adjudicated by the Court without encroaching on state constitutional law. *See id.* at 557.

*Id.* at 3469 (1983).

*Id.* at 3477-78. In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the *Long* Court determined that the prior methods of deciding whether a case had an adequate nonfederal ground were ad hoc and inconsistent. *See id.* at 3475. The Court stated: “[w]e merely assume that there are no such grounds when it is not clear from the opinion itself that the state court relied upon an adequate and independent state ground and when it fairly appears that the state court rested its decision primarily on federal law.” *Id.* at 3476-77. As Justice O'Connor mentioned in a footnote, this new presumption was foreshadowed in two recent Burger Court opinions. *Id.* at 3477 n.8. In *Delaware v. Prouse*, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), and *Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.*, 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the Court reviewed state cases that discussed both federal and state issues. *See id.* at 3477 n.8. In *Prouse*, the Court based its decision to accept jurisdiction on its determination that the state rested its decision on a misinterpretation of federal constitutional provisions. *See 440 U.S.* at 652-53. Similarly, in *Zacchini*, the Court determined that the Ohio Supreme Court had based its holding on an erroneous understanding of federal law, and, thus, the Court reviewed the case on the merits. *See 433 U.S.* at 568; *see also Oregon v. Kennedy*, 456 U.S. 667, 671 (1982) (fair reading of case below indicated federal constitutional law as basis of decision).

*Id.* at 3490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that in cases in which the petitioner is a state official, the Court is being asked “to rule that the state court interpreted federal rights too broadly and ‘overprotected’ the citizen.” *Id.* The purpose of the Court, however, should be to ensure that the federal rights of citizens have been vindicated, not to control state constitutional lawmaking. *See id.*

*Id.* at 3475. In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun noted the importance of uniformity in federal law, but criticized the Court's new approach as inefficient and likely to cause advisory opinions. *Id.* at 3483 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, on the other hand, contended that the “uniformity” argument was superfluous because the need for uniformity would still exist in a state case based on an adequate nonfederal ground. *Id.* at 3491-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
on federal constitutional law.\(^{24}\)

As predicted by Justice Stevens, this drastic revision of the adequate and independent state ground doctrine has been invoked extensively when the state court has interpreted the state constitution to provide greater protection to its citizens than the federal Constitution.\(^{25}\) The \textit{Long} doctrine may therefore cause a prolifera-

\(^{24}\) Id. at 3475. Justice O'Connor stated that if the independent non-federal ground is "not apparent from the four corners of the opinion," the Court will "accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so." Id. at 3475-76. This position is inconsistent with Justice O'Connor's prior commitment to foster independence between the state and federal court systems, and to foster comity through deference to the finality of state court decisions. See O'Connor, \textit{Trends in the Relationship Between Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge}, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 814-15 (1981).

\(^{25}\) See \textit{Long}, 103 S. Ct. at 3490-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Since \textit{Long}, the Court has granted certiorari in numerous cases in which the states have rendered judgments in favor of their citizens. See \textit{Florida v. Meyers}, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1855-56 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). \textit{But cf. Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g}, 104 S. Ct. 2267, 2276-77 (1984) (state case may have been influenced by misconception of federal law but case remanded for lack of strong federal interest). The decision on the merits in \textit{Michigan v. Long}, it is submitted, is illustrative of the recent tendency of the Court to narrow the scope of constitutional liberties. See \textit{Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion in the Burger Court}, 63 KY. L.J. 421, 433-34 (1974). In People v. \textit{Long}, 413 Mich. 461, 320 N.W.2d 866 (1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983), the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the conviction of the defendant, holding that a protective search permits only a pat-down search of the individual and not a search of the passenger compartment of his car. Id. at 472-73, 320 N.W.2d at 869-70. By accepting the case for review, the Supreme Court was able to extend the power of the police by permitting a search of the passenger compartment when a \textit{Terry} protective search is in order. \textit{Long}, 103 S. Ct. at 3480-81; see also \textit{Terry v. Ohio}, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (police can conduct protective search of individual upon reasonable suspicion that individual is armed and dangerous). The defendant's conviction was subsequently reinstated. See \textit{Long}, 103. S. Ct. at 3483. Justice Stevens criticized the majority's acceptance of jurisdiction, stating that "the final outcome of the state processes offended no federal interest whatever. Michigan simply provided greater protection to one of its citizens than some other State might provide or, indeed, than this Court might require throughout the country." See id. at 3490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, by reaching the merits of a federal question in these cases, it is submitted that the Supreme Court is infringing on the rights of a state to provide constitutional guarantees to its citizens that exceed those provided by the United States Constitution.

During the Warren Court era, the states retreated from active state constitutional lawmaking. See \textit{Kelman, Foreword, Rediscovering the State Constitutional Bill of Rights, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 413, 413 (1981); Developments in the Law—The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1224, 1228 (1982).} This retreat was the result of the Warren Court's extension of individual liberties and the application of most of the Bill of Rights to the states by the fourteenth amendment. See Falk, \textit{The Supreme Court of California 1971-1972 Foreword: The State Constitution: A More than Adequate Nonfederal Ground}, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 273-74 (1973); Note, supra, at 1328. The Burger Court's dilution of Warren Court precedents and the hesitation of the Burger Court to protect individual liberties have renewed the interest of state courts to develop state constitutional law. See Kelman, supra, at 413-14; \textit{Developments in the Law, supra}, at 1331.
tion of advisory opinions concerning state law. In fact, since the state court can reinstate its decision on remand, the Burger Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over state cases involving merely a potential misapprehension of federal constitutional law ensures that the power to render the decisions of the Court advisory rests solely in the hands of state court judges. Since the advisory opinion doctrine has long been perceived as arising from article III to protect the power and legitimacy of the Supreme Court, any doctrine that increases the risk of advisory opinions drains the authority of the Court and impairs the federal judicial power. Federal power is

26 See Comment, supra note 13, at 1095. In general, the Court has traditionally denied review on the merits unless an adequate non-federal ground did not exist. See, e.g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 555 (1940) (uncertainty as to basis of state court decision was sufficient grounds for Supreme Court to deny review).

27 Cf. Comment, supra note 13, at 1095 (when state reinstates its own judgment, Supreme Court has engaged in unnecessary adjudication). State court judges already have demonstrated that they will not hesitate to exercise the power to render the Supreme Court’s opinion advisory. See, e.g., State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425, 427-28 (S.D. 1984) (although federal cases may be persuasive regarding interpretation of state constitution, state courts are final authorities); see also State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-32, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983) (asserting right of state to interpret its own constitution more protectively than federal Constitution); cf. Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2090 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (expression of concern for Supreme Court encroachment into areas reserved for state judges). According to some commentators, the principles of federalism demand that a state court review its own constitutional provisions before resorting to the guidelines that the Supreme Court has set for the federal Constitution. Falk, supra note 25, at 285; Developments in the Law, supra note 25, at 1329. Even prior to Michigan v. Long, state courts rebelled against Supreme Court opinions reversing state court holdings that construed constitutional guarantees more broadly than the Supreme Court would prefer. Note, supra note 11, at 297. It is not surprising, therefore, that the reaction of the states to Michigan v. Long has been less than receptive. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 261 (Mont. 1983) (Sheehy, J., dissenting) (“[t]he United States Supreme Court has no business contravening the final decisions of a state judiciary where no federal right guaranteed to all citizens has been offended”).

