Home > Journals > St. John's Law Review > Vol. 98 > No. 2
Document Type
Note
Abstract
(Excerpt)
This Note argues that although the introduction of additional criteria of analysis of a merger on the labor market is positive for consumers, workers, employees, and the overall public, the 2023 Guidelines insufficiently balance the effects of a merger for both workers and consumers and fail to consider all relevant factors within the labor market, such as inflation rates and distinguishing between wage and non-wage benefits. Instead, the 2023 Guidelines should balance the implications for each interested group to provide a more accurate decision as to the merits of a merger.
Part I of this Note will provide background on the Merger Guidelines generally. Specifically, this Part will address key merger legislation, the ends each statute sought to address, and how case law like Brown Shoe Co. v. United States provided an outline for the first Merger Guidelines in 1968. Part II will detail the evolution of the Merger Guidelines, closely considering societal and political influences, in addition to historical precedent. Part III will address the relevant criteria under the 2023 Merger Guidelines by the Biden Administration and how that has differed from past versions. Part IV will consider the impact of the 2023 Guidelines on the labor market.
Finally, Part V of this Note will argue that the 2023 Guidelines fail to consider all interested parties to a merger and, instead, place an unequal emphasis on the labor market while failing to include all relevant factors in their analysis of this market. Instead, a balancing test considering non-wage benefits, inflation, and other market-related factors that are not included in the 2023 Guidelines, as well as the relation to the negative effects of the labor market, should be weighed against the potential procompetitive benefits for all markets.
