This Note argues that § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA permits disparate impact claims for job applicants, despite the revised holding of the Eleventh Circuit. First, the plain meaning of § 4(a)(2) strongly suggests that disparate impact protections lie for job seekers, in contrast to the Eleventh Circuit’s ultimate finding. This argument draws on a close textual and structural analysis of the ADEA, supplemented with a comparative analysis to Title VII. Furthermore, this Note unpacks the legal arguments surrounding the 1972 amendment to Title VII, demonstrating that the absence of the “applicants for employment” language from § 4(a)(2) does not restrict the scope of disparate impact theory to current employees under the ADEA. This reflects the robust case law to suggest otherwise, as well as the practical limitations of the congressional override amendment as a legislative device, which evidences very little if any congressional intent to distinguish between closely related statutes.