28 See Comment, supra note 13, at 1095-96 (Long presumption presents the “greatest likelihood of unnecessary adjudication and advisory opinions”). The Pullman abstention doctrine offers support for the proposition that the Court should defer to the states in cases involving uncertain grounds of decision in order to preserve its authority. See Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). In Pullman, a federal equity claim had properly been brought before a district court with a pendent state claim that had not been heard in the state court. Id. at 497-98. The Court adopted a policy of judicial restraint by reasoning that the resolution of constitutional issues should be avoided when “a definitive ruling on the state issue would terminate the controversy.” Id. at 498. Writing for the court, Justice Frankfurter argued that the jurisdiction of a federal court would be undermined if the federal court’s determination could be overturned by a subsequent state adjudication. Id. at 500. “The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court.” Id.; see also H.J. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 93 (1973) (federal decision when state law is unclear would waste judicial resources and drain comity).
further reduced by filling the Supreme Court docket with nonjusticiable questions, leaving less time to resolve cases invoking significant federal interests. Moreover, despite the reputation of the Burger Court for protecting federal-state comity, the Long doctrine, by increasing the pool of state cases available for federal appellate review, interferes with the inherent power of a state court to interpret its own constitution. Finally, although the Long Court criticized earlier decisions for impairing judicial economy through continuance or vacation and remand, more judicial time is wasted by adjudicating a matter that already has been deter-

See Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1855 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The swollen docket of the Supreme Court is another reason why the state courts should actively function as state constitutional lawmakers. See Sheran, State Courts and Federalism in the 1980's: Comment, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 789, 792-93 (1981); see also H.J. FRIENDLY, supra note 28, at 3-4 (federal courts are faced with a breakdown because of increased workload and increased interference into state affairs); Department of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425, 429 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Court should not expand jurisdiction over state cases because of already large docket).

Cf. Bartels, Avoiding a Comity of Errors: A Model for Adjudicating Federal Civil Rights Suits that “Interfere” with State Civil Proceedings, 29 STAN. L. REV. 29, 61-62 (1979) (Burger Court may have expanded comity in civil areas as well as criminal). But see Wilkes, supra note 25, at 433-34 (“Burger Court will not hesitate to set aside state judgments that expand federal rights beyond the limits thought desirable by the Burger Court”).

See Comment, supra note 13, at 1099. State courts are not required to interpret state constitutions in the same manner that the Supreme Court has construed the federal Constitution. See Falk, supra note 25, at 285 n.39; Note, supra note 11, at 297. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted several times that a state constitution can confer greater rights and protections than the federal Constitution, especially in criminal matters. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (state free to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those Supreme Court deems necessary); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (state may impose stricter standards on searches and seizures than those required by federal Constitution). Thus, Supreme Court precedents should be considered merely persuasive authority by state judges when construing state constitutions. See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 233, 471 A.2d 347, 352 (1983); State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425, 427-28 (S.D. 1984); Falk, supra note 25, at 283. The adequate and independent state ground doctrine is not inconsistent with the principle that federal law must govern when there is a conflict between state and federal law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

Id. The Supremacy Clause, however, does not require federal courts to accept jurisdiction over all cases involving federal questions. See id.; Bator, supra note 3, at 633. Bator argues that “it is worth reminding ourselves that the supremacy clause does not say that the federal government shall be supreme. It doesn't even say that the federal courts shall be supreme. It says, fundamentally, that the Constitution shall be supreme.” Bator, supra note 3, at 633 (emphasis in original).

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
mined under state law, or that will be rendered federally moot by a
subsequent state decision on remand.33

The Long decision erases the benefits of the earlier adequate
and independent state ground doctrine,34 fails to further any of the
policies that it purports to promote,35 and increases the risk of advi-
sory opinions.36 It is therefore suggested that the Court should
dismiss those cases in which an adequate and independent state
ground arguably exists, but federally guaranteed constitutional
rights are at least minimally upheld.37 The Court should accept re-
view, however, when an adequate and independent state ground
may exist, but the decision of the state court impinges on the peti-
tioner's guaranteed rights as protected by the United States Con-
stitution.38 If a state court may have misinterpreted federal con-
stitutional law, but the grounds of decision are too obscure to
determine if a federal right has been denied, it is submitted that
the probability that an adequate and independent state ground
does not exist should be weighed against the likelihood of a mis-
construction of federal constitutional law. When the state court
opinion analyzes interpretations of federal constitutional law in
contravention of the recognized understanding of the Supreme
Court, without reference to any state constitutional provision
that would render the same result, the Court should grant a continu-
ance and seek clarification.39 However, if the state court acknowl-
edges a state constitutional right that is analogous to a federal constitutional right, there is no reason for the Supreme Court to intrude upon the judgment of the state court. This approach is consistent with the goal of federal-state comity because it not only allows the state courts the freedom to be the final arbiters of their own constitutions, but also credits state judges with the ability to determine constitutional issues. In addition, it will help to reinstate an original function of the adequate and independent state ground doctrine; namely, to minimize dilution of the federal judicial power and thereby maximize the Court’s authority and legitimacy.

Pitcairn, 324 U.S. at 126-28. The continuance method maintains the Court’s power because the Court can hear the case on the merits upon being informed by the state that the state decision was based on federal law. See id. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to interpret federal law, see id. at 127; thus, an alternative approach would be for the Court to vacate and remand the case to the state court, see California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33, 35 (1972) (per curiam); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 556 (1940). The state court could then reinterpret the federal law, or provide greater protections by interpreting the state constitution. See Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 104 S. Ct. 2267, 2278-79 (1984) (Supreme Court remanded case to state court for reinterpretation of state law); cf. State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425, 427 (S.D. 1984) (state court based decision on state constitution after remand from Supreme Court).


See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 15, at 20-21. Although some state court actions are reviewable by the Supreme Court pursuant to § 1257 of Title 28, the state courts are still the final arbiters of state law. Id. It is important for state courts to take an active role in state constitutional lawmaking to preserve their independence and keep the process of dispute resolution as close to the people as possible. Sheran, supra note 29, at 799; see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2090 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[s]tates in our federal system . . . remain the primary guardian of the people”); Bator, supra note 3, at 636 (state courts should be involved in constitutional lawmaking as enforcers of the law); Note, Taking Federalism Seriously: Limiting State Acceptance of National Grants, 90 YALE L.J. 1694, 1700 (1981) (implementation of popularly desired policy goals more likely when government close to people).

See Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884) (acknowledging concurrent jurisdiction of states to interpret Constitution); cf. Sheran, supra note 29, at 792 (many programs have improved quality of state court judges).

Cf. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945) (clarification from state court is simplest procedure for dealing with ambiguously grounded cases); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940) (“[i]ntelligent exercise of our appellate powers compels us to ask for the elimination of obscurities and ambiguities from opinions in such cases”); Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1934) (Court should not take jurisdiction when ground of
HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF

The federal habeas corpus statute enables a person convicted by a state court to have his case reviewed by a federal court to determine if he is being held in violation of the federal Constitution. During the years of the Warren Court, habeas corpus petitions were encouraged on the ground that "federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary judicial review." Due in part to the Warren Court's expansion of habeas jurisdiction, the Burger Court has severely restricted the availability of federal habeas review of state convictions. The constriction has been greatest in the area of decision is nonfederal).

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44 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982). Section 2254(a) provides that:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 330-46 (2d ed. 1983) (summary of history and important case law).


fourth amendment rights. In this context, a state prisoner is pre-
cluded from seeking habeas relief if he previously has been af-
forded an “opportunity for full and fair litigation” of his fourth
amendment claim in state court. This standard forecloses any
meaningful federal review of fourth amendment violations by the
states. Since the habeas corpus statute requires a petitioner to
exhaust all state remedies before coming into federal court, a
state prisoner inevitably will have fully litigated his fourth amend-
ment claim in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. By
denying a federal remedy explicitly provided by Congress, the
Court has attempted “to rewrite [a] jurisdictional statute. . . .”,
and, therefore, has encroached on the powers reserved to the legis-
lature by the United States Constitution.

