Bend, Don’t Break: Promoting Interagency Collaboration to Enhance Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool

Authors

Carson Sugg

Document Type

Note

Abstract

(Excerpt)

The U.S. government’s sanctions measures and related enforcement actions for violations are ascending to new levels— both in number and scope. The Executive branch contends that additional authority is necessary to adequately undertake these initiatives, which are a response to proliferating exigent global situations. The requests face opposition from members of Congress and legal scholars, who argue that the current sanctions regime disproportionally favors the Executive at a cost to both individuals and the co-equal branches. The push and pull of these stances suggest that a review of the current regime is due.

This Note argues that economic sanctions are—and can continue to be—an effective means of achieving U.S. foreign policy interests when pursued strategically through joint efforts of the Treasury and Justice Departments. An intra-agency approach, like the one that is currently in place, provides the Executive with enough authority in the nation’s security arena, while not subverting constitutional protections for individuals.

Part I provides a brief overview of the development of the Executive’s national security powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) and the proliferation of sanctions programs created pursuant to it. Part II compares the Treasury’s use of sanctions and asset blocking mechanisms with the DOJ’s asset forfeiture response to sanctions violations. Part III rebuts suggestions that the Executive’s existing powers should be augmented either by an expansion of IEEPA or with new standalone authority. Further, Part III argues that forfeiture actions enhance the effectiveness of the Treasury’s sanctions programs, thus furthering U.S. foreign policy interests while providing potential targets with the ability to effectively assert legal challenges.