There's Not Enough Cement and Too Much Air in That Concrete: Addressing the Weakness of the Supreme Court's Concrete Injury Analysis

Authors

Sidney Balaban

Document Type

Note

Abstract

(Excerpt)

“Zombie” debt collectors—third-party entities who purchase from creditors and attempt to collect on debts that have passed the statute of limitations periods—have become a particular nuisance and source of distress to the unsuspecting consumer. A serious problem arises in some states, such as Illinois, which allow for the limitations period to restart if the debtor began making payments again or promised to make payments, giving nefarious debt collectors the chance to trick consumers into renewed legal liability—a true zombification. Fortunately, in 1978, Congress passed the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA” or “the Act”) to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors” because “[e]xisting laws and procedures . . . [were] inadequate to protect consumers” from such harms. The FDCPA “imposes requirements on debt collectors to make prescribed disclosures to consumers and to refrain from harassment, abuse, false or misleading representations, and certain specified unfair practices.”

Through the act’s civil suit provision in § 1692k, the FDCPA empowers not only executive agencies but consumers themselves to prosecute violations. Indeed, Congress envisioned that the primary means for enforcement would be private consumer actions. Yet, this citizen suit provision has rapidly begun losing its potency—particularly in cases where claimants allege only intangible, psychological injuries—because of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of standing requirements.