See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (state prisoner cannot obtain habeas relief based on claim that exclusionary rule should have applied to certain evidence at trial); see also id. at 503, 517-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Stone is foundation for further minimiza-
tion of habeas relief).

Id. at 494. In Stone, the Court reasoned that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule would not be diminished by the denial of habeas corpus relief. Id. at 493. Rather, the Court feared that overturning a criminal conviction on collateral relief after two tiers of state courts had rejected a fourth-amendment claim could create disrespect for the law and the administration of justice. Id. at 491. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan contended that the majority did not focus on a crucial point in the case—the availability of a federal forum to redress federal constitutional violations. Id. at 503, 511-13 (Brennan, J., dissent-

Because the federal judiciary is protected by life tenure and a guaranteed salary, federal judges are insulated from the political pressures that may persuade a state court judge to “bend” the Constitution to avoid controversial issues. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; see also Stone, 428 U.S. at 525 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“detached federal review is a salutary safe-
guard”); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469-71 (A. Hamilton) (1966) (tenure and salary protections of federal judiciary ensure preservation of constitutional rights); Bator, supra note 3, at 623 (prestige, expertise, tenure, and salary of federal judges result in greater sensitivity to federal rights).

See Holmberg v. Parratt, 548 F.2d 745, 749 (8th Cir.) (Bright, J., dissenting) (Stone deprives prisoner of opportunity to have his constitutional claim reviewed by a federal court), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969 (1977); Comment, Development of Federal Habeas Corpus Since Stone v. Powell, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 1145, 1165; cf. United States ex. rel. Petillo v. New Jersey, 562 F.2d 903, 906 (3d Cir. 1977) (whether fourth-amendment issue was decided cor-
rectly by state court is irrelevant in light of Stone).

See infra notes 91-115 and accompanying text.


See Stone, 428 U.S. at 503-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court and Congress, 44 Ohio St. L.J. 367, 368 (1983) (Congress, not
The Burger Court, however, has placed further restrictions on habeas relief that affect the availability of habeas review regardless of the substantive basis of the petitioner's federal claim.\(^5\) Most notably, a state prisoner can no longer obtain habeas relief if he has committed a procedural default during the course of the state proceedings against him, unless a vague and restrictive "cause and prejudice" test is met.\(^6\) A habeas petitioner is also precluded from plenary federal review if he has failed to exhaust all available state remedies with respect to any one claim in his petition.\(^5\)

**State Procedural Defaults**

In *Fay v. Noia*,\(^6\) the Warren Court recognized that, in limited instances, a habeas petitioner's failure to comply with a state procedural rule could constitute grounds for dismissal of the writ.\(^7\) The Warren Court, while concerned primarily with providing impartial federal review of alleged constitutional violations by a state,\(^6\) recognized a federal responsibility to avoid undue interfer-

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\(^3\) **Note:** The Court, should be weighing competing policy considerations involved in controversy over scope of habeas jurisdiction; cf. Remington, *State Prisoner Access to Postconviction Relief—A Lessening Role for Federal Courts: An Increasingly Important Role for State Courts*, 44 Ohio St. L.J. 287, 300 (1983) (Court's habeas decisions reflect policies of "oft rejected proposal[s] to Congress").

\(^4\) **Note:** See id. at 422-24. By extending the habeas remedy to state prisoners, and providing for a trial of the facts anew, Congress designed a habeas remedy that was "additional to and independent of direct Supreme Court review." See id. at 415-16; Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 355, 355-56 (1867); see also *Ex parte McCadle*, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867) (amendment to habeas statute broadens habeas jurisdiction to cover every constitutional violation); Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866) (statutory extension of habeas corpus enlarges liberties). See generally Peller, *supra* note 45, at 610-44 (historical perspective of Habeas Corpus Act and cases interpreting Act require broad federal collateral review). Arguably, the federal interests compelling habeas review necessitate habeas jurisdiction that is more extensive than appellate jurisdiction of state cases. Compare *Fay*, 372 U.S. at 429-33 (interest of state in compliance with an important and legitimate procedural rule is irrelevant in habeas proceeding) with *Henry v. Mississippi*, 379 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1965) (adequate and independent state procedural ground may preclude federal appellate review when state asserts legitimate reason for compliance). Indeed, the right of an individual to habeas corpus relief is specifically enumerated in the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I,
ence with state court proceedings. Thus, the Fay Court held that unless a state prisoner’s failure to comply with a state procedural rule was the result of a “deliberate bypass” of the rule by the prisoner for the purpose of “saving” the federal constitutional claim for habeas review, a federal court should review the petition. The deliberate bypass rule denied habeas review only to fully informed state prisoners who intended to violate state court procedural rules.

In Wainwright v. Sykes, the Burger Court explicitly rejected the deliberate bypass standard, holding that, absent “cause and prejudice,” a petitioner who, knowingly or not, fails to comply with any state court procedural rule will be denied federal habeas review on the merits. Thus, even when the interest of the state in

§ 9, cl. 2 (“[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it”).

See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965) (Court will defer to adequate and independent state procedural ground when there is legitimate state reason for compliance). But see Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964) (Court will not defer to state procedural requirement that is not applied fairly). While the Henry Court acknowledged that the adequate and independent state ground doctrine applied to both state substantive and procedural grounds, the Court noted that adherence to the doctrine was less compelling when the state court decision was based on a state procedural ground. Henry, 379 U.S. at 446-47. Accordingly, the Court concluded that to ensure the vindication of constitutionally guaranteed rights in such cases, federal appellate review should not be forfeited unless the state has a legitimate interest in preserving the important state procedural rule that has been waived. See id. But cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426-27 (1963) (because it is intended as remedy for unconstitutional restraint, habeas corpus jurisdiction cannot be diminished by anything that may occur in state court proceeding). Furthermore, although a state procedural rule is arguably legitimate, a federal forum will not be forfeited by the petitioner if he complied substantially with an alternate, legitimate rule. See Henry, 379 U.S. at 448-49.

372 U.S. at 438. In Fay, the petitioner applied for federal habeas relief although he had not made a timely appeal in state court, resulting in an unexhausted claim. Id. at 394-96. The Court noted that the doctrines of comity and finality should not outweigh the prisoner’s right to a federal forum to hear his constitutional claim. See id. at 419-20, 424. Thus, unless the petitioner himself, not his lawyer, deliberately bypassed the state procedural rule, habeas jurisdiction would be granted. See id. at 439. But see Sallet & Goodman, Closing the Door to Federal Habeas Corpus: A Comment on Legislative Proposals to Restrict Access in State Procedural Default Cases, 20 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 465, 470 (1983) (requiring deliberate bypass by prisoner himself nearly always results in waiver).

See Fay, 372 U.S. at 439.


See id. at 87-88. In Sykes, a state prisoner was denied habeas corpus relief because of his failure to comply with the contemporaneous-objection rule of Florida. Id. at 85-86. The Court adopted the “cause and prejudice” test of Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976), which held that a petitioner must show why the state procedural rule was not complied with and that the loss of opportunity resulting from such noncompliance actually prejudiced the defendant’s trial. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90-91. The Court then remanded the case to the district court to dismiss the writ because the petitioner had not explained his
enforcing the bypassed rule is weak, the Burger Court is foregoing federal jurisdiction without examining the validity of the substantive federal claim.\textsuperscript{44}

While the \textit{Sykes} case shifted the burden of proof regarding habeas jurisdiction to the petitioner,\textsuperscript{65} two subsequent opinions, \textit{Engle v. Isaac}\textsuperscript{66} and \textit{United States v. Frady},\textsuperscript{67} have placed further demands on habeas petitioners by broadly defining what will not constitute "cause" and "prejudice."\textsuperscript{68} In \textit{Isaac}, after the petitioners were imprisoned the Ohio Supreme Court reinterpreted the state constitution, changing the burden of proof regarding self-defense.\textsuperscript{69} The petitioners argued that they had "cause" for failing to comply with a state contemporaneous objection rule, since at the time of the state trial a constitutional violation did not yet exist.\textsuperscript{70} Al-
though the petitioners' counsel were not expected to predict future changes in the law, the Isaac Court nevertheless denied the writ, holding that cause was not established by the mere "futility of presenting an objection to the state courts." In Frady, a case involving a habeas petition by a federal prisoner, the Court held that the petitioner failed to show actual "prejudice" because he had not presented any colorable evidence indicating that the trier of facts might reverse the outcome of the case.

