The Supreme Court and Political Questions (Book Review)

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limit such deductions is virtually to tax gross income or gross receipts and
this is unconstitutional, in the author's opinion. All deductions must be allowed
to arrive at net income. Today states refuse to allow a deduction for federal
income taxes paid or state income taxes paid. Many states refuse to allow
deductions for actual losses, etc.

The author's presentation of his thesis is made with much vigor and
passion. He is profoundly disturbed by what he feels is an unconstitutional
usurpation of power on the part of state legislatures. To quote the author,
"The action of the legislative or executive branches which conflicts with the
limitations (as the author sees them) in the Constitution is void, even though
it is action which would advance social justice." This quotation indicates a
positive point of view, one that the reader will sense throughout the book. It
presents a vital issue that has been clamoring for solution during the past
ten years.

Certainly this book has done much to help by analyzing the principles
which govern and control the taxing power of the Government of the United
States and the governments of the several states. In an attempt to solve the
larger problem of advancing social justice, such an analysis must be a starting
point.

BENJAMIN HARROW.*

THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS. By Charles G. Post, Jr.,

The primary object of the Constitutional Convention was to create and
establish a strong Federal Government. To this end, the first three Articles
of the Constitution provide that the legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress; the executive power shall be vested in the President; and the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and such other inferior
courts as the Congress shall ordain and establish. This separation of powers
has been consistently recognized throughout our history. The framers realized
that an absolute demarcation was neither possible nor desirable. Express pro-
vision was made for the exercise of a power by one department which would
ordinarily vest in another. For example, the President might exercise the
power of vetoing legislation; the Congress might sit as a court of impeachment;
and the courts might promulgate rules for their practice and procedure. In the
development of our Constitutional Law many other instances may be cited
where it is recognized that one of the branches of government may act in
respect to a matter that belongs within the jurisdiction of another branch. To
cite but one example, the Constitution provides that Congress has power to
regulate commerce among the several states. Congress may pass a general law
on this subject leaving to an administrative board or to the Executive Depart-
ment the power to carry out the details. "The filling in of details" has never

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been regarded as wrongful delegation, although the principle of separation is fully recognized. However, where there appears to be a clear violation of the principle, the action cannot be sustained. We need only to refer to the many recent decisions of the Supreme Court concerning the New Deal legislation to appreciate that the principle stated is most important and vital. In respect to the exercise of the judicial power, the Court, of necessity, must be its sole judge. From the beginning the Court has never hesitated to refuse to act in a matter that clearly belongs either to the legislative or executive branches, and it is to be expected that it will so continue to act in the future. As in the past, these matters will probably be classified by the Court as "political questions" belonging properly to one or the other departments. When such decisions are made, imaginative minds will immediately contend that such a determination destroys the duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution.

The author, as the title to his work implies, has made a study of this question as he states, "to observe the doctrine of political questions, as it were, in action; to note the consequences when the court enshrouded a question in the folds of this doctrine and finally, to discover the motives of jurists in so placing a problem within the category of political questions and then accepting the decision of the political departments". The setting is enveloped in mystery from which one may anticipate discoveries. It is a revelation which results from a peek behind the judicial robes, showing the motives of the judge who has the temerity to dispose of a question political rather than justiciable in nature. And so the author's study begins with an examination of all the types of cases that have been disposed of under this principle. There is the case of Luther v. Borden arising out of Dorr's rebellion, where the Court refused to determine which of two contending governments within the state was the de jure government; Pacific States Co. v. Oregon, where the Court refused to pass upon the question whether in adopting the initiative and referendum, a state ceased to be republican in form. In both instances the Court was of the opinion that the questions presented were not justiciable but rather political and properly belonging to the Legislative Department, and, therefore, refused to assume jurisdiction. Then there are cited and explained by the author other cases arising under the Reconstruction Acts; the status of Indian tribes; treaties with foreign powers; and the relation of the United States with foreign countries, particularly in reference to the declaration and termination of hostilities. In making this review the author is able to answer the first of two questions propounded by him in his study, to wit: What are the consequences that result from such decisions? His answer is that the Court refuses to assume jurisdiction. As this is axiomatic it is submitted that so elaborate a demonstration is hardly necessary.

The remainder of the study is devoted to answering his second question, which is: What gives rise to the utilization of the concept? Fortunately for the reader the question is reduced to simple terms by the inquiry as to what causes the jurist to place a particular problem in the category of political questions? It is with trepidation that the author gives his answer for, indeed,
the answer will reveal the important discoveries to be made. The motives of
the Court are to be found. To the author it is not enough that the doctrine
of separation of powers clearly explains the Court's decision; it is not enough
that in their nature these political questions must, in their final decision, lie
with the electorate; it is not enough that there are no rules conferring jurisdiction
upon the Court. These theories are discarded as unrealistic, false, and doc-
trinaire. The real reasons, argues the author, for the Court's establishing
political questions as a category, are expediency, social or economic policy, and
in some instances a realization that a decision would not be enforced by the
Executive or recognized by the states. In *Luther v. Borden,* Dorr, with his
rebellion, had caused enough rumpus; and wise discretion required that further
disputes should be determined by the legislature rather than the judiciary. In
brief, there are times when expediency requires the Court to accept as final the
determination of the political departments that black is white. Those who
recall the unanimous decision of our Supreme Court in the *Schechter case,* and
who appreciate how easy it might have been on the ground of expediency for
the Court to refuse jurisdiction, would hesitate to accept the conclusions of
the author.

The "discoveries" made in this study were made about a decade ago by
Professor Maurice Finkelstein. His article appeared in the Harvard Law
Review, under the title of "Judicial Self-Limitation." A scholarly reply to
this article appeared in a later issue of the Harvard Law Review, written
by Mr. Melville F. Weston. It is unfortunate that the author, having included in
his study a bibliography of about seventy-five writers, has omitted Professor
Finkelstein's article, although he has included Mr. Weston's reply thereto.

WILLIAM TAPLEY.*

**SCIENTIFIC TAX REDUCTION.** By Howe P. Cochran. New York: Funk &

It is not surprising that in the past year an unusual number of able and
interesting books have been presented to the public as an aid to an enlightened
discussion of specific tax laws or of the general aching problem of taxation.
After twenty-four years of experience with the Federal Income Tax law,
twenty-one years of administering a Federal Estate Tax law, and seven years
of playing hide-and-go-seek with a Federal Gift Tax law, the taxpayer at last
is confronted with a book that he can read as he runs. The author of *Scientific
Tax Reduction* is a born story teller and the art of telling stories is, like
literature, as old as the human race. *Scientific Tax Reduction* reads like a

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*See note 1, supra.
+Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837
(1935).
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