Home > Journals > St. John's Law Review > Vol. 85 > No. 3
Document Type
Note
Abstract
(Excerpt)
This Note argues that the new requirements imposed by New York's amended adverse possession statute are being unconstitutionally applied retrospectively to vested property rights, thereby divesting individuals of their property without just compensation. Part I outlines the history of adverse possession and the status of the law in New York today. Part II exposes the issues in applying the amended statutes by looking at how recent New York State Supreme Court and Appellate Division cases have interpreted section 9. Part III analyzes the issues raised by the retrospective application of the amended statute through statutory construction and a discussion of the policies behind adverse possession. This Part will also demonstrate how the indefinite expansion of the limitations period for adverse possession-as permitted by the literal interpretation of section 9-abrogates substantive rights as well as procedural remedies. Consequently, the limitations period for adverse possession is distinct from purely procedural statutes of limitations that have been revived and upheld by New York as constitutional. Lastly, this Part will argue that retrospective application of the amended laws to vested property rights violates the Fourteenth Amendment as an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. Part IV proposes three solutions: (1) the New York Court of Appeals hears and decides a case on point, setting the requisite precedent; (2) the legislature modifies the language of section 9 to prohibit the retrospective application of the amended statutes to niche possessors; or (3) New York justly compensates niche possessors divested of their property in this manner with the fair market value of their property at the time of divestment.