Sykes, Isaac, and Frady combine to reveal an unprecedented deference to state court procedural rules by the Burger Court. In other jurisdictional contexts, the Court has recognized the supremacy of federal law unless the federal court is interfering with state substantive law. Recognizing the important federal interest of providing a federal forum when a claim involves litigants from different states, the Court has construed broadly its congressionally granted rulemaking authority so that litigants from different states are ensured uniform procedure in a federal court.

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71 Id. In a recent decision, Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984), the Court held that the novelty of a constitutional issue at the time of the state court action could establish cause, id. at 2910. The durability of this slight retreat from Isaac is questionable, however, since the plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan, was joined by only three justices. See id. at 2912, 2913. See generally Kniffin, Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action by United States Courts of Appeals, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 53, 58 (1982) (precedential effect of decision diminished when justices do not agree on given result for same reasons).

72 456 U.S. at 171. Writing for the Frady Court, Justice O'Connor rejected the petitioner's contention that the "plain error" standard in Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied to his case. Id. at 166-67; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) ("[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the Court"); cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973) (when petitioner's challenge to imprisonment could be brought under habeas corpus statute, habeas corpus requirements cannot be circumvented by a claim under the Civil Rights Act).

73 See supra note 46, at 1622; infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text; cf. Remington, supra note 52, at 299-300 (suggesting that even adequacy of state procedure is unimportant as long as claim has been litigated in state court). The constant outcry of politicians and the public alike is that the courts have been too lenient in letting criminals go free due to procedural technicalities. See generally E. Wright, Court at the Crossroads, Time Mag., Oct. 8, 1984, at 33, col. 2. But cf. Bator, supra note 3, at 823 (federal courts should be immune from political pressures). It is suggested that the procedural barriers raised by the Burger Court have swung the pendulum so far that the unjustly incarcerated may no longer be freed due to procedural technicalities.

74 See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.

75 See C. Wright, supra note 44, § 23, at 128.

76 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-74 (1965). When Congress formulates a rule that rationally is capable of classification as a procedural rule, it is deemed constitutional and will be enforced unless it interferes with state substantive law. See id.
Specifically, a state procedural rule is applied in a diversity case only if the application of the state rule would yield a different outcome than if federal law were applied.\textsuperscript{77} Similarly, by granting the federal judiciary the broad power to pursue fresh facts in habeas cases, Congress has demonstrated a distrust of the ability of state courts to provide adequate federal constitutional guarantees to state prisoners,\textsuperscript{78} and has conferred upon the federal courts the responsibility to preserve the important federal interest of vindicating the rights of those who are unjustly imprisoned.\textsuperscript{79} It is suggested that this significant federal interest clearly outweighs the weak state interest of ease in state judicial administration. Nevertheless, by requiring the habeas petitioner to negotiate a maze of procedural barriers before his constitutional claim can be heard on the merits, the Court has placed the interests of comity and deference to state judicial administration above the strong federal interest of vindicating constitutional violations.\textsuperscript{80}

It is submitted that the restrictive definitions of "cause" and "prejudice" adopted by the Court have resulted in a substantial injustice, possibly of constitutional dimensions, to the petitioner. Even in cases of fundamental unfairness, the \textit{Isaac} "cause" standard traps the habeas petitioner by denying him habeas relief when his "astute counsel" overlooks an esoteric constitutional claim.\textsuperscript{81} By denying habeas relief premised on the inadvertent error of an attorney that does not even reach the level of a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the restrictive cause standard precludes the petitioner from relief without regard

\textsuperscript{77} See id. at 469; M. Redish, \textit{supra} note 6, at 177.

\textsuperscript{78} See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 n.9, 415-16 (1963) (expansion of habeas corpus act to state prisoners was passed in anticipation of post-Civil War abuses); Peller, \textit{supra} note 45, at 619 (Congress passed 1867 Act to enforce newly created federal rights).

\textsuperscript{79} See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508 (1953); see also Peller, \textit{supra} note 45, at 618 (language of 1867 Act requires broad federal collateral review).

\textsuperscript{80} See Remington, \textit{supra} note 52, at 299-300; Rosenn, \textit{supra} note 46, at 362.

\textsuperscript{81} Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133-34 (1982). The current Ohio rule on the burden of proving self-defense had not yet been pronounced by the Ohio courts at the time of the defendant's procedural default. \textit{Id.} at 110-11. The Supreme Court determined that the petitioner's counsel should have relied on the general due process standards of \textit{In re Winship}. \textit{Id.} at 131, 133. In \textit{Winship}, the Court held that a defendant cannot be convicted except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the charge against him. \textit{In re Winship}, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Based on the \textit{Winship} decision, the \textit{Isaac} Court found that the petitioner's attorney had the "tools" to raise the constitutional claim at the time of trial. \textit{Isaac}, 456 U.S. at 133. The Court recognized that not every attorney would have gleaned this tenuous connection, yet declared that the Constitution did not guarantee "astute counsel." \textit{Id.} at 134; see \textit{supra} note 71 and accompanying text.
to the substance of his claim.\textsuperscript{82} To avoid this result, the petitioner's attorney will be encouraged to raise every possible constitutional claim in state court, thereby hindering comity by overloading state courts with a plethora of potentially meritless claims.\textsuperscript{83} Finally, by requiring the petitioner to present a "colorable claim of innocence" to meet the actual prejudice standard of Frady,\textsuperscript{84} the Court has implicitly overruled \textit{In re Winship}\textsuperscript{85} by shifting the burden of proof from the prosecutor to the defendant.\textsuperscript{86}

It is suggested that the Court reinstate the \textit{Fay} "deliberate bypass" standard, accompanied in certain instances by a showing of fundamental unfairness. To protect the petitioner's right to a federal forum, neither the petitioner nor his attorney may knowingly forego an important state procedural rule as a tactical means of obtaining access to a federal forum.\textsuperscript{87} If the petitioner's attorney

\textsuperscript{82} See Remington, \textit{supra} note 52, at 297; Sallet & Goodman, \textit{supra} note 60, at 481; \textit{cf.} Seidman, \textit{Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure}, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 467 (1980) ("Wainwright seemingly mandates the continued incarceration of factually innocent defendants in order to deter defense attorney misconduct").

\textsuperscript{83} See Remington, \textit{supra} note 52, at 297 n.47. Aware of the impropriety of punishing habeas petitioners for the ministerial errors of their attorneys, the Court has retreated slightly from the procedurally difficult cause standard. \textit{See} Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2910 (1984) (defendant has "cause" when legal basis of a constitutional claim is "not reasonably available to counsel").

\textsuperscript{84} United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170-71 (1982). The notion that a habeas petitioner should include a colorable claim of innocence in his petition was espoused by Judge Friendly. \textit{See} Friendly, \textit{Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments}, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 160 (1970) (defendant must show fair probability that alleged error would have raised reasonable question of doubt about his guilt in mind of trier of facts). The Burger Court has relied explicitly on Judge Friendly's argument. \textit{See} Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 & n.31 (1982); \textit{see also} Peller, \textit{supra} note 45, at 593 (Supreme Court supports colorable claim of innocence requirement); Seidman, \textit{supra} note 82, at 449-59 & n.69 (same).

