Home > Journals > St. John's Law Review > Vol. 88 > No. 4
Document Type
Note
Abstract
(Excerpt)
This Note argues that courts should interpret § 1325(c) as applicable to anyone who enters a marriage with any intent of evading immigration laws, regardless of any other underlying motivations. Part I examines the motivations for and prevalence of immigration marriage fraud, as well as the historical context in which the statute in question was drafted. Part II analyzes the unsettled landscape of § 1325(c)'s interpretation and application, in addition to the competing arguments for the respective tests. Part III argues for the universal adoption of the Evade the Law standard, premised on the need for plain meaning statutory interpretation and the imprudence of creating textually unsupported statutory exceptions. Additionally, this argument details several policy considerations, centered on congressional intent and enforcement challenges, which support the adoption of the Evade the Law standard. Part IV concludes by calling for Supreme Court action on this split or, in the alternative, legislative measures that Congress can undertake to settle this question of statutory interpretation.