Ronald Turner

Document Type




This Article focuses on judicial lawmaking and policymaking in an important area of antidiscrimination law—Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s regulatory regime. As enacted in 1964, Title VII only prohibited intentional employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The statute requires a finding that an employer “has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint.” “[Such] ‘disparate treatment’ . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others . . . . Proof of discriminatory motive is critical . . . .” Thereafter, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the United States Supreme Court held that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” Title VII claims alleging such “ ‘disparate impact’ . . . involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.” The Court held, “Proof of discriminatory motive . . . is not required under a disparate-impact theory.”



To view the content in your browser, please download Adobe Reader or, alternately,
you may Download the file to your hard drive.

NOTE: The latest versions of Adobe Reader do not support viewing PDF files within Firefox on Mac OS and if you are using a modern (Intel) Mac, there is no official plugin for viewing PDF files within the browser window.