\textsuperscript{85} 397 U.S. 358 (1970). For a brief discussion of the \textit{Winship} case, see \textit{supra} note 81.

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{See} Sallet & Goodman, \textit{supra} note 60, at 478; \textit{Comment}, Lundy, Isaac & Frady: \textit{A Trilogy of Habeas Corpus Restraint}, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 169, 215 (1983). It is axiomatic that the prosecutor is required to prove each and every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. \textit{In re Winship}, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); \textit{see supra} note 81.

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{See} Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-40 (1963) (habeas relief should be precluded when petitioner "deliberately by-passed" a state procedural ground); \textit{see also} United States \textit{ex rel. Allum v. Twomey}, 484 F.2d 740, 744-45 (7th Cir. 1973) (criticizing requirement that client participate in every tactical decision of competent counsel); Sallet & Goodman, \textit{supra} note 60, at 481 (criminal defendants must sometimes be bound to their attorneys' decisions); \textit{cf.} Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2907 (1984) (federal courts are empowered to go beyond procedural forfeiture to protect constitutional rights); Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1364 (10th Cir. 1981) (non-deliberate attorney error may constitute "cause"); Rachel v. Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 200, 204 (6th Cir. 1978) (inexperience of attorney constitutes "cause"). Requiring the dismissal of a habeas claim when there has been a deliberate bypass
deliberately bypassed a legitimate state procedural rule, the petitioner should still be permitted to obtain habeas relief if the effect of the procedural default resulted in fundamental unfairness.\textsuperscript{88} Specifically, the effect of a procedural default is fundamentally unfair when the petitioner loses his opportunity to raise a claim that could have swayed the trier of facts when deciding the issue of guilt.\textsuperscript{89} This two-prong approach ensures a habeas petitioner a federal remedy for actual constitutional abuses while limiting access to a federal forum only to meritorious claims.\textsuperscript{90}

\textit{Exhaustion of State Remedies}

The Federal Judiciary Act requires a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus to exhaust all reasonably available state remedies before applying for the writ.\textsuperscript{91} The exhaustion requirement is in-

\textsuperscript{88} See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 136 & n.1 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (procedural foreclosure of federal habeas relief should result only when petitioner has received fundamentally fair trial); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 547-48 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (habeas relief should be confined to cases truly involving fundamental unfairness); cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 95 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“if the constitutional issue is sufficiently grave, even an express waiver by the defendant himself may sometimes be excused”). By requiring the petitioner to make an additional showing of fundamental unfairness if his attorney deliberately bypassed a state procedure, the possibility of “sandbagging” is reduced. C\textit{f}. \textit{Sykes}, 433 U.S. at 89 (requiring dismissal only when petitioner himself deliberately bypasses state procedure encourages sandbagging). “Sandbagging” occurs when a petitioner’s attorney delays raising a constitutional issue in the state court for the purpose of saving the claim for a federal habeas proceeding if the petitioner loses in state court. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{89} See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 542 n.7 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).


\textsuperscript{91} 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1982). The exhaustion requirement provides:

(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.

(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, . . . if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.

\textit{Id.}
tended to foster comity and to preserve the role of the state court in enforcing federal law.92 Recently, in *Rose v. Lundy,*93 the Supreme Court interpreted these subsections of the habeas statute to preclude federal habeas corpus relief when the petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims.4 Lundy confronts the habeas petitioner with two choices when he presents such a mixed petition to the district court: he may return to state court to exhaust the unexhausted claims or he may remove the unexhausted claims from the petition and proceed to federal court.95 The *Lundy*

92 See Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (per curiam) (exhaustion requirement of § 2254(b) and (c) "serves to minimize friction between our federal and state systems of justice by allowing the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights"); H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A180 (1947) (citing *Ex parte Hawk,* 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944)); see also *Rose v. Lundy,* 455 U.S. 509, 515, 518 (1982) ("exhaustion doctrine is principally designed to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings"); *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court,* 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973) (exhaustion doctrine balances interests of federalism with need to preserve writ of habeas corpus).

93 455 U.S. 509 (1982).

94 Id. at 510, 518-19. A habeas petition containing claims that have already been exhausted in the state court, as well as claims that have not been determined by the state court, is deemed a mixed petition. See id. at 510. The "total exhaustion" rule necessitates the dismissal of such a petition. See id.

Prior to *Rose v. Lundy,* there had been a split among the circuit courts over the disposition of mixed habeas petitions. Id. at 513 n.5. *Compare* Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 355 (5th Cir. 1978) (requiring total exhaustion) and Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1976) (total exhaustion required unless prevented by reasonable circumstances) with Katz v. King, 627 F.2d 568, 574 (1st Cir. 1980) (reviewing exhausted claims in mixed petition) and Cameron v. Fastoff, 543 F.2d 971, 976 (2d Cir. 1976) (same). While only the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have dismissed all claims in mixed petitions, no circuit has accepted such petitions when the unexhausted claims were interwoven with, or pertinent to, the resolution of the exhausted claims. See, e.g., Triplett v. Wyrick, 549 F.2d 57, 59 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (dismissal when exhausted claims "closely intertwined" with unexhausted claims); United States ex rel. DeFlumer v. Mancusi, 380 F.2d 1018, 1019 (2d Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (claims so related as to require dismissal); cf. Miller v. Hall, 536 F.2d 967, 969 (1st Cir. 1976) (accepting review of exhausted claims in mixed petition since such claims were unrelated to unexhausted claims). See generally Casenote, *Total Exhaustion of State Remedies in Habeas Corpus Proceedings,* 24 B.C.L. Rev. 1339, 1341 (1983) (interwoven mixed petition logically requires simultaneous presentation of exhausted and unexhausted claims). Even the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, which advocated total exhaustion, permitted review of the exhausted claims in mixed petitions when the district court had mistakenly considered the exhausted claims, see, e.g., Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1981) (review permitted because district court reached merits of exhausted claim), or when the petitioner provided a reasonable explanation for his failure to exhaust, see *Lundy,* 455 U.S. at 529 n.7 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Casenote, supra, at 1343. *Lundy,* however, required that the "total exhaustion" rule be "rigorously enforced." 455 U.S. at 518.

95 *Lundy,* 455 U.S. at 510. In *Lundy,* the respondent had been convicted by a jury in a Tennessee state court of rape and a crime against nature. Id. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review of the
Court maintained that a total exhaustion requirement would advance both state and federal interests by fostering comity and finality, while providing a more complete factual record for federal review.\(^6\)

The *Lundy* plurality noted that a petitioner who drops an unexhausted claim to proceed with his exhausted claims in federal court might forfeit later federal review of his unexhausted claim under Rule 9(b) of the habeas corpus statute.\(^7\) Rule 9(b) requires

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\(^6\) *Id.* at 511 & n.2. The respondent also was denied relief by the Knox County Criminal Court. *Id.* at 510. Subsequently, the respondent filed a habeas petition in federal district court alleging four grounds of relief, including two that previously had not been exhausted in the Tennessee courts. *See id.* at 511.

\(^7\) *Id.* at 518-19. According to Justice O'Connor, "[a] rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error." *Id.*

The *Lundy* Court determined that the "mixed petition" issue had not been addressed by the statute itself, the legislative history, or pre-statutory case law. *See id.* at 518-17; *Case Note, A Federal District Court Must Dismiss in its Entirety A State Prisoner's Habeas Corpus Petition Containing Both Exhausted and Unexhausted Claims of Constitutional Violations: Rose v. Lundy, 32 Drake L. Rev. 1057, 1059 (1982-1983).* Consequently, the Court based its decision on the policies underlying the exhaustion requirement. *See Lundy, 455 U.S. at 516-20; Casenote, supra note 94, at 1344.*

Even without the "abuse of the writ" sanction, the pro se petitioner who is unaware of his option to amend his petition is at a disadvantage. *See Lundy, 455 U.S. at 530 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a Return to First Principles, 44 Ohio St. L.J. 393, 435 (1983). But cf. *Note, Rose v. Lundy: The Supreme Court Adopts the Total Exhaustion Rule for Review of Mixed Habeas Corpus Petitions, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 859, 879-80 (plurality's discussion of abuse of the writ may result in delay due to broadening of the abuse standard by lower federal courts); Note, Habeas Corpus — Much Ado About Very Little: The Total Exhaustion Rule, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1841, 1648 (1982) (without "abuse of the writ" sanction, policies of total exhaustion rule are undermined since dismissed mixed petition may be refiled through federal courts). The total exhaustion rule permits a petitioner to remove unexhausted claims from a habeas petition to avoid complete dismissal, *see supra* note 94 and accompanying text, while prior to *Lundy*, most lower court judges *sua sponte* dropped the unexhausted claims from the mixed petition, *see supra* note 94. By relinquishing the discretion of the district court judges to remove the claims *sua sponte*, the Court anom-
the dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus when the court finds that
the petitioner has abused the writ by deliberately excluding new
grounds from an earlier petition. The interpretation by the plu-
rality of Rule 9(b) effectively disregards the intent of Congress to
deny only those writs that contain grounds that the petitioner
"knowingly" and "deliberately" avoided in his first petition. Fur-
thermore, by initially refusing plenary review for failure to ex-
haust, and later barring habeas relief under Rule 9(b), the plurality
has created an insurmountable procedural hurdle that precludes
any habeas petitioner who has unwittingly included a meritorious
unexhausted claim in his habeas petition from securing a federal
forum. It is suggested that the purposes of the exhaustion doc-
trine are adequately served by allowing the district courts discre-
tion to consider whether to review some exhausted claims in a
mixed petition. A "total exhaustion" rule, however, impairs fed-
eral-state comity because state courts are compelled to resolve friv-
olous unexhausted claims.

lously assumes that the unwitting pro se petitioner will be aware of his option to amend his
habeas petition to exclude unexhausted claims. Cf. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 530 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (petitioner's opportunity to amend depends on his awareness of this option);
Recent Decision, 21 Duq. L. Rev. 309, 327 (1982) (typical petitioner will be unaware of his
option to amend, thwarting judicial economy). But cf. Yackle, supra, at 434-35 (if judge
advises petitioner, waste of judicial resources may result since petitioner may return to state
court and exhaust frivolous claims).

98 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b) (1982). Rule 9(b) provides, in pertinent part:
"A second or successive petition may be dismissed if . . . new and different
grounds are alleged, [and] the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to as-
sert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.
Id.

99 Lundy, 455 U.S. at 533-36 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b) advisory committee note (1982) (quoting Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1963)) ("if a prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds
for federal collateral relief" from his first petition, he may be deemed to have violated rule
will be denied habeas relief only when state procedures have been deliberately bypassed).
See generally Note, Rose v. Lundy and Rule 9(b): Will the Court Abuse the Great Writ?, 49
Brooklyn L. Rev. 335, 352 & n.101 (1982) (Sanders Court adopted deliberate bypass stan-
dard of Fay).

100 Cf. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 529-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (total exhaustion require-
ment will "trap the unwary pro se prisoner . . . whose only aim is to secure a new trial or
release from prison").

101 See id. at 523-24 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Note, Federal Habeas Corpus: The
Exhaustion Doctrine and Mixed Petitions—Rose v. Lundy and "Exhaustion" Under the
391, 438 (1963) (federal judges hearing habeas claims have implicit discretion to deny relief
when petitioner deliberately bypassed state procedure).

102 Lundy, 455 U.S. at 525 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d
In an effort to mitigate the harshness of the rule, some lower federal courts have carved exceptions to the total exhaustion requirement. For example, a federal court may review a mixed petition on the merits when the unexhausted claim is frivolous and would require "exhaustion of a nullity." In addition, a mixed petition may be reviewed when state law renders the return of the state claim to the state court futile because the substance of the unexhausted claim has been specifically reviewed and rejected by the state court. Indeed, a district court generally may dismiss any unexhausted claim on the ground that it is highly unlikely to provide relief to the petitioner.

A minority of the circuits has attempted to alleviate the effect of the total exhaustion rule by conducting plenary review of exhausted claims in a mixed petition when the state explicitly waives a habeas petitioner's failure to exhaust all claims. These circuits

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104 See Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 1050, 1054 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 980 (1984). In Haggins, the court decided a mixed petition case on the merits because the equal protection claim that the defendant advanced was "patently frivolous." Id.

105 See Hawkins v. West, 706 F.2d 437, 440-41 (2d Cir. 1983) (useless to send claim back to state court when federal claim yields same result); Williams v. Holbrook, 691 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1982) (exhaustion requirement satisfied when substance of claims brought before state and federal court are the same, even though federal claims might be somewhat reformulated); see also Matlock v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1984) (when state courts foreclose corrective process, returning unexhausted claim to state court furthers no state interest, thus undermining reasons for Lundy "total exhaustion" rule); Beaty v. Patton, 700 F.2d 110, 112 (3d Cir. 1983) (dismissal for exhaustion is unnecessary when attempt to invoke state procedure would be futile); Zelenka v. Israel, 699 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1983) (exhaustion requirement is waived when state court has held adversely to petitioner's argument in other cases); cf. Perry v. Fairman, 702 F.2d 119, 121 (7th Cir. 1983) (petition should be dismissed for failure to exhaust only if there is "near certainty" that state court will entertain claim in question).


107 See, e.g., Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (state, through attorney general, can wave exhaustion), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2180 (1984); Sweezy v. Garrison, 694 F.2d 331, 333 (4th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (attorney general unconditionally waived exhaustion request), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 908 (1983); cf. Lacy v. Gabriel, 732 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir.) (habeas petition cannot be invalidated if state raises unexhausted
contend that permitting a state to waive its right of initial review furthers the goals of comity, finality, and conservation of judicial resources. Incidental to the waiver doctrine, some circuit courts also have permitted the continuance of an action pending a determination of the unexhausted claims in the state court, thereby granting the state court discretion to review the unexhausted claims on the merits or waive initial jurisdiction.

Thus, by creating extensive exceptions to Lundy, the circuits have grappled with the inflexibility of the total exhaustion requirement. Through these exceptions, the circuits not only have cast doubt on the propriety of the Lundy rule, but also have paved the way for its inevitable overruling. Clearly, an approach allowing the district courts some discretion is preferable to a per se rule requiring the dismissal of all claims in a mixed petition. In an


108 See McGee v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 1206, 1210-11, 1214 (6th Cir. 1984); Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1505-06 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2180 (1984); see also Felder v. Estelle, 693 F.2d 549, 554 (5th Cir. 1982) (permitting state waiver because exhaustion is a matter of comity). But see Naranjo v. Ricketts, 696 F.2d 83, 86-87 (10th Cir. 1982) (state waiver not dispositive of exhaustion issue). The McGee and Thompson courts found indirect support for the state waiver doctrine from abstention cases such as Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977), in which the Court held that the waiver of the Younger abstention doctrine was permissible when the state voluntarily submits to a federal forum, id. at 479-80; see McGee, 722 F.2d at 1211; Thompson, 714 F.2d at 1503; see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (federal courts should abstain from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances).

109 Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1499-1500, 1504-05 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2180 (1984); Collins v. Lockhart, 707 F.2d 341, 344 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc); see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 526 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring). The goals of Lundy—comity, maximization of judicial resources, and prevention of delay—are fostered by continuance. Thompson, 714 F.2d at 1499. Furthermore, continuance is not explicitly precluded by Lundy. Id.

110 See supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.

111 See, e.g., Hall v. Iowa, 705 F.2d 286-87 (8th Cir.) (Lundy confined to federal claims; federal district court may hear mixed petition when unexhausted state claims present no issue of constitutional relevance), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 339 (1983); cf. Recent Decision, supra note 97, at 328 (durability of Lundy is questionable since decision was based on inaccurate statutory interpretation). Precedent does not require adherence to the total exhaustion requirement. Lundy, 456 U.S. at 523-24 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519-20 (1972) (Court reviewed exhausted claim despite mixed petition); Picard v. O'Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (exhaustion requirement satisfied if claim has been fully and fairly presented to state court).

112 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
effort to devise procedural barriers that discourage pro se petitioners from litigating their habeas claims, the Supreme Court risks damaging federal-state comity and wasting judicial resources. A district court judge should be able to dismiss a futile or frivolous unexhausted claim in the interest of judicial economy, and, more importantly, should be able to provide the petitioner with speedy relief under the habeas corpus statute. When a mixed petition contains meritorious unexhausted claims interwoven with exhausted claims, continuance provides both ample deference to state courts and a federal forum in which all the habeas petitioner’s constitutional claims may be consolidated. Furthermore, it is submitted that continuance circumscribes the possibility of an abuse of the writ sanction by preserving the original habeas petition.

SYNTHESIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S JURISDICTIONAL POSTURE

The federal interest theory of jurisdiction recognizes a broad power in Congress, under article III, to create federal jurisdiction whenever a potential federal issue exists. To preserve federal ju-

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113 See Matlock v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1984); Yackle, supra note 97, at 435.

114 See Matlock v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1984) (futility doctrine furthers federal judicial economy); Recent Decision, supra note 97, at 327 (discretion promotes judicial economy by avoiding summary review of all petitions for unexhausted claims); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963) (discretion provides flexibility to avoid illogical jurisdictional bars); Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1505-06 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (waiver fosters comity and finality), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2180 (1984).

115 See Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (continuance permits all of petitioner’s claims to be heard at once), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2180 (1984); Collins v. Lockhart, 707 F.2d 341, 344 (8th Cir. 1983) (case held in abeyance, as a matter of comity, so that state court could litigate unexhausted claim); M. REDISH, supra note 6, at 219 (continuance does not disturb state court judgment).

116 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.

117 See M. REDISH, supra note 6, at 56; see also Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp. Probs. 216, 224 (1948) (Congress’ greater power to legislate includes lesser power to confer federal jurisdiction). The federal interest theory derives from Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); see M. REDISH, supra note 6, at 54-57; C. WRIGHT, supra note 44, § 20, at 111. An expansive interpretation of Osborn recognizes a potential for federal jurisdiction over any case involving even a remote federal issue, provided that Congress enacts a jurisdictional statute. See M. REDISH, supra note 6, at 56. But cf. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 187-88 (1953) (limiting Osborn to those cases involving pre-existing federal interests or instrumentalties). Even those who object to jurisdiction based on the expansive interpretation have recognized that such an interpretation is valid. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 471 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 826 (2d Cir.
dicial resources for those cases involving significant federal interests and to promote comity, the federal courts have maintained a policy of judicial restraint with regard to some types of cases that technically are within the realm of federal jurisdiction, but do not present an important federal question.\(^{118}\) When Congress specifically has recognized a significant federal interest and has authorized federal jurisdiction, discretionary policies of judicial restraint and comity are overridden.\(^{119}\)

The habeas corpus statute, by offering fresh factfinding in a federal district court in addition to ordinary appellate review, demonstrates a recognition by Congress that the availability of a federal remedial process above and beyond certiorari review will help protect the important federal interest of redressing the unconstitutional incarceration of state prisoners.\(^{120}\) Conversely, the adequate and independent state ground doctrine, as traditionally applied,

\(^{118}\) See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (no federal injunctions against state criminal prosecutions absent extraordinary circumstances); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941) (federal courts to recognize state independence by exercising discretion in asserting jurisdiction); cf. M. Redish, supra note 6, at 216-17 (the adequate and independent state ground doctrine prevents advisory opinions and fosters comity).

\(^{119}\) See Mishkin, supra note 117, at 192 ("where there is an articulated and active federal policy regulating a field," article III permits broad federal jurisdiction); cf. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1964) (noting importance of federal jurisdiction when statute provides for fresh factfinding); H.J. Friendly, supra note 28, at 95 (strength of federal interest is an important determinant regarding whether federal courts should abstain). If federal law creates a duty and a remedy, federal jurisdiction usually will be found. See C. Wright, supra note 44, § 17, at 95. Even when a federal statute provides a duty without a remedy, a private cause of action may be implied in a federal forum. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1979) (right of action in federal court may be implied from Congressional intent even though face of statute authorizes no remedy); see also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979) (Court will imply cause of action when remedy would accomplish underlying purpose of statute). The Court's ability to imply remedies derives from Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 824 (1824) (when there is a right, a remedy must be available).

demonstrated a recognition by the Court that when a state court renders a decision on the basis of both the state and federal constitutions, and Congress has not expressly conferred federal jurisdiction, the federal interest involved is correspondingly weak. The Supreme Court has deferred to state court resolution of questions of state law tangentially involving inchoate federal constitutional issues. The Burger Court, however, has extended the federal interest doctrine past its outermost limit by reviewing state cases that involve only a potential misconstruction of federal law. Therefore, by constricting habeas relief while expanding appellate review over ambiguously grounded state cases, the Burger Court has refused to recognize a strong federal interest expressly stated by Congress, while creating jurisdiction when Congress has been silent and the federal interests involved are weak.

121 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
122 See C. Wright, supra note 44, § 7, at 22; cf. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3490 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (sound management of scarce judicial resources counsels policy of judicial restraint); H.J. Friendly, supra note 28, at 93 (federal court should abstain from interpreting state statutes that have not yet been construed by state courts).
123 Even the most expansive interpretations of Osborn recognize that Congress must act pursuant to article III to establish jurisdiction over potential federal questions. See M. Redish, supra note 6, at 55-56; cf. Note, The Outer Limits of “Arising Under,” 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 978, 986 n.5 (1979) (Osborn rejects power in excess of jurisdiction).
124 See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (1983). Through the holding in Long, the Supreme Court authorized itself to accept appellate jurisdiction over state cases whenever the state court has not clearly indicated that its opinion was based on state law. Id. This elusive jurisdictional posture permits the Court to hear state cases even when no federal right has been denied. See id. at 3490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court, almost exclusively, has invoked the Long presumption of jurisdiction when the state court has safeguarded an individual more protectively than the federal Constitution would require. See Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1855 (1984); cf. L. Baum, The Supreme Court 90 (1981) (screening process by Burger Court in criminal cases reflects pattern of accepting cases primarily brought by prosecutors).
125 See Comment, supra note 13, at 1099 (Supreme Court has reduced access to lower courts while increasing oversight of state supreme courts).
126 Compare Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3474 (1983) (claim of state heard on the merits although there was no denial of federal constitutional right) with Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110 (1982) (plenary review of unconstitutional imprisonment denied due to procedural default) and Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982) (procedural default precludes review). The federal interest doctrine mandates broad access to a federal forum in the area of habeas corpus because significant federal interests are at stake. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text. The doctrine is violated when the Supreme Court assumes jurisdiction of state cases in which there is only a possibility of a misconstruction of federal law and clarification from the state court is warranted. See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text. Furthermore, every state case brought to a federal court under the habeas corpus statute asserts a violation of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982) (petition must contend...
A common ground for the creation of federal jurisdiction is the fear that states will not provide a neutral forum that adequately protects the rights of litigants. A constitutional example of such "protective jurisdiction" is the provision for diversity jurisdiction in article III. The same protective theory also underlies both the habeas corpus statute and the appellate jurisdiction statute under which cases involving adequate and independent state grounds may be reviewed.

