Document Type
Article
Publication Title
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Publication Date
Fall 1982
Volume
1
First Page
15
Abstract
(Excerpt)
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted as part of a larger package of federal legislation aimed at redressing the wrongs of past discrimination and at preventing future transgressions against members of identified groups—most notably racial minorities. This title of the Act—prohibiting discrimination based upon race, color, or national origin in federally assisted programs or activities—has been relied upon by private individuals and administrative agencies to remedy discrimination in education, employment, housing, and more recently in health care and other municipal services. As a discrimination statute, Title VI draws its congressional enactment authority from section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. As this is a statute conditioning receipt of federal funds upon compliance with federal statutory and administrative directives, congressional power is derived from Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, commonly known as the "Spending Clause," which provides that "Congress shall have Power to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States….”
A recent split of judicial authority resulting from the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke has placed the broad-based utility of Title VI in serious question. In Bakke, five of the Justices held that Title VI is "coterminous" with the Fourteenth Amendment, that is, that Title VI proscribes only those racial classifications that are proscribed by the Constitution. This so-called "doctrine of coextensiveness" has left the lower courts to grapple with the issue of whether Title VI mandates the constitutional standard of proof of discriminatory intent as enunciated by the Court in Washington v. Davis, or merely that of disproportionate impact as utilized by the courts in employment discrimination cases brought under Title VII. Prior to Bakke, the leading precedent on the standard of proof in Title VI cases was Lau v. Nichols, in which the Court applied an effects standard. The question now remaining is whether Bakke overruled Lau, that is, whether discriminatory intent rather than mere disproportionate impact is required to establish a prima facie Title VI case based upon a facially neutral policy having a disparate racial impact.
Comments
Available at: https://uclawconstitutionalquarterly.com/vol1-15