The Error in Applying the Language Conduit-Agency Theory to Interpreters Under the Confrontation Clause

Authors

Gregory J. Klubok

Document Type

Note

Abstract

(Excerpt)

Part I of this Note explains the origins of the Confrontation Clause and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the topic. Part II of this Note explains the current split of authority among the United States Courts of Appeals on whether interpreters who translate at police interrogations are subject to the Confrontation Clause. Part III of this Note explains why the language conduit-agency theory is inherently incompatible with the Confrontation Clause and why the government should have to call the interpreter who translated a defendant’s statements at a police interrogation to the stand if it wants to introduce the interpreter’s statements into evidence. Finally, Part IV explains how prosecutors can use interpreters at interrogations without running afoul of the Confrontation Clause.