Keith J. Larson

Document Type




While there is a vast body of literature contemplating the impact term limits might have on the lawmaking process, little attention has been focused on why lawmakers would decide to back passage of this procedural tool. And yet this is the pivotal question, given that Congress is the only legislative body authorized to send a proposed constitutional amendment to the states for ratification. This Article attempts to fill this gap in the literature. Using public choice theory and empirical data, this Article develops a model that allows us to better predict when, if ever, members of Congress might act to pass a proposed term limits constitutional amendment.



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