The 1867 amendments to the habeas corpus laws reflect a Congressional concern that state court judges would not adequately protect the federal constitutional rights of state prisoners and criminal defendants. The Burger Court, however, by creating excessive procedural barriers that reduce the availability of habeas
review, has subverted the intent of Congress and has relied on untenured state court judges to monitor state criminal proceedings and executive activity for federal constitutional violations.\textsuperscript{122} Similarly, in enacting section 1257 of the Judiciary Code, Congress intended to permit Supreme Court appellate review of state decisions only when the state clearly impinged on some recognizable federally created right.\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Michigan v. Long} and its progeny, however, authorize a discretionary posture that permits review of state cases whether or not a federal right has been denied.\textsuperscript{124} If the Supreme Court accepts for review a case that does not involve the denial of a federal right, federal protective jurisdiction is being exercised when such protection is unnecessary.\textsuperscript{125} Thus, the Court is risking unauthorized interference into state constitutional lawmaking.\textsuperscript{126}

The Burger Court repeatedly has stressed the importance of comity, finality of decisions, and the maximization of judicial resources.\textsuperscript{127} Yet, in both the areas of habeas corpus and adequate

\textsuperscript{122} See Neuborne, \textit{The Myth of Parity}, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1127-31 (1977). Federal judges, because of their life tenure and salary security, are excellent protectors of federal constitutional rights. See Bator, supra note 3, at 623; Neuborne, supra, at 1127-30. Conversely, state court judges, subject to partisan pressures, are less likely to protect individual rights. See Bator, supra note 3, at 623.

\textsuperscript{123} See supra notes 38 and 126. To establish appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, a state petitioner must satisfy one of the qualifications of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982). When a federal right is denied, a state petitioner can appeal to the Supreme Court if a federal treaty, statute, or constitutional provision has been explicitly invalidated. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1)-(2) (1982). Additionally, a state claimant may petition for a writ of certiorari when any right is “specially set up or claimed under the Constitution. . . .” Id. § 1257(3). Thus, Congress has not only refused to authorize appellate jurisdiction for potential federal questions, but also has specifically limited appellate jurisdiction to recognizable federal issues. See C. Wright, supra note 44, § 107, at 743 (federal question necessary to invoke Supreme Court jurisdiction under § 1257).

\textsuperscript{124} See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{125} See Comment, supra note 13, at 1101.

\textsuperscript{126} See Brennan, \textit{State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights}, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 498 (1977); Kelman, supra note 25, at 414; Wilkes, supra note 25, at 433-34.

\textsuperscript{127} See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3475-76 (1983); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982); Comment, supra note 86, at 203. Justice Powell suggested that expansive habeas corpus relief is antithetical to the following values:

(i) the most effective utilization of limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded.

and independent state grounds, the Burger Court’s jurisdictional mandates portend the diminution of these goals. The Long policy of permitting review on the merits, even though an adequate and independent state ground may exist, engenders a waste of judicial resources because of the high risk of advisory opinions, harms federal-state comity through intrusion into state constitutional lawmaking, and prevents finality, since the state court, on remand, must review the case on the merits for the second time.

In the habeas corpus arena, the Lundy total exhaustion rule hinders comity and wastes state judicial resources by requiring the exhaustion of even frivolous state claims and prevents finality when unexhausted claims are returned to the state courts only to be taken back through the federal system at a later date. In addition, since an attorney’s failure to assert a plausible claim does not satisfy the “cause” arm of the Sykes “cause and prejudice” standard, attorneys will advance every possible constitutional claim.

See infra notes 139-144 and accompanying text.

See Comment, supra note 13, at 1095; supra note 26 and accompanying text.

See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3492 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 13, at 1096.

See, e.g., State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425, 426 (S.D. 1984) (Court reversed and remanded case to state court); see Comment, supra note 13, at 1093; cf. H.J. Friendly, supra note 28, at 98 (federal court should abstain from interpreting unclear state law because subsequent, conflicting construction by state courts will render federal decision “futile and unnecessary”).

See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 524-25 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“total exhaustion” rule may cause unnecessary adjudications by state and federal courts); Casenote, supra note 94, at 1356 (“total exhaustion” rule will increase burden on federal judges); see also McGee v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 1206, 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1984) (comity is undermined when state court must endure expense and delay of reviewing unexhausted state claim that must ultimately be decided in federal forum); Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1505-06 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (“total exhaustion” rule could delay finality), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2810 (1984); Yackle, supra note 97, at 435 (if ignorant habeas claimant made aware of his options, he may return to state court to exhaust claims and then petition for habeas relief again in federal court).

The ever increasing number of federal cases has been a constant concern of the Supreme Court. See J. Grossman & R. Wells, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 212 (2d ed. 1980); Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1191, 1203 & n.74 (1977). However, the impact of habeas petitions on the docket has been exaggerated because the size of the federal judiciary has grown and the percentage of time that federal judges spend on habeas corpus petitions is minimal. Comment, supra note 46, at 1632-33; see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1983) (In 1983, 241,842 cases were filed in the federal district courts, but only 8,532 were habeas petitions by state prisoners); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1982) (delegating some district court functions to magistrates). More importantly, cutting back on constitutional guarantees to preserve judicial resources is a “dangerous tool” for relieving overloaded dockets. See Brennan, supra note 136, at 498.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION thereby impinging on state judicial resources and impairing comity and finality by burdening state courts with excessive, possibly meritless federal constitutional claims.\textsuperscript{143} Thus, the Burger Court's attempts to achieve the goals of comity, finality, and judicial economy through decisions in the areas of habeas corpus and ambiguously grounded state cases have not only resulted in virtual judicial amendments to the congressional statutes conferring jurisdiction in these areas, but actually have undercut the policies the Court purports to promote.\textsuperscript{144}

CONCLUSION

It is submitted that recent Supreme Court jurisdictional decisions in the areas of habeas corpus and adequate and independent state grounds have failed to maximize federal judicial power, and may adversely affect the legitimacy of the Court as an institution. To counteract the immediate and long-term ill effects of these recent pronouncements, this Note has advocated that the Long doctrine be replaced by a balancing of state and federal interests that will reduce the opportunities for the Court to infringe on state constitutional lawmaking in the guise of correcting misapprehensions of federal law. In addition, the Note has proposed the abolition of the Sykes "cause and prejudice" standard and the reinstatement of the Fay v. Noia "deliberate bypass" test, coupled in certain circumstances with a showing of fundamental unfairness. Finally, this Note has suggested that post-Lundy decisions by lower federal courts demonstrate the unworkability of the "total exhaustion" rule, and has recommended that these lower courts be re-endowed with the discretion to determine compliance with the exhaustion requirement in deciding whether to review mixed habeas petitions.

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\textsuperscript{143} See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. Considerations of finality should not undermine the goal of vindicating an individual who has been unjustly imprisoned. See Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2910 (1984); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963); Comment, supra note 46, at 1634. Since only a minimal percentage of state convicts petition for habeas corpus, and the actual percentage who actually attain relief is even less, the importance of finality has been exaggerated. See Comment, supra note 46, at 1633.

\textsuperscript{144} See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 503-06 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 86, at 204. Nothing in Article III grants the Supreme Court the power to legislate. See U.S. Const. art. III. Congress alone was vested with the lawmaking powers of the government and has the sole authority to amend its own laws. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; cf. Saltzburg, supra note 52, at 368 (Congress should determine policy objectives in